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Chapter 1
Introduction
Regulation is an integral part of well-functioning financial systems (Barth et al. (2004)).
In fact, the financial sector is regulated more than many other sectors because it is
prone to market failures with disastrous consequences, such as bank failures and fi-
nancial crises (Barth et al. (2008)). Also, the institutions and actors of the financial
sector are highly interconnected both within countries and globally. Therefore, they
are susceptible to the spread of market disturbances. As such, financial regulation has
many important functions to fulfill, ranging from addressing contagion and aligning
the incentives of unsophisticated users of financial products and sophisticated sellers
to preventing negative social externalities emanating from costs of failure of a finan-
cial institution being in excess of private costs to the shareholders (Levine (2011)).
However, the consequences of a particular financial regulation may not always
match with the intended policy objectives (Levine (2011)). For example, an impor-
tant stabilizing attribute of financial regulation, deposit insurance, aims to protect
uninsured depositors and reduce the risk of systemic bank runs (Dewatripont and
Tirole (1994); Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). However, deposit insurance faces major
challenges as it fails to restore depositor monitoring of banks and incentivizes banks
to take excessive risk by weakening the link between banks’ default risk and cost of
funding (Kane (1989); Calomiris (1999); Ioannidou and de Dreu (2006)). A deposit in-
surance reform that fails to ensure depositor confidence could still lead to bank runs
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(Martinez-Peria et al. (2001)). Another example comes from the strand of literature
studying the effects of banking deregulation since the mid-1970s in the United States.
Several studies have shown that interstate branching deregulation accelerated state-
level economic growth (Jayaratne and Strahan (1996)) and reduced poverty (Beck et al.
(2010)), while others pointed to deregulation episodes being associated with higher
wage inequality (Jerzmanowski and Nabar (2013)).
This dissertation presents three chapters that explore the effects of selected finan-
cial reforms and regulations on financial intermediation as well as the real effects of
bank failures in a highly deregulated banking environment. Chapter 2 concerns the
effects of deposit insurance in banking systems where Islamic and conventional banks
operate side by side. It looks at the depositors’ deposit supply and disciplining be-
havior in six banking systems after the announcement of a split of deposit insurance
administration between Islamic and conventional banks promoted in the aftermath of
the 2008 financial crisis to restore depositor confidence. This regulatory intervention
allows Islamic banks to be covered by a Sharia-compliant deposit insurance scheme.
The chapter sheds light on how banking reforms shape depositors’ financial decision
making and sensitivity to financial risk. Chapter 3, unlike the other chapters, does not
study the effects of a particular banking reform. It rather investigates the effects of
bank failures following a period of high deregulation on wage inequality during the
recent financial crisis in the United States. Finally, Chapter 4 studies how a regulatory
shock (the repeal of Regulation Q in the United States after the crisis) to funding costs
affects banks’ branch networks and geographic diversification. It sheds light on how
banking regulations put in place in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis have
affected bank conduct and strategies. In what follows, I give an overview of each
chapter.
Chapter 2 is titled Religious Incentives in the Deposit Market. It is solely my own
work. In the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision and the International Association of Deposit Insurers urged Is-
lamic banks to adopt a Sharia compliant deposit insurance scheme to align the Islamic
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financial Institutions with their core business models, based on re (IADI, 2014). In ef-
fect, several jurisdictions where Islamic and conventional banks operate side by side
(Bahrain, Jordan, Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia and Turkey) announced separation of
their deposit insurance schemes to allow Islamic banks to have a Sharia administered
deposit insurance fund. I exploit that these regulatory changes happened in a stag-
gered way to explore the role of religion on depositors’ decision making.
I observe that after the announcement of a separate Islamic deposit insurance
scheme, deposit growth increases and deposit return decreases differentially for treated
banks. These results are both statistically and economically significant. The announce-
ment is associated with an approximate 2.8 percentage points increase in deposit
growth and a 0.8 percentage points decrease in deposit return. These results suggest
that the observed effects are supply-driven. Furthermore, these results are robust to
standard error clustering adjusted for a small number of clusters and hold even after
controlling for country dependent and time varying shocks, religiosity and political
governance indicators. I attribute these findings to the fact that Islamic depositors
rewarded their banks after the announcement of a Sharia-compliant scheme due to
reduction of the risk of Sharia noncompliance.
I also find that although bank risk-taking did not significantly change after the sep-
aration announcements, Islamic depositors’ reaction to risk changed. A conventional
deposit insurance scheme covering both Islamic and conventional deposits may face
difficulties in convincing depositors about the Sharia conformity of reimbursed funds
in the event of bank insolvency (Sole (2007); Aysan et al. (2017)). By comparing the de-
gree of disciplining against bank insolvency risk (measured by time-varying Z-score)
before and after the separation announcements, I find that the depositor disciplining
disappears after the announcement of an Islamic deposit insurance scheme.
Overall, my findings indicate that Islamic deposit insurance reforms promoted in
the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis were effective in restoring depositor
confidence (as evidenced by a supply-driven increase in Islamic banks’ deposits) but
hampered depositor disciplining against banks’ financial risk-taking. Alternatively,
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these results can be interpreted as ethical appeals, such as religiosity playing a role in
depositors’ financial decision making and determining depositors’ sensitivity to bank
risk. As such, to my knowledge, this is the first study that examines the effects of
religious branding of financial reforms on non-pecuniary incentives in the financial
markets.
Chapter 3 is titled Bank Failures and Wage Inequality. It is a joint work with
Christopher Martin Hols from the Bonn Graduate School of Economics. The litera-
ture examining the roots and consequences of the correlations between financial dis-
tress and wage inequality has proliferated in the last decade. Beck et al. (2010) and
Jerzmanowski and Nabar (2013) studied the correlation between financial deregula-
tion and income and wage inequality. The former found that deregulation decreased
poverty, whereas the latter showed that deregulation increased wage inequality. How-
ever, to date, there are no studies examining the association between bank failures and
wage inequality. In Chapter 3, we attempt to fill this gap in the literature. In particular,
we investigate the effects of bank failures on wage inequality.
It is important to answer this question because financial distress plays a critical
role in shaping the gaps between the certain segments of the population (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine (2009)). It can influence who can start and run a business and who
cannot, who can afford education and who cannot, and essentially, who can realize
one’s economic desires and ambitions and who cannot. Furthermore, by affecting the
allocation of capital, financial distress can change both the rate of economic growth
and the demand for labor, with potentially big distributional implications (Townsend
and Ueda (2006)).
In Chapter 3, we focus on investigating the effects of bank failures on wage in-
equality between skilled and unskilled workers. We exploit the geographical variation
in bank failures across Public Use Micro-data Areas (PUMA) in the United States. To
that end, we make use of American Community Survey data to elicit demographic
and labor market characteristics of individuals in a repeated cross-section framework.
This enables us to use several multi-way fixed effects that control for all time-varying
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community, sector as well as community and sector differences that capture underly-
ing economic conditions across each industry within a PUMA.
We run multiple Mincerian skill-wage regressions and show for the period of 2008-
2010 that local bank failures explain 6% to 10% of the annual wage gap between
skilled and unskilled workers. Simultaneous consideration of annual work hours,
wages, employment status as well as labor force status of individuals suggests that
the observed effects can be attributed to the labor demand. In particular, communities
with bank failures (relative to unaffected communities) do not incur reductions in
hourly wages for unskilled workers but experience a decline in labor demand through
a reduction in annual working hours for unskilled workers, translating into declines
in annual wages for unskilled workers more than for skilled workers.
In the next step, we identify a unique channel for the decline in labor demand.
Specifically, we exploit the sector-level variation in the use of knowledge-dependent
capital, which we determine by the ratio of intangible capital to overall capital. The
underlying idea is that sectors that rely more on intangible (knowledge-dependent)
capital are expected to have more elastic demand for unskilled workers. At the same
time, these sectors are less able to pledge collateral as sectors relying on tangible cap-
ital. Hence, when credit shocks induced by bank failures hit the economy, relatively
affected sectors (sectors with intangible capital) would shed unskilled labor more so
than unaffected sectors. Our results suggest that the size of the effect bank failures
on the skill premium when the ratio of intangibility to tangibility increases by one
standard deviation from the mean is 4.1% to 8.1%.
These results open up a new channel, bank failures, for the widening of the skill
premium. They also indicate a potential mechanism of how shocks in the financial
markets can be transmitted to labor markets. To our knowledge, we are the first to
show that knowledge-dependent capital matters for the transmission of such shocks
with distributional consequences. Also, we are the first to study the correlation be-
tween bank failures followed by a period of financial deregulation and wage inequal-
ity.
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Chapter 4 is titled The Net Interest Margin and the Branch Network. It is a joint
work with Christopher Martin Hols from the Bonn Graduate School of Economics. It
studies how banks’ funding costs can affect geographical diversification of banks by
exploring the regulatory shock to funding costs in the United States in the aftermath
of the recent financial crisis.
There is extensive literature on how geographical bank branch network diversi-
fication affects banks’ funding costs. Diamond (1984) and Boyd and Prescott (1986)
suggest that geographic diversification can bring additional assets that are imperfectly
correlated with existing assets and this can reduce bank risk and lower funding costs.
Similarly, if banks spread to diverse geographic areas where the economies are im-
perfectly correlated with the bank’s existing local economy, they will be able to use
internal capital markets to respond effectively to local shocks on asset quality and
liquidity (Houston et al. (1997); Houston et al. (1998); Gatev et al. (2009) and Cornett
et al. (2011)). Other studies investigate how geographical bank branch network di-
versification can result in increased funding costs. For example, Brickley et al. (2003)
and Berger et al. (2005) show that distance can make it difficult for bank headquarters
to monitor subsidiaries, which can have a negative impact on efficiency, asset quality
and funding costs.
However, the literature is largely mute on the causality going in the opposite di-
rection, i.e., how funding shocks translated into changes in net interest margins affect
geographical bank branch network diversification. In fact, a reduction in the net in-
terest margins can “. . . reduce gross value of core deposits and given that branches
have non-interest expenses, maintaining deposit relationships could become a neg-
ative present value business” (Claessens et al. (2017)). If an increase in the funding
costs indeed affects banks’ geographical branch network diversification, consequences
other than for banks’ profits can follow. For example, the literature on banks’ inter-
state expansion in the United States suggests that it accelerates the economic growth
and reduces the poverty rates of individual states (e.g. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996);
Beck et al. (2010)).
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Using the repeal of Regulation Q (i.e. the ban on interest payments on commercial
checking accounts) as a natural experiment, we study the causal relationship between
banks’ funding costs and the number of branches they have. In the United States,
interest payments were heavily regulated in the aftermath of the Great Depression.
Interest payments on time deposit accounts and savings deposits were capped until
1986 and interest payments on demand deposits were abolished altogether until 2011.
The partial repeal of Regulation Q in 2011 allowed banks to pay interest on demand
deposits. We use this intervention as an exogenous variation in a natural experiment
as it increased the interest expenses for banks that relied heavily on funding through
demand deposits more than for banks that relied to a lesser extent on demand de-
posits. The reform led to a reduction in the net interest margin of affected banks of
around 0.4 percentage points annually, which is nearly on par with the decline in the
net interest margin between 2009 and 2015.
We document that the banks more reliant on demand deposits before Regulation
Q was repealed decreased their number of branches substantially by around a third
of a branch per bank. The overall effect is around 670 branches, which corresponds to
10% of affected banks’ aggregated branch network. Extrapolating our results, we can
explain a decline in the aggregated branch network of around 1600 branches, which
corresponds to a quarter of the aggregated decline in the branch network since 2009.
Interestingly, we find that the affected banks managed to reduce asset risk, which
was to some extent achieved by withdrawing branches from poorer neighborhoods.
Our results on banks’ time-varying Z-scores suggest that banks might become safer
after the reform. However, banks also decreased their capital ratios following the
regulatory intervention, making an overall risk assessment inconclusive.
7
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Religious Incentives in the Deposit
Market
2.1 Introduction
While the literature on finance pays great attention to the use of monetary incen-
tives to shape investors’ behavior, circumstances that investors face are also abound
with examples in which they are attracted through non-monetary incentives and, in
particular, through appeals of an ethical kind such as religious and moral norms. In-
stances of such appeals driving financial decision-making are ubiquitous. The value
of ethically driven financial activities, including socially responsible investing, green
finance, religiously-compliant investing and the like has grown by a factor of six over
the last decade.1 However, despite the recognition that ethical appeals affect financial
choices, empirical evidence remains scarce.
In this chapter, I study the effects of religion on financial decision-making. To this
end, I exploit a unique natural experiment that involves Islamic banks as the unit of
analysis. Islamic banking is one of the fastest growing segments of the global financial
market, with Islamic financial assets having more than doubled in size since 2006 and
Islamic banks spreading across over 75 countries (World Bank (2014)). Islamic banks
1Ethical Futures (2016) presents the soaring trend in the ethical market from a historical perspective.
8
CHAPTER 2. ISLAMIC DEPOSIT INSURANCE 2.1. INTRODUCTION
offer various products that conform to the Islamic law (Sharia) and highlight the
ethical aspect of their business models. Their prevalence suggests that consumers
may have religious considerations when making financial decisions.
In my natural experiment, I concentrate on six jurisdictions where Islamic and
conventional banks operate side by side, and where regulators have announced ad-
ministrative separation of deposit insurance funds between conventional and Islamic
banks.2 This separation allows Islamic depositors to be covered by a Sharia-compliant
deposit insurance scheme, which was formerly not the case. For the majority of the
countries, the reform only concerned administrative separation was not associated
with any other regulatory changes.3 Time variation in the announcement of sep-
aration of deposit insurance funds across countries enables me to run a staggered
difference-in-differences (DID) model where units belong to both control and treat-
ment groups at several points in time.4 By comparing Islamic banks operating in
different countries at different points in time, the experiment tests how depositors of
Islamic banks react to additional religious compliance induced by a separate Islamic
deposit insurance scheme.
Theoretically, it is not ex-ante clear how Islamic depositors would react to the reli-
giosity of their banks induced by Sharia-compliant deposit insurance schemes. On the
one hand, the theory of market discipline suggests that given that depositors are in-
centivized to monitor their banks, they engage in disciplining by rewarding or punish-
ing their banks for their relative performance (Calomiris and Kahn (1991); Diamond
and Rajan (2001)). Interestingly, the quasi-equity contract structure of Islamic deposits
(Mudarabah) may ensure that Islamic depositors intensely monitor their banks (Errico
and Farahbaksh (1998); El-Hawarey et al. (2004); Beck et al. (2013)).5 Therefore, so
2Jurisdictions in which both conventional and Islamic banks operate are defined as dual banking
systems. My experiment includes Bahrain, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia and Turkey as dual
banking systems.
3Only for Bahrain, the separation announcement came alongside a change in the coverage of the
deposit insurance scheme. However, I conduct a triple differences analysis and show that this does not
contaminate my results.
4Staggered DID models are used extensively in financial intermediation literature. Beck et al. (2010)
and Haselmann (2011) are two examples.
5Mudarabah is based on a profit-loss sharing mechanism (PLS). Under a PLS arrangement, borrow-
9
2.1. INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 2. ISLAMIC DEPOSIT INSURANCE
far as monitoring incentives are concerned, one can expect that a Sharia-compliant
deposit insurance scheme would be rewarded by Islamic depositors.
However, the reaction of depositors to Sharia-compliant deposit insurance schemes
may also depend on the level of religious devotion (Aysan et al. (2017)). The literature
on social and behavioral finance has distinct views on this issue. On the one hand,
religious people tend to be more risk-averse (Miller and Hoffmann (1995); Hillary and
Hui (2009)). This might make them prefer an environment where the risk of Sharia
non-compliance is low. On the other hand, Abedifar et al. (2013) argue that Islamic
depositors may be more loyal. Similarly, Webley et al. (2001) show that investors
with ethical concerns tend to be over-committed even in the case that their investment
operations deviate from the ethical criteria. Thus, loyalty and over-commitment might
numb Islamic depositors’ sensitivity to Sharia compliance. Therefore, depending on
the effect of religion on individuals (piety, peer and network effects, social belonging
and shaming and the like), Islamic depositors may or may not react to a Sharia-
compliant deposit insurance scheme.
Taking stock of these predictions, I estimate the average treatment effect on the treated
of separation announcement on deposit growth and return in Islamic banks for the
period 2007-2015. Considering deposit growth (quantity) and return (price) simul-
taneously enables me to observe whether the effects are demand- or supply-driven
(Ioannidou and de Dreu (2006)). My baseline findings suggest that following sepa-
ration announcements, deposit growth increases while deposit return declines for Is-
lamic banks. In other words, depositors reward additional Sharia compliance induced
by separation of deposit insurance funds in that they increase deposited amounts and
accept lower returns on their deposits, suggesting that the observed effects are supply-
driven.
To better understand the dynamics of separation announcement on the outcome
variables, deposit growth and return, I apply several placebo treatments where I as-
ers share profits and losses with banks, which in turn, share profits and losses with depositors. In
a way, depositors become residual claimants rather than creditors of banks. Such a business model
makes Islamic banks prone to agency problems in the deposit market.
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sign the treatment one, two and three years before and after the actual intervention
took place. For placebo treatments preceding the actual treatment, I observe that dif-
ferences in the outcome variables between treated and control banks are statistically
zero. For placebo treatments after the actual treatment, however, I observe systemat-
ically significant differences in outcome variables between treated and control banks,
which supports previous findings. This observation enables me to show evidence in
favor of the satisfaction of “the parallel trend” assumption of DID setups. Such a
placebo treatment also reiterates that separation announcement is the mostly reason
for the observed supply-driven increases in deposits and other channels such as im-
provements in trust within Islamic banks are very unlikely, unless the timing of these
alternative channels exactly correspond to my treatment years.
Besides, I concentrate on the timing of the separation announcements. I conduct a
thorough desk review on whether deposit insurance separations in my sample coun-
tries happened as part of larger financial reforms that ultimately increased deposit
supply. Here, anecdotal evidence suggests that in all the majority of countries in my
sample, deposit insurance separation is promoted as a stand-alone regulatory pro-
gram.6 In addition, I test whether religiosity or the ability of a country to make laws
potentially confounded the timing of the separation announcement. Controlling for
these factors in my regressions, I verify the baseline findings that depositors of Islamic
banks reward the additional Sharia-compliance induced by separation of deposit in-
surance funds.
In the next step, I study the channel through which the rewarding behavior of Is-
lamic depositors occurs. Sóle (2007) argues that since the funds of a common deposit
insurance scheme, which lacks Sharia compliance mechanisms, may be invested in
interest-bearing assets, concerns are raised about its religious conformity. Thus, a con-
ventional insurance scheme covering both Islamic and conventional deposits may face
difficulties in convincing depositors about the reliability of reimbursed funds when
6Section 4 provides a discussion on the institutional framework leading to separation of deposit
insurance schemes at the country level.
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an Islamic bank failure occurs (cross-subsidization channel) (Aysan et al. (2017)). That
is, Islamic depositors could be affected adversely by a conventional deposit insurance
scheme only when their banks fail. By comparing the degree of disciplining against
bank insolvency risk (measured by time-varying Z-score) before and after the treat-
ment, I find that the former market discipline disappears after the announcement of
an Islamic deposit insurance scheme. Therefore, I attribute this finding to the presence
of a cross-subsidization channel.
As an alternative identification strategy, I utilize conventional banks as an addi-
tional control group to Islamic banks and employ a triple-differences methodology to
control for time-varying heterogeneity across countries. The underlying idea is that
conventional banks operating in the same countries would have similar characteris-
tics to Islamic banks, but they would not be necessarily affected by additional Sharia
compliance induced by separation of deposit insurance funds. Estimation results from
triple-differences regression verify that the baseline findings, that Islamic depositors
reward their banks and the channel of rewarding is cross-subsidization, still hold.
Improvements in religious compliance can potentially influence Islamic deposi-
tors’ behavior in two ways: Piety or religious identity (Pepinsky (2010)). For pious
individuals, separation of deposit insurance funds to allow Islamic depositors to be
covered by Sharia-compliant schemes can be seen as morally “right”. However, the
choice of Sharia-compliant products could be part of an outward expression of reli-
gious identity and due to peer effects or even social shaming as documented in similar
environments (DellaVigna et al. (2012); Perez-Truglia and Troiano (2016)). It can be
expected that for pious individuals to act, the actual religious compliance matters, as
opposed to the announcement of future religious compliance. Note that my analysis
concentrates on the announcement of separation of deposit insurance funds rather
than the event of actual separation due to data limitations. In a research design allow-
ing one to observe the effects of both the announcements and the actual separations,
one could potentially disentangle piety from religious identity. As I am not able to
measure the effects of the actual separation announcements, the explanatory power
12
CHAPTER 2. ISLAMIC DEPOSIT INSURANCE 2.1. INTRODUCTION
of my findings regarding the effects of piety on depositors is unclear. However, my
findings can at least suggest that factors related to religious identity (peer and net-
work effects, social belonging and shaming, etc.) may explain depositors’ rewarding
behavior more than piety or religious morality.
Overall, my findings indicate that improvements in religious compliance induced
by separation of conventional and Islamic deposit insurance funds are morally per-
suasive from Islamic depositors’ perspective. This suggests that ethical appeals such
as religion affect financial decision-making, most likely through religious identity.
This provides a suggestive rationale for the increasing trend in ethical financial activi-
ties. My findings also demonstrate the trade-off between the availability of funds and
the presence of market discipline in designing deposit insurance schemes in banking
sectors where religious sentiments play a role.
This chapter contributes to several strands of the literature. First, my work is
related to the well-established literature on non-monetary incentives (Frey (1997); Ak-
erlof and Kranton (2000); Gneezy (2005); Bénabou and Tirole (2003), (2006)). Non-
pecuniary appeals, especially moral ones, are commonly used tools of persuasion
and many companies’ corporate social responsibility strategies are directed towards
gaining reputation through business models incorporating charitable causes to attract
consumers. I contribute to this literature by showing evidence from the dimensions
of religious morality in a banking regulation setup and how this makes Islamic de-
positors reward their banks following the improvements in Sharia compliance.
Second, my work contributes to the literature studying deposit insurance and
market discipline (Flannery (2001); Martinez-Peria et al. (2001); Demirgüç-Kunt and
Huizinga (2004); Ioannidou and de Dreu (2006)). This literature finds that introduc-
tion of deposit insurance numbs the monitoring and disciplining incentives of de-
positors against bank risk, exacerbating moral hazard. I contribute to this literature
by providing evidence on how depositors’ disciplining works in Islamic banks where
religious sentiments shape financial choices. There is also a body of evidence indi-
cating that depositors monitor not only their banks but also the credibility of deposit
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insurance schemes (Flannery (1998); Martinez-Peria et al. (2001)). I also complement
this stock of evidence by finding that for Islamic banks, deposit insurance is credible
when Sharia compliance is ensured.
Beyond shedding light on the role of non-pecuniary incentives in financial decision-
making, this chapter also contributes to a broader literature on economic behavior and
religion (Iannaccone (1998); Barro and McCleary (2006), Clingingsmith, Khwaja and
Kremer (2009); Hilary and Hui (2009); Cantoni (2015); Campante and Yanagizawa-
Drott (2015); Bénabou et al. (2015); Benjamin et al. (2016); He and Hu (2016)). Identi-
fying the effects of religion on economic behavior is difficult using observational data
for several reasons. First, it is hard to observe religiosity as exogenous treatment. Sec-
ondly, in the absence of counter-factual, second-order effects of religion on personal
characteristics, such as risk aversion, commitment and loyalty, could confound the
first-order effects of religion, such as religious identity or faith, on economic behavior.
My work contributes to this literature by comparing Islamic banks with each other
and establishing the causal link between religious compliance of financial institutions
and commitment of depositors through an arguably exogenous event.
Finally, this chapter contributes to a small but growing body of literature on Is-
lamic banking. This literature mainly studies the business models, efficiency, effec-
tiveness and stability of Islamic banking (Abdull-Majid et al. (2010); Cˇihák and Hesse
(2010); Khan (2010); Ongena and Sendeniz-Yuncu (2011); Beck et al. (2013); Aysan et
al. (2017)). There is also a growing body of evidence that show the effects of reli-
gion on credit relationships in Islamic banking setups (Baele et al. (2014); Beck et al.
(2017)). I contribute to this literature by showing evidence on the effects of religion in
Islamic deposit markets.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes
the fundamental characteristics of Islamic banking and Islamic deposit insurance
schemes. Building on this institutional knowledge, Section 3 develops the main hy-
potheses of the chapter. Section 4 discusses the sample selection and specifies the
empirical models for hypothesis testing. Section 5 presents the empirical results and
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robustness tests. Section 6 summarizes the findings and concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Islamic Deposit Contracts
Islamic banking is a system of banking practices that are in line with the rules of
Islam or Sharia, which are based on the Qur’an or the sayings of the prophet Mo-
hammad. The key elements that differentiate Islamic banks from conventional banks
are mainly the prohibition of gambling and the interest (riba) as well as the emphasis
on risk sharing. Possessing these principles, Islamic deposit contracts (Mudarabah)
are different to conventional deposits. An Islamic deposit contract is a partnership
agreement between bank and depositor, with profits and losses of investment being
shared in jointly agreed ratios (Aysan et al. (2017)). This special contract arrangement
is manifested in the liability side of an Islamic banks’ balance sheet as an investment
account that does not bear a predetermined interest rate but rather delivers a share of
profits. In fact, an Islamic deposit account owns neither debt-based nor equity-based
compensations. Thus, potential agency problems are embedded in the contract struc-
ture of Islamic deposits. They arise from the separation of cash flow and control rights
for investment account holders (Saifieddine (2009)). Even though depositors are not
creditors but residual claimants of banks, they are not given the control rights under
a Mudarabah arrangement (Aysan et al. (2017)).
2.2.2 Conventional Deposit Insurance from a Sharia Perspective
The role of conventional and Islamic deposit insurance schemes is largely similar,
whereby a deposit insurance fund collects premiums from banks and protects the
insured deposits. The major difference between Islamic and conventional deposit
insurance schemes is that only permissible expenses are paid by the Islamic fund and
the fund is invested in Islamic instruments, which are generally in the form of Sukuk
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issued or guaranteed by the governments (Arshad (2011)). Sukuk refers to shares in
the ownership of underlying real assets relating to investment activity. A Sukuk holder
keeps a common share in the ownership of the assets associated with the investment.
In effect, Sukuk holders are entitled to a share in the revenues earned through the
underlying assets.
There are two types of Islamic deposit insurance practice around the world: In-
surance of Islamic deposits under a conventional deposit insurance scheme and In-
surance of Islamic deposits by a Sharia-compliant deposit insurance scheme. The
evaluation of the former from the perspective of Sharia is done based on the follow-
ing grounds: how a conventional deposit insurance scheme generates funds and how
it utilizes those funds (IADI (2010)).
Firstly, moral purity of all transactions is at the center of Islamic finance. In that
sense, Sharia-compliant funds should not be mixed (commingled) with those of non-
Islamic funds (Sóle (2007)). Although it is not ex-ante clear if commingled funds are
morally impure from a Sharia perspective, the practice of interest-bearing investment
of collected funds in a conventional deposit insurance scheme raises concerns regard-
ing Sharia conformity. Therefore, management of Islamic deposits under conven-
tional deposit insurance schemes lacks a control mechanism to ensure the separation
of funds.
Secondly, utilization of commingled funds in the case of an Islamic bank failure
(cross-subsidization) is considered to be at odds with Sharia compliance. Thus, a con-
ventional deposit insurance scheme covering both conventional and Islamic deposits
may face difficulties in convincing depositors about the reliability of reimbursed funds
in case of an Islamic bank failure (Aysan et al. (2017)). For these reasons, separation
of deposit insurance funds may signal a radical departure from conventional banking
towards Sharia-compliant banking.
16
CHAPTER 2. ISLAMIC DEPOSIT INSURANCE 2.3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.3 Hypothesis Development
In the deposit market, Islamic banks’ depositors are concerned with various risks.
Apart from the financial risk, one particular risk characteristic endemic to Islamic
banks is the Sharia risk, which can be defined as the operational risk of deviating
from the rules of Islam (Ginena (2013)).
An announcement of separation of deposit insurance funds between conventional
and Islamic banks to allow the latter to have a scheme under Sharia control improves
religious compliance, or to put it differently, reduces Sharia noncompliance risk. I
formulate two hypotheses on how Islamic depositors would react to the introduction
of a Sharia-compliant deposit insurance scheme.
How would Islamic depositors react to the decline in Sharia risk due to a separation of
deposit insurance funds?
Theoretically, depositors monitor their “investment” by evaluating the activities of
banks to ensure that their investments are not in danger. The underlying theory of
market discipline suggests that depositors would ask for higher returns and withdraw
their funds in response to excessive risk-taking by banks. Banks, needing to maintain
a steady flow of reasonably priced working capital, would then have incentives to
decrease excessive risk-taking. The empirical literature also supports the theory that
financial risk characteristics and deposit growth (deposit return) are negatively (posi-
tively) correlated (Martinez-Peria et al. (2001); Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004)).
Recent corporate finance theories argue that corporate governance is increasingly
based on entry-exit strategies (Aysan et al. (2017)). In the absence of control rights
(as in Mudarabah contracts) dispersed blockholders may have the ability to govern
firms (Edmans (2009); Admati and Pfleider (2009); Edmans and Manso (2011)). This
indirect governance mechanism is based on disciplining through trading, i.e., an entry
strategy upon positive information and an exit strategy upon negative information.
A governance and disciplining mechanism similar to an entry-exit strategy is es-
pecially relevant to Islamic banks. Based on the contract structure of Islamic deposits,
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depositors are considered as “quasi-shareholders”. Although deposits are not trad-
able, they are liquid. Thus, Islamic depositors can reward or punish their banks by
increasing or decreasing the supply of deposits, respectively, depending on the level
of risk taken.7 Such a governance strategy can discipline banks, even though the indi-
vidual depositors do not have direct control over the operation of the bank. Thus, the
decline in Sharia risk resulting from a separate Islamic deposit insurance fund is ex-
pected to be related to deposit growth positively and return on deposits negatively. In
other words, depositors may reward improvements in Sharia compliance induced by
a separate deposit insurance fund by increasing their funds deposited and by asking
for lower returns.
However, the degree of religious devotion may also play a crucial role in deter-
mining whether Islamic depositors would reward their banks for compliance with
Sharia. The literature on behavioral finance has different views on this topic. On
the one hand, religious agents tend to be more risk-averse than non-religious agents
(Miller and Hoffman (1995); Hilary and Hui (2009)). This would imply that indeed
low levels of Sharia risk are preferable for Islamic depositors. On the other hand,
Abedifar et al. (2013) posit that Islamic depositors may have a strong sense of loy-
alty. Similarly, experimental economics literature shows that ethical investors tend to
be over-committed to their investment even if it operates outside the ethical criteria
(Webley et al. (2001)). These arguments on loyalty and over-commitment may numb
the sensitivity of Islamic depositors to Sharia risk. In light of this argumentation, I
present the first hypothesis of the chapter:
Hypothesis 1: Conditional on religious devotion, Islamic depositors reward their
banks for the decline in Sharia risk. That is, they increase the amount deposited and
ask for lower returns due to a Sharia-compliant deposit insurance scheme.
What happens to depositor disciplining against excessive (financial) risk-taking by banks
after a separation of deposit insurance funds?
7In the case of punishing due to high bank risk, depositors can also switch to a more liquid invest-
ment.
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The previous section presented that the administration of Islamic deposits under
a conventional deposit insurance scheme is Sharia non-compliant as the commin-
gled funds would be utilized to recover insolvent Islamic banks (cross-subsidization).
Apart from concerns regarding impurity of funds, the negative effects of a Sharia
non-compliant administration of a common deposit insurance scheme can only mate-
rialize when Islamic banks become insolvent. Conversely, a deposit insurance scheme
with a Sharia-compliant administration would be free of cross-subsidization as the
funds reimbursed to depositors in case of a bank failure would be Sharia-compliant
funds. Hence, I present the next hypothesis of the chapter:
Hypothesis 2: Under a common deposit insurance scheme, Islamic depositors en-
gage in market disciplining in response to the insolvency risk of their banks. That is,
they withdraw their funds and ask for higher returns in response to an increase in
bank insolvency risk under a common deposit insurance scheme. Moreover, this mar-
ket discipline disappears with the introduction of a separate Islamic deposit insurance
fund.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are developed to address Sharia and insolvency risks within
the context of Islamic deposits, respectively. However, these two types of risk can
also evolve together. In particular, non-compliance with Sharia risk may eventually
result in insolvency risk in Islamic banks. In fact, Swartz (2013) mentions depositor
discipline for non-compliance of Sharia risk, which may cause operational risk and in
turn insolvency risk. I specifically test the presence of this in a subsequent section and
find that Sharia-compliant deposit insurance schemes do not cause higher or lower
bank insolvency risk.
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2.4 Empirical Method
2.4.1 Sample Selection and Data
The concept of deposit insurance is relatively new to the Islamic banking system. Until
recently, the majority of jurisdictions either did not have an explicit deposit insurance
scheme or the coverage of Islamic deposits was arranged under a conventional deposit
insurance.
The idea of a separate and Sharia-compliant deposit insurance scheme first came
into existence in the Turkish banking system. The “special finance houses” were al-
lowed to have their own religious deposit insurance scheme as a separate arrangement
operating side by side with the conventional deposit insurance fund in 2001. The an-
nouncement and the immediate introduction of this scheme were largely attributed to
the bank run episode of “Ihlas Special Finance House” during the crisis of the Turk-
ish banking system due to Sharia misconduct in 2001. However, the operation of this
arrangement did not last long. In December 2005, upon enactment of the Banking Act
No.541, special finance houses were given the status of Islamic banks and the Islamic
deposit insurance fund was transferred to the Savings and Deposit Insurance Fund
(SDIF), the country’s conventional deposit Insurance system.
In Malaysia, the adoption of a deposit insurance scheme for the overall banking
system was managed in 2005. Former implicit guarantees were replaced by the dual
deposit insurance scheme. In other words, the administration of the Islamic and
conventional deposits was separate since from the beginning. To this end, the prin-
cipal contract structure of the Malaysian Islamic deposit insurance was decided to be
Kafalah bil ’Ujr (guarantee with fee), in which Islamic banking institutions pay a fee
in the form of annual premiums in return for a deposit insurance fund assuming the
obligation of reimbursing insured depositors.
Bahrain was the first country to provide insurance to Islamic banks under the
conventional deposit insurance system. This practice was abandoned in 2010. The
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deposit insurance reform of 2010 aimed at replacing the current post-funded scheme
with a pre-funded scheme. Moreover, the old scheme was revised and the administra-
tion of the Islamic deposit insurance fund was separated. The administration of the
fund responsible for the Islamic banking system assumed a Takaful (mutual guarantee)
principle.
For Kuwait, Indonesia and Jordan, the announcement of the separate deposit Is-
lamic deposit insurance scheme can largely be attributed to external reasons. In the
years after the global financial crisis, the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision
(BCBS) and the International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) produced the
“Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems” in November 2014, empha-
sizing the need to establish “Islamic deposit insurance systems . . . for the protection
of Islamic deposits in accordance with Islamic principles and rules.” Subsequently,
Jordan, Indonesia and Kuwait made the announcements of creating a separate deposit
insurance framework for Islamic deposits to ensure their Sharia-compliant adminis-
tration (Abdelhady (2015); Central Bank of Kuwait (2016)).
Importantly, there is no anecdotal evidence that separation announcements were
part of a bigger package of financial reforms across these jurisdictions. This ensures
that another financial reform confounding the separation event is highly unlikely. It
is worth mentioning that other jurisdictions such as Oman and Qatar also announced
the establishment of a Sharia-compliant deposit insurance scheme in order to meet
the “Core Principles” in 2015. However, so far, they lack an explicit deposit insurance
scheme for their banking system, making the event of separation irrelevant for them.
Therefore, I concentrate on all dual banking systems with an explicit deposit insur-
ance scheme covering Islamic banks. Data availability restricts my analysis to Bahrain,
Jordan, Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia and Turkey. The time span of the analysis is de-
termined by the data limitations and the fact that Kuwait implemented an explicit
deposit insurance scheme in 2007. Therefore, I focus on the time period of 2007-2015.
I collect yearly balance sheet and income statement information from the Islamic
banks of these jurisdictions by utilizing the annual reports either published on the
21
2.4. EMPIRICAL METHOD CHAPTER 2. ISLAMIC DEPOSIT INSURANCE
websites of the banks or by contacting them by telephone. Previous studies (Beck
et al. (2013); Abedifar et al. (2013)), utilize the Bankscope dataset to study Islamic
banking. However, it is not possible to obtain the information specifically on PLS
accounts in Bankscope. Moreover, Bankscope provides limited information on the
breakdown of aggregate deposit returns across deposit categories. As I specifically
focus on deposit accounts’ PLS feature, I hand-collect annual reports of banks, where I
can observe information broken down based on different deposit categories. I do so by
systematically reviewing banks’ websites. Wherever the information is not available,
I contact banks’ officers by telephone or personal bilateral meetings.
Several countries in my sample have conventional banks with Islamic windows.
I exclude those banks from my analysis as it is not possible to observe Islamic ac-
counts separately in these banks’ annual reports. Moreover, Indonesia has established
regional Islamic banks, for which annual reports are not available.8
In brief, I end up with 47 Islamic banks from 6 dual banking systems. Despite the
above-mentioned limitations, my sample covers at least 81% of all Islamic banks in
terms of bank size in individual dual banking systems.9
2.4.2 Identification
To test the hypotheses presented in the previous section, I consider a setup where reg-
ulators announced splitting up their deposit insurance funds to allow Islamic banks
to be covered by Sharia-compliant deposit insurance in 6 dual banking systems. Fol-
lowing Aysan et al. (2017) and Karas et al. (2013), I treat this event, happening at the
country level, as exogenous to the individual depositors.
The time variation in the separation announcements across countries makes the
identification strategy a staggered DID strategy. A similar research design has been
used in several studies (Haselmann et al. (2010); Beck et al. (2010)). Focusing on
8According to Indonesia Financial Services Authority, regional Islamic banks comprise only 2.5%
of total Islamic deposits (OJK (2017)), a negligible amount for my study.
9The total assets of the Islamic banking sector at the country level were obtained from Dubai Islamic
Bank (2017).
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multiple interventions takes care of many threats regarding the (external) validity of
the results. This methodology can be illustrated as follows: Suppose there are two
countries, A and B, implementing a separate Islamic deposit insurance scheme at
times t = 1 and t = 2, respectively. If we consider t = 0 to be the starting period of
our sample, then from t = 1 to t = 2, country B serves as the control group and after
that serves as treatment group for subsequent time periods. Therefore, most countries
belong to both treatment and control groups at several points in time. Moreover, this
specification is robust to some countries (Malaysia) being treated before the sample
period and some countries (Turkey) never being treated during the sample period.
Similar to most studies focusing on deposit insurance and depositor behavior
(Ioannidou and de Dreu (2006); Karas et al. (2013); Aysan et al. (2017)), I analyze
both the quantity and price equation in a reduced-form model. The combined infor-
mation from both of these equations helps me show that observed effects are supply
as opposed to demand-driven (e.g. regulatory discipline).
Hypothesis 1 states that depositors would positively react to a Sharia-compliant
deposit insurance scheme conditional on the level of religiosity. Unlike former studies
that use conventional banks as a control group to Islamic banks (Aysan et al. (2017)),
I argue that the comparison of treated Islamic banks with control Islamic banks takes
care of the fact that level of religious devotion is to some extent controlled for. More-
over, to the extent that religiosity is time-invariant, it is controlled by bank or country
fixed effects. Unfortunately, surveys that measures religiosity at the country level
such as the World Values Survey provide only one wave for each country. This makes
it impossible for me to observe how religiosity changes over time. However, an ad-
vantage of my setup is that it, unlike others that compare conventional and Islamic
banks, compares Islamic banks with one another to difference out the potential effects
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Table 2.1: Announcement of separate Islamic deposit insurance scheme
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Country
Bahrain 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Jordan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Kuwait 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Malaysia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: This table reports the coding of the treatment variable, Treatment, used in this analysis
across six dual banking systems. Years before the announcement of separate Islamic deposit
insurance are coded as zero (0), whereas years after the announcement are coded as one (1).
of religiosity. The model to test Hypothesis 1 is presented below:
DEPGict = αi + αt + δ1Treatmentct + γ1BankFundamentalsict−1 + η1MacroControlsct + eict
(2.1)
DEPRict = βi + βt + δ2Treatmentct + γ2BankFundamentalsict−1 + η2MacroControlsct + uict
(2.2)
where i is bank, c is country and t is year. The dependent variables are DEPG, the
growth of price-level adjusted deposits, and DEPR, implicit return on deposits cal-
culated by banks expenditures on deposits divided by total bank deposits. α and β
factors are bank- and time-level fixed effects, respective of their indexes.10 Treatment
is a dummy variable taking the value one (1) for years after the announcement of a
separate Islamic deposit insurance scheme and zero otherwise, as shown in Table 2.1.
BankFundamentals and MacroControls refer to the control variables used in equations
(2.1) and (2.2). BankFundamentals include standard bank characteristics such as size
and also include publicly observable bank risk measures such as capital-asset ratio,
loan quality, asset returns etc., which have been used in previous studies (Martinez-
Peria et al. (2001); Demirgüç-Kunt and De Dreu (2004)) to show financial risk and
depositor discipline. They are lagged one period to account for delayed publication
10αi and βi serve also as country dummies.
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of annual reports by one year. Finally, MacroControls are the variables that are chang-
ing across countries and over the years such as GDP per capita growth, population
growth, inflation and the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, which measures the concen-
tration of the Islamic banking sector in a country, in a given year.
A positive estimate for δ1 in equation (2.1) and a negative estimate for δ2 in equa-
tion (2.2) would verify Hypothesis 1. Ensuring that signs of these coefficients simul-
taneously hold would imply that the effect is supply-driven.
Hypothesis 2 claims that since cross-subsidization is only relevant in case of a bank
failure, Islamic depositors should discipline their banks for high insolvency risk in
the absence of a Sharia-compliant deposit insurance. Moreover, disciplining behavior
must vanish after the introduction of a Sharia-compliant deposit insurance scheme. To
test this hypothesis, I reformulate equations (2.1) and (2.2), and estimate the following
model:
DEPGict = αi + αt + φ1Z− scoreict + ψ1Treatmentct ∗ Z− scoreict (2.3)
+ γ1BankFundamentalsict−1 + η1MacroControlsct + vict
DEPRict = βi + βt + φ2Z− scoreict + ψ2Treatmentct ∗ Z− scoreict (2.4)
+ γ2BankFundamentalsict−1 + η2MacroControlsct +ωict
I use a time-varying Z − score measure following Lepetit and Strobel (2013). Z −
score is inversely related to an upper bound of the probability of insolvency p(roa ≤
−car). Hence, low values of Z − score imply the tendency towards insolvency. In
consequence, the examination of depositor disciplining in response to an increase in
bank insolvency must be manifested in equations (2.3) and (2.4) in such a way that Z−
score must be positively correlated with DEPG and must be negatively correlated with
the DEPR. A positive estimate for φ1 and a negative estimate for φ2 would indicate
the existence of disciplining against bank insolvency risk before the announcement
of the separation of deposit insurance funds (i.e., when Treatmentc,t = 0). Instead,
a negative estimate for ψ1 and a positive estimate for ψ2 would indicate that the
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change in the degree of disciplining against bank insolvency risk depends positively
on Treatmentc,t. (i.e., when Treatmentc,t = 1) (Ioannidou and de Dreu, 2006).11
2.4.3 Summary Statistics
Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics on the variables used in the analysis. It com-
pares pre- and post-treatment periods separately. Interestingly, the comparison of pre-
and post-event mean values of deposit growth (DEPG) and deposit return (DEPR)
suggests an increase in the deposit supply after the announcement of a separate Is-
lamic deposit insurance scheme in a “reduced-form” sense. Some bank characteristics
such as return on assets and loan quality worsen after the announcement, while other
bank characteristics stay roughly similar for both pre-event and post-event observa-
tions, based on Table 2.2. It is important to note that the effect of separation an-
nouncements on deposit growth and return on deposits are conditional on the bank
characteristics. The underlying assumption here is that separation announcements
do not, in and off themselves, have an impact on these covariates. Observing that
there are potentially significant differences in bank characteristics between pre- and
post-treatment periods may indeed suggest that a separation announcement affects
some bank characteristics. In a following section, I specifically test for the presence of
this and do not find evidence for bank characteristics being affected by a separation
announcement.
11See appendix B for a more formal discussion.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics
Description Source Mean-pre-treatment Mean - post-treatment
Dependent Variables
DEPG Rate of growth of total deposits Annual reports 0.09(0.08)
0.11
(0.09)
DEPR Expenses on deposits divided by total depsoits Annual reports 0.05(0.03)
0.03
(0.03)
Bank Fundamentals
Return on Assets Net income divided by total assets Annual Reports 0.08(0.07)
0.05
(0.03)
Loan Quality Nonperforming loans divided by gross loans Annual Reports 0.09(0.16)
0.05
(0.11)
Liquidty Liquid assets (cash, central bank debt, short term securities) divided by total assets Annual Reports 0.24(0.13)
0.25
(0.14)
Size Natural logarithm of total assets Annual Reports 21.2(1.51)
21.3
(1.49)
Capital Asset Ratio Equity divided by total assets Annual Reports 0.18(0.08)
0.15
(9.00)
Z-score sum of capital asset ratio and return on assets divided by standard deviation of return on assets Annual Reports 2.59(2.44)
2.35
(2.11)
Macro-level Variables
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index: sum of squared deposit market share Annual Reports 4247.08(1247.34)
2358.92
(1289.05)
GDP per Capita Growth Rate of growth of real GDP World Bank 0.024(0.03)
0.026
(0.023)
Inflation Rate of Change of GDP deflator World Bank 0.08(0.06)
0.025
(0.06)
GOVEFF Index ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, bigger values indicating more efficient government. World Bank 0.0043(0.283)
0.7714
(0.386)
Religiosity Percentage of respondents stating they are religious World Values Survey 0.745(0.065)
0.642
(0.111)
Secularism Categorical variable from 1 to 10, 10 being least secular World Values Survey 5.386(0.452)
5.335
(0.440)
Population Growth Rate of growth of population World Bank 0.0009(0.0066)
0.0004
(0.003)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. This table shows the variable descriptions and the means of the variables used in this analysis
across pre- and post-treatment periods.
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2.5 Empirical Results
Table 2.3 presents the results from DID estimators. Columns (1), (3) and (5) exhibit
the estimation results of equation (2.1), while columns (2), (4) and (6) refer to the
estimation results of equation (2.2). All columns include bank and year fixed effects.
Bank fundamentals comprise of Size, Z-score, Capital Asset Ratio, Loan Quality, Return
on Assets and Liquidity and macro controls include GDP per Capita Growth, Inflation,
Population Growth and HHI. Baseline estimates from columns (1) and (2) demonstrate
the evidence of depositors of Islamic banks rewarding their banks upon the announce-
ment of a separate Sharia-compliant deposit insurance scheme leading to a decline in
Sharia risk. As mentioned in the previous section, the coefficients should be inter-
preted with caution. In the absence of a price equation (equation (2.2)), a decrease in
Sharia risk due to the announcement of a separate Islamic deposit insurance fund is
associated with, ceteris paribus, a 2.8 percentage points increase in deposit growth,
on average. Similarly, in the absence of a quantity equation (equation (2.1)), the an-
nouncement of a separate Islamic deposit insurance, on average, decreases the im-
plicit return on deposits by 0.8 percentage points. However, within a reduced-form
framework, it is not possible to give an exact magnitude of the increase in deposit
supply as a result of the treatment. Nevertheless, the signs and the significance of
the coefficients demonstrate that there definitely exists a deposit supply increase after
the announcement of a separate Islamic deposit insurance scheme, failing to reject
Hypothesis 1 that Islamic bank depositors reward their banks due to an exogenous
Sharia-compliant scheme they have to take part in.
Regressions of columns (1) and (2) do not include a factor controlling for time-
varying and country-specific shocks. In order to control for all such shocks, a fixed
effects factor that varies both in a country and year dimension (αc,t) is required. How-
ever, such a fixed effects factor would fully absorb the variation in my treatment vari-
able. To be able to tackle this issue, I follow the methodology proposed by Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2003) and Haselmann et al. (2010). They suggest including the
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Table 2.3: Baseline regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DEPG DEPR DEPG DEPR DEPG DEPR DEPG DEPR
Treatment 0.0281*** -0.00804* 0.0259*** -0.00777** 0.0236** -0.00731* 0.0192** -0.00577
(0.00645) (0.00314) (0.00512) (0.00266) (0.00655) (0.00333) (0.00680) (0.00382)
DEPG(−i)ct 0.0494*
(0.0219)
DEPR(−i)ct 0.0960
(0.111)
Before3 0.0110 -0.00548
(0.0113) (0.00601)
Before2 -0.00836 -0.00274
(0.0100) (0.00204)
Before1 -0.000890 -0.00234
(0.00737) (0.00426)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Country FE No No No No No No Yes Yes
Bank Fundamentals Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wild Bootstrap-t p-value 0.015 0.095 - - - - 0.095 0.150
N 294 292 294 292 294 292 48 48
R2 0.460 0.783 0.486 0.788 0.450 0.787 0.326 0.334
Notes: The sample period is 2007-2015. This table reports the estimation results from equa-
tions (2.1) and (2.2). The dependent variable in columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) is DEPG. The
dependent variable in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) is DEPR. Treatment refers to the announce-
ment of separate Islamic deposit insurance scheme. Columns (1)-(6) include bank fixed effects
and bank fundamentals. Bank fundamentals are ReturnonAssets, LoanQuality, Liquidity,
Size, CapitalAssetRatio and Z − score. All columns include time fixed effects and macro
controls. Macro controls include HHI, GDPperCapitaGrowth, In f lation, PopulationGrowth.
DEPG(−i)ct and DEPR(−i)ct are respective mean values of DEPG and DEPR of each country
and each year excluding each respective bank i itself. Be f ore3, Be f ore2, Be f ore1 are 3 years, 2
years and 1 year leads of the Treatment variable, respectively. Columns (7) and (8) show the
estimations whose bank dimensions are collapsed. Standard errors are shown in parentheses
and are clustered by country. Wherever shown, country-level clustered standard errors are
wild bootstrapped. Wild bootstrapped p-values for the coefficient of Treatment variable is
reported. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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mean value of the dependent variable of each country and each year excluding each
respective bank i itself, denoted as DEPG(−i)ct and DEPR(−i)ct respectively for the
quantity and the price equations. As presented in Table 2.3, columns (3) and (4), the
inclusion of these variables leaves the results unchanged.
In columns (5) and (6), Be f ore1, Be f ore2 and Be f ore3 coefficients are placebo treat-
ments that test if the outcome variables were significantly different between treat-
ment and control banks 1 year, 2 years and 3 years before the announcement of a
separate Islamic deposit insurance scheme. Estimation results suggest that, on aver-
age, there were no significant differences in outcome variables between treated and
control banks. Thus, one can claim that in the absence of the treatment, treated and
non-treated banks would behave similarly.
So far, the standard errors are clustered at the country level to account for the
correlation of error terms in the time dimension for each country. However, a small
number of clusters might lead to the inconsistent estimation of the standard errors. In
difference-in-differences setups where the variable of interest is most of the time a bi-
nary variable, this problem is exacerbated (Bertrand and Mulliathan (2004)). Another
potential problem concerning the inconsistent estimation of standard errors is the
“Moulton” problem, referring to the group-level correlation of error terms when us-
ing individual-level dependent variables explained by group-level regressors (Moul-
ton (1990)).
To address the latter problem, I collapse the bank dimension of my sample and
estimate the country-level equations in columns (7) and (8). Although the quantity
equation is robust to collapsing the bank dimension, the coefficient of the treatment
variable in the price equation is no longer significant at the 10% level but at the 15%
level. Despite a minor reduction in the significance in the price equation, the signs
of the coefficients remain the same. For the former problem, I use the “Wild clus-
ter bootstrap percentile-t” procedure proposed by Cameron et al. (2008). Inference
with cluster-robust standard errors has a limitation that it assumes that the num-
ber of clusters goes to infinity asymptotically. This assumption is hard to satisfy
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with small number of clusters. What Cameron et al. (2008) proposes is to bootstrap
clusters of small sample corrected standard errors based on T-distribution. Through
Monte-Carlo simulations, they find that the wild cluster bootstrap percentile-t proce-
dure empirical rejection rates were very similar to theoretical values, even when the
number of clusters were six (6). This procedure has recently started to be used in
DID setups with a small number of clusters, especially in labor economics literature
(Nandi (2015); Kalsi (2017)). To this end, Table 2.3 also presents the p-values of the
coefficient estimates of the treatment variable for the baseline regressions.
2.5.1 Dynamics of the Treatment
Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 present the dynamic effects of the treatment for equation
(2.1) and (2.2), respectively. The y-axes of the figures show the percentage point
difference in the respective outcome variables across treatment and control groups,
while the x-axes show the years relative to the announcement of the separate Islamic
deposit insurance. The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals adjusted
for the state-level clustering for the respective point estimates. These figures illustrate
two key points: Innovations in deposit growth and deposit return do not precede the
announcement of a separate Islamic deposit insurance and the effect of the announce-
ment materializes after one year. As shown by the confidence intervals, coefficients
on the placebo treatments preceding the actual announcement year are insignificantly
different from zero, whereas subsequent years after the actual announcement are as-
sociated with differential deposit growth increase and implicit return decrease for the
treated banks as opposed to control banks, thus verifying the existence of Islamic
depositors rewarding their banks due to a reduction in Sharia risk.
2.5.2 Timing of the Treatment
The factors determining the timing of deposit insurance adoption is rarely studied
in the literature. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008) point out several channels that, in
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Figure 2.1: The dynamic impact of the treatment on Islamic deposit growth
Notes: This figure plots the impact of the announcement of a separate Islamic deposit insur-
ance scheme on the growth of deposits. I consider a 7-year window, spanning from 3 years
before the announcement until 3 years after the announcement. The dashed lines represent
95% confidence intervals, adjusted for country-level clustering. Specifically, I report estimated
coefficients from the following regression:
DEPGi,c,t = αi + αt + β−3Treatment−3c,t + ...+ βTreatmentc,t + ...+ β+3Treatment
+3
c,t + ei,c,t
The Treatments equal zero, except as follows: Treatment−j equals one for countries in the jth
year before the announcement, while Treatment+j equals one for states in the jth year after the
announcement. αi and αt are bank (as well as country) and year fixed effects, respectively.
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Figure 2.2: The dynamic impact of the treatment on Islamic deposit return
Notes: This figure plots the impact of the announcement of a separate Islamic deposit insur-
ance scheme on the growth of deposits. I consider a 7-year window, spanning from 3 years
before the announcement until 3 years after the announcement. The dashed lines represent
95% confidence intervals, adjusted for country-level clustering. Specifically, I report estimated
coefficients from the following regression:
DEPRi,c,t = ηi + ηt + γ−3Treatment−3c,t + ...+ γTreatmentc,t + ...+ γ+3Treatment
+3
c,t + ui,c,t
The Treatments equal zero, except as follows: Treatment−j equals one for countries in the jth
year before the announcement, while Treatment+j equals one for states in the jth year after the
announcement. ηi and ηt are bank (as well as country) and year fixed effects, respectively.
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theory, might affect the timing of the adoption of deposit insurance schemes. Two
of those channels seem to be relevant to my setup. The first one is the efficiency
of government; that is, how fast and effectively a government can implement public
goods. In countries where different forms of financial safety net arrangements are
provided by public entities and where participation in the safety net is mandatory by
the agents in the economy, the financial safety net is ultimately a non-exclusive good.
In that sense, there is a possibility that more efficient governments can implement
financial safety nets such as deposit insurance earlier.
The second channel states that political interest can lead to the early adoption of
deposit insurance (Laeven (2004); Calomiris and Jaremski (2016)). Political interest
theory sees society comprising of different groups with divergent private interests
and, therefore, with divergent views on how the deposit insurance scheme should
be designed. The private interest group with the most political influence ensures
the adoption of a form of deposit insurance with risk shifting mechanisms working in
favor of itself, which may explain the observed heterogeneity among countries regard-
ing the mechanisms that control the risk shifting in deposit insurance. When projected
to my setup, in countries where the political influence of private interest groups that
favor Sharia compliance is high, the implementation of a deposit insurance scheme
which ensures the Sharia compliance might happen earlier.
Furthermore, the political interest channel might affect the adoption of a deposit
insurance scheme with a particular risk shifting control depending on the efficiency of
the government. That is, private interest groups might have enough political influence
over the design of the deposit insurance scheme, however, as long as the governments
are inefficient, implementation of such a deposit insurance system might incur delays.
In short, more religious countries or countries with efficient governments might have
the potential to adopt a separate Islamic deposit insurance scheme earlier. And if this
were true, the timing of the treatment might not be random. Therefore, I may need to
control for religiosity, government efficiency and their interaction in my regressions.
As long as religiosity and government efficiency are time-invariant characteristics,
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Table 2.4: Timing of the treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DEPG DEPG DEPR DEPR DEPG DEPG DEPR DEPR
Treatment 0.0288∗∗ 0.0281∗∗∗ -0.00886∗∗ -0.00824∗ 0.0269∗∗∗ 0.0262∗∗∗ -0.00855∗∗∗ -0.00794∗∗
(0.00717) (0.00650) (0.00238) (0.00358) (0.00623) (0.00530) (0.00187) (0.00302)
GOVEFF 0.114 -0.0824 -0.252∗ -0.00569 0.216 -0.00208 -0.223∗ -0.00580
(0.292) (0.178) (0.0984) (0.0808) (0.263) (0.152) (0.103) (0.0613)
GOVEFF × Secularism -0.0349 0.0510∗∗ -0.0498 0.0449∗
(0.0506) (0.0169) (0.0448) (0.0187)
GOVEFF × Religiosity 0.00432 0.0487 -0.0772 0.0408
(0.236) (0.124) (0.203) (0.101)
DEPG(−i)ct 0.0507∗ 0.0500∗
(0.0220) (0.0221)
DEPR(−i)ct 0.0755 0.0950
(0.117) (0.115)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fundamentals Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wild Bootstrap-t p-value 0.066 0.052 0.069 0.089 - - - -
N 294 294 292 292 294 294 292 292
R2 0.461 0.460 0.790 0.783 0.488 0.486 0.793 0.788
Notes: The sample period is 2007-2015. This table reports the estimation results from equa-
tions (2.1) and (2.2) altered by adding GOVEFF, Secularism and Religiosity variables defined
in Table 3. GOVEFF ∗ Secularism and GOVEFF ∗ Religiosity denote the interaction terms.
The dependent variable in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) is DEPG. The dependent variable
in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) is DEPR. Treatment refers to the announcement of a sep-
arate Islamic deposit insurance scheme. All columns include bank fixed effects, bank fun-
damentals, year fixed effects and macro controls. Bank fundamentals are ReturnonAssets,
LoanQuality, Liquidity, Size, CapitalAssetRatio and Z − score. Macro controls include HHI,
GDPperCapitaGrowth, In f lation, PopulationGrowth. DEPG(−i)ct and DEPR(−i)ct are respec-
tive mean values of DEPG and DEPR of each country and each year excluding each respective
bank i itself. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered by country. Wher-
ever shown, country-level clustered standard errors are wild bootstrapped. Wild bootstrapped
p-values for the coefficient of Treatment variable is reported. *, **, *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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they would be captured by bank fixed effects.12 Nevertheless, I try to proxy these
variables and include them in the regressions to evaluate if the results found in Table
2.3 still hold.
In Table 2.4, GOVEFF variable refers to the Government Effectiveness Index from
the World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators. It varies both by year and by
country. This proxy captures the perceptions of the quality of public services, the
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pres-
sures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of the
government’s commitment to such policies. Furthermore, I use two time-invariant
proxies for religious devotion from the latest waves of World Values Survey in each
country: Religiosity, which is the percentage of the respondents who consider them-
selves religious in the survey, and Secularism, indicating how necessary the respon-
dents consider the interpretation of regulations by religious authorities. Due to bank
fixed effects, individual effects of Religiosity and Secularism cannot be estimated.
However, the effects of interactions of these variables with GOVEFF can still be es-
timated. The results from Table 2.4 suggest that the baseline results are robust to
the inclusion of control variables capturing religiosity and government efficiency and
their interaction.
2.5.3 Commingling, Cross-Subsidization and Bank Risk-Taking
Hypothesis 2 argues that under a common deposit insurance scheme, Islamic depos-
itors can be affected by commingled funds when their banks become insolvent. In
other words, under a conventional deposit insurance system, Islamic funds would
be invested in interest-bearing assets (commingling). In case of bank insolvency, Is-
lamic depositors would be cross-subsidized by the commingled funds. A sufficient
condition to test this hypothesis is to consider how Islamic depositors react to bank
insolvency before and after the reform. If Hypothesis 2 is indeed correct, one must
observe a decrease in the deposit supply in response to an increase in bank insolvency
12Note that bank fixed effects also serve as country fixed effects in this setup.
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by depositors for pre-treatment observations. Also, the degree of disciplining against
bank insolvency must decline for post-treatment observations.
Table 2.5 shows the estimation results of equations (2.3) and (2.4). Coefficient es-
timates of Z − score demonstrate that before the treatment, Islamic depositors tend
to withdraw their funds and ask for higher returns in response to an increase in the
probability of bank insolvency (shown in columns (1) and (2), respectively). Interest-
ingly, the coefficient estimates of the interaction term, Treatment ∗Z− score in columns
(1) and (2) indicate that there is a significant decline in the degree of disciplining de-
pending on the status of the treatment. That is, the degree of disciplining in response
to an increase in the probability of bank insolvency decreases significantly after the
announcement of a separate Islamic deposit insurance scheme.
In short, the results from Table 2.5 verify the hypothesis that depositors of Islamic
banks are concerned about being compensated by the commingled funds in case their
banks become insolvent. After the treatment, however, as the possibility of commin-
gling and cross-subsidization vanishes, depositors of Islamic banks also stop engaging
in disciplining through reducing the deposit supply in response to an increase in bank
insolvency risk.
The economic intuition behind the estimation results presented in Table 2.5 might
not be straight forward. Ultimately, the table presents the results on the effect of the
treatment depending on Z− score. To be able to interpret the estimated coefficients in
a meaningful way, I concentrate on the changes in deposit growth and return along
the distribution of Z − score. Moving from 75th percentile (51.38) to 25th percentile
(17.14) of the Z − score distribution, treatment variable increases deposit growth by
1.2 percentage points and decreases deposit return by 0.8 percentage points.
So far, I have not touched upon the issue of whether the treatment variable has
an effect on risk-taking of individual banks. This issue is particularly relevant in my
study for the following reason: If the new deposit insurance scheme provided an ad-
equate regulatory discipline forcing Islamic banks to take on less financial risk, the
evidence on depositors’ rewarding their banks might simply be due to a decrease in
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Table 2.5: Evidence on commingling and cross-subsidization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEPG DEPR DEPG DEPR
Z-score 0.00101∗∗ -0.000353∗∗ 0.000905∗∗ -0.000319∗
(0.000306) (0.000104) (0.000298) (0.000136)
Treatment × Z-score -0.000317∗∗∗ 0.000162∗ -0.000313∗∗∗ 0.000153∗
(0.0000552) (0.0000764) (0.0000431) (0.0000615)
DEPG(−i)ct 0.0493∗
(0.0205)
DEPR(−i)ct 0.0751
(0.114)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fundamentals Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wild Bootstrap-t p-value 0.044 0.092 - -
N 294 292 294 292
R2 0.472 0.788 0.497 0.791
Notes: The sample period is 2007-2015. This table reports the estimation results from equa-
tions (2.3) and (2.4). The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is DEPG. The dependent
variable in columns (2) and (4) is DEPR. Treatment refers to the announcement of a separate
Islamic deposit insurance scheme. All columns include bank fixed effects, year fixed effects,
bank fundamentals and macro controls. Bank fundamentals are ReturnonAssets, LoanQuality,
Liquidity, Size and CapitalAssetRatio. Macro controls include HHI, GDPperCapitaGrowth,
In f lation, PopulationGrowth. DEPG(−i)ct and DEPR(−i)ct are respective mean values of DEPG
and DEPR of each country and each year excluding each respective bank i itself. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered by country. Wherever shown, country-level
clustered standard errors are wild bootstrapped. Wild bootstrapped p-values for the coeffi-
cient of Treatment ∗ Z − score variable is reported. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.6: Sharia-compliant deposit insurance and bank risk-taking
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Z-score Loan Quality CAR ROA Liquidity
Treatment -4.699 0.00235 -0.0193 -0.00981 0.0709
(4.107) (0.0108) (0.0101) (0.0120) (0.0453)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fundamentals No No No No No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wild Bootstrap-t p-value 0.65 0.77 0.32 0.95 0.43
N 347 319 347 347 347
R2 0.951 0.638 0.878 0.482 0.618
Notes: The sample period is 2007-2015. This table reports the estimation results from
yi,c,t = αi + αt + β1Treatmentc,t + β2MacroControlsc,t + ei,c,t. The dependent variables are
Z− score, LoanQuality, CAR (capital asset ratio), ROA (return on assets), Liquidity. Treatment
refers to the announcement of a separate Islamic deposit insurance scheme. All columns in-
clude bank fixed effects, bank fundamentals, year fixed effects and macro controls. Bank
fundamentals include Size. Macro controls include HHI, GDPperCapitaGrowth, In f lation,
PopulationGrowth. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered by coun-
try. Wherever shown, country-level clustered standard errors are wild bootstrapped. Wild
bootstrapped p-values for the coefficient of Treatment variable is reported. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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risk-taking. Although the reduced-form model takes care of the direct effects of reg-
ulatory discipline (deposit demand side), the indirect effects manifesting themselves
through financial risk-taking cannot be taken care of. Especially in the price equa-
tion, this effect can show itself through a traditional risk-return relationship. Thus,
whether such a scenario is present is an empirical concern, which I address in Table
2.6.
I use five dependent variables, which are largely accepted as factors capturing the
publicly observable risk of banks (Martinez-Peria et al. (2001)). The coefficient of
interest is still the treatment variable that measures if there was a significant change
in terms of risk-taking differentially for treated banks after the announcement of a
separate Islamic deposit insurance scheme. Given that all of these publicly observable
risk variables could be affected by the treatment variable and confound the treatment,
I exclude them as controls for one another in the regressions. Therefore, Table 2.6
presents the results without BankFundamentals as controls.
As Table 2.6 suggests, none of the risk variables seem to be significantly changed
after the treatment. Hence, the indirect effects of regulatory discipline affecting the
supply of deposits through a reduction in banks’ financial risk-taking seem not to be
present.
2.5.4 Robustness Tests
This section presents several robustness tests. First, baseline regressions presented in
Table 2.3 include units that are never treated (Turkey) and always treated (Malaysia).
Although the staggered DID methodology is robust to the inclusion of such units,
given the limited variation in my treatment, I may pick up a cross-country variation
that does not change over time. In other words, the baseline findings might not
be related to the change in deposit insurance if Malaysia always had high levels of
Islamic deposit supply and Turkey had low levels of Islamic deposit supply. To show
that my results are indeed driven by separation announcements of deposit insurance
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Table 2.7: Baseline regressions without Malaysia and Turkey
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEPG DEPR DEPG DEPR
Treatment 0.0201∗∗∗ -0.00904∗ 0.0198∗∗∗ -0.00885∗∗
(0.00602) (0.00377) (0.00506) (0.00306)
DEPG(−i)ct 0.0445
(0.0297)
DEPR(−i)ct 0.0840
(0.136)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No No
Bank Fundamentals Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wild Bootstrap-t p-value 0.046 0.097 - -
N 124 122 124 122
R2 0.323 0.698 0.402 0.743
Notes: The sample period is 2007-2015. This table reports the estimation results from equa-
tions (2.1) and (2.2) with a sample excluding Malaysia and Turkey. The dependent variable
in columns (1) and (3) is DEPG. The dependent variable in columns (2) and (4) is DEPR.
Treatment refers to the announcement of a separate Islamic deposit insurance scheme. All
columns include bank fixed effects, time fixed effects, bank fundamentals and macro controls.
Bank fundamentals are ReturnonAssets, LoanQuality, Liquidity, Size, CapitalAssetRatio and
Z− score. Macro controls include HHI, GDPperCapitaGrowth, In f lation, PopulationGrowth.
DEPG(−i)ct and DEPR(−i)ct are respective mean values of DEPG and DEPR of each country
and each year excluding each respective bank i itself. Standard errors are shown in paren-
theses and are clustered by country. Wherever shown, country-level clustered standard errors
are wild bootstrapped. Wild bootstrapped p-values for the coefficient of Treatment variable is
reported. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.8: Evidence on commingling and cross-subsidization with natural logarithm
of Z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEPG DEPR DEPG DEPR
ln(Z-score) 0.0308∗ -0.0139∗ 0.0281∗ -0.0129∗
(0.014504) (0.006217) (0.013547) (0.006143)
Treatment × ln(Z-score) -0.0079∗∗ 0.0023∗ -0.0074∗∗ 0.0022∗
(0.00268) (0.000993) (0.002264) (0.000801)
DEPG(−i)ct 0.0479∗
(0.0230)
DEPR(−i)ct 0.0773
(0.113)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fundamentals Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wild Bootstrap-t p-value 0.066 0.095 - -
N 294 292 294 292
R2 0.472 0.788 0.497 0.791
Notes: The sample period is 2007-2015. This table reports the estimation results from equa-
tions (2.3) and (2.4). The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is DEPG. The dependent
variable in columns (2) and (4) is DEPR. Treatment refers to the announcement of a separate
Islamic deposit insurance scheme. All columns include bank fixed effects, year fixed effects,
bank fundamentals and macro controls. Bank fundamentals are ReturnonAssets, LoanQuality,
Liquidity, Size and CapitalAssetRatio. Macro controls include HHI, GDPperCapitaGrowth,
In f lation, PopulationGrowth. DEPG(−i)ct and DEPR(−i)ct are respective mean values of DEPG
and DEPR of each country and each year excluding each respective bank i itself. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered by country. Wherever shown, country-level
clustered standard errors are wild bootstrapped. Wild bootstrapped p-values for the coeffi-
cient of Treatment ∗ ln(Z− score) variable is reported. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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funds, I re-run baseline regressions with a sample that excludes Malaysia and Turkey.
Taking these two countries out of my sample leads to a decline in the number of
observations by 170. Table 2.7 shows the estimation results. It indicates that even
with a sample that excludes never treated and always treated units, baseline results
still hold. In other words, previous results are not driven by cross-country variation
that is unrelated to the treatment variable.
Second, evidence on the channel of cross-subsidization depicted in Table 2.5 in-
cludes Z-scores as bank solvency measures as proposed by Lepetit and Strobel (2013).
However, as noted in Leaven and Levine (2009), Z-score is a highly-skewed measure
of bank solvency. Instead, they suggest using the natural logarithm of Z-score. Al-
though subsequent studies questioned this suggestion (Lapteacru (2016)), for the sake
of completeness, I repeat the analysis shown in Table 2.5 with the natural logarithm
of Z-score. Table 2.8 presents the respective estimation results. It verifies the previ-
ous findings on the channel of cross-subsidization: though correcting the skewness
in Z-score measure by taking its natural logarithm leads to a loss in statistical signif-
icance to a certain extent, all the findings presented in Table 2.5 still hold at the 10%
significance level.
2.5.5 Alternative Identification: Triple-Differences Model
DID estimates assume that, conditional on control variables, there are no country
factors confounding the treatment variable, varying in both country and time dimen-
sions. As in all DID setups, the treatment variable is attributed to the event that the
researcher thinks most important. However, the uncertainty of what is actually cap-
tured by the treatment variable is a significant concern due to potential unobserved
contaminating events.13
This critical DID assumption can be relaxed by including another control group in
13For instance, in Bahrain, the announcement of a separate Islamic deposit insurance scheme was
coupled with an announcement of an increase in deposit insurance coverage both for Islamic and
conventional banks. Therefore, the observed effect of Islamic depositors rewarding their banks might
not come from the separate deposit insurance announcement but from increased deposit insurance
coverage. Many contaminating events alike might exist.
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Table 2.9: Conventional banks only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEPG DEPR DEPG DEPR
Treatment -0.00441 0.00356 -0.00240 0.00186
(0.00506) (0.00257) (0.00315) (0.00101)
DEPG(−i)ct 0.659∗∗∗
(0.106)
DEPR(−i)ct 0.736∗∗∗
(0.0860)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fundamentals Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 990 993 990 993
R2 0.469 0.801 0.502 0.827
Notes: The sample covers only conventional banks and the sample period is 2007-2015. The
dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is DEPG. The dependent variable in columns (2)
and (4) is DEPR Treatment refers to the announcement of separate Islamic deposit insurance
scheme. All columns include bank fixed effects, time fixed effects and macro controls. Macro
controls include HHI, GDPperCapitaGrowth, In f lation, PopulationGrowth. DEPG(−i)ct and
DEPR(−i)ct are respective mean values of DEPG and DEPR of each country and each year
excluding each respective bank i itself. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are
clustered by country. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.10: Pre-treatment variable means of Islamic banks and conventional banks
Mean (Islamic) Mean (Conventional)
Dependent Variables
DEPG 0.09(0.08)
0.10
(0.16)
DEPR 0.05(0.03)
0.049
(0.023)
Bank Fundamentals
Return on Assets 0.08(0.07)
0.01
(0.04)
Loan Quality 0.09(0.16)
0.05
(0.14)
Liquidty 0.24(0.13)
0.26
(0.13)
Size 21.2(1.51)
21.5
(1.55)
Capital Asset Ratio 0.18(0.08)
0.13
(0.06)
Z-score 2.59(2.44)
2.35
(2.11)
Notes: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. This table shows the variable means
across Islamic and conventional banks before the announcement of a separate Islamic deposit
insurance scheme. Group means of dependent variables are not (statistically) significantly
different from each other.
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each country which is not subject to our treatment of decline in Sharia risk as a result
of a separate Islamic deposit insurance announcement. A recent implementation of
this approach in financial intermediation literature comes from Körner (2017). The
underlying idea is that a comparison between non-treated control units in the coun-
try where the treatment happened and the non-treated units in other countries are
subtracted from the difference-in-differences estimate. Thus, this approach is called
“triple-differences”.
To this end, conventional banks in my sample countries can be used as an addi-
tional control group for my analysis. However, using conventional banks as another
set of control group requires satisfying some conditions. Under the Neyman-Rubin
framework, one crucial assumption to establish a causal relationship is the stable
unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), where treatment assignment to one group
does not affect the potential outcome for the other group (Rubin (1977)). In my set
up, although the announcement of a separate, Sharia-compliant deposit insurance
scheme should not directly affect conventional banks’ depositors, it can affect them
indirectly. First, conventional depositors could be affected by the announcement due
to a potential shrink in the size of the conventional deposit insurance scheme after
separation. Second, depositors could switch between the two types of banks, which
could very well occur in my setting. In fact, switching from conventional banks to
Islamic banks after the separation announcement could result in overestimation in
my triple-differences regression. Therefore, it is crucial to test whether treatment has
some significant effect on the newly introduced control group of conventional banks.
Table 2.9 presents the results emanating from regressing the treatment variable
on the outcome variables of the conventional banks. The insignificant coefficients
indicate that the treatment variable does not affect the newly introduced control group
of conventional banks. A triple-differences methodology could be applied from the
perspective of SUTVA.
In the next step, I investigate how similar are the Islamic and conventional banks in
outcome variables before the intervention took place. Table 2.10 shows the summary
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Table 2.11: Triple-differences regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEPG DEPR DEPG DEPR
Treatment × Islamic 0.0185∗ -0.00967∗∗∗
(0.00867) (0.00153)
Z-score × Islamic 0.000876∗∗∗ -0.000268∗∗
(0.000167) (0.000100)
Treatment × Z-score × Islamic -0.000281∗∗∗ 0.000177∗∗∗
(0.0000563) (0.0000348)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Type-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Type Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fundamentals Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wild Bootstrap-t p-value 0.090 0.045 0.015 0.025
N 1145 1146 1145 1146
R2 0.517 0.809 0.516 0.808
Notes: The sample period is 2007-2015. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is
DEPG. The dependent variable in columns (2) and (4) is DEPR. Columns (1) and (2) show
the estimation results of equations (2.5) and (2.6), respectively. Columns (3) and (4) show
the estimation results for triple-differences specification. Treatment refers to the announce-
ment of a separate Islamic deposit insurance scheme. Islamic is a dummy variable taking the
value one (1) for Islamic banks and zero (0) otherwise. All columns include bank fixed effects,
country-year fixed effects, bank type-year fixed effects, bank fundamentals and bank type con-
trols. Bank fundamentals are ReturnonAssets, LoanQuality, Liquidity, Size, CapitalAssetRatio
and Z − score. Bank type controls include the interaction of Islamic variable with following
macro-level variables: HHI, GDPperCapitaGrowth, In f lation, PopulationGrowth. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered by country. Wherever shown, country-level
clustered standard errors are wild bootstrapped. For columns (1) and (2), wild bootstrapped
p-values for the coefficient of Treatment ∗ Islamic variable and for columns (3) and (4) wild
bootstrapped p-values for the coefficient of Treatment ∗ Z − score ∗ Islamic variable are re-
ported. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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statistics of dependent and independent variables separately for conventional and
Islamic banks in pre-treatment periods. Interestingly, there are no systematic differ-
ences between these two groups in terms of the dependent variables, which suggests
that it is plausible to use conventional banks as the second control group. The differ-
ence between these two groups manifests itself in other bank characteristics, which I
would ultimately include as control variables in my estimations. The corresponding
reduced-form model turns into
DEPGisct = αi + αct + αst + δ1Treatmentct ∗ Islamics + γ1BankFundamentalsisct−1
+ η1Xsct + eisct (2.5)
DEPRisct = βi + βct + βst + δ2Treatmentct ∗ Islamics + γ2BankFundamentalsisct−1
+ η2Xsct + uisct (2.6)
where s indexes banking sector (Islamic bank or conventional bank). αi and βi capture
all time-invariant bank factors. Moreover, αc,t captures all time-variant country-level
factors common to both banking sectors. Finally, αs,t and βs,t reflects time-varying
banking sector factors that are constant across countries. Treatmentc,t ∗ Islamics, this
time, indicates Islamic banks after the announcement of a separate Islamic deposit
insurance scheme. So as to take into account the possibility that Islamic banks and
conventional banks can react differently to prevailing macroeconomic conditions, pre-
vious macro-level controls are multiplied by a dummy variable, Islamics that takes the
value one (1) for Islamic banks and zero (0) otherwise, which are denoted by Xs,c,t.
Bank-level controls are included as before.
The results of this approach are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.11.
Though the magnitude of δˆ1 is smaller and δˆ2 is bigger than the difference-in-difference
estimates, the inclusion of conventional banks as an additional control group does
not alter the conclusion that Islamic depositors reward their banks due to further
Sharia compliance brought by an announcement of a separate Islamic deposit insur-
ance scheme. In addition, columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.11 also verify the finding that
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commingling and cross-subsidization channels are present.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter attempts to improve our understanding of whether non-pecuniary ap-
peals such as religion play a role in financial decision-making. To answer this ques-
tion, I turn my attention to a natural experiment in which several countries announced
a separation of deposit insurance funds between Islamic and conventional banks to
allow the former to have a Sharia-compliant coverage scheme. Using hand-collected
bank-level data and differences-in-differences as well as triple-differences methodolo-
gies, I find that depositors of Islamic banks reward their banks after the announcement
of a separate Islamic deposit insurance fund in the sense that they increase the quan-
tity deposited and ask for lower deposit returns. In a way, they reward their banks
due to a decline in Sharia nonconformity risk, which was present when the adminis-
tration of the funds attributable to Islamic deposits was under a conventional deposit
insurance scheme.
I also find that former disciplining by Islamic banks’ depositors against the risk of
insolvency vanishes after the announcement of a separate Islamic deposit insurance
scheme. I attribute these findings to the commingling and cross-subsidization chan-
nels. These results point to a trade-off between availability of funds (deposit supply)
and the existence of market discipline in the design of deposit insurance schemes in
banking systems where religious sentiments matter.
Overall, my findings expand several strands of the literature ranging from the role
of non-monetary incentives in financial decision making to the effect of deposit insur-
ance on depositor disciplining. The results indicate that Sharia compliance induced by
Islamic deposit insurance reforms were morally persuasive from Islamic depositors’
perspective. These results can also be interpreted as ethical appeals such as religiosity
playing a role in depositors’ financial decision making and determining depositors’
sensitivity to bank risk. They provide a rationale for the recent increases in ethical in-
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vesting around the world. To my knowledge, this is the first evidence in the literature
that examines the effects of religious branding of financial reforms.
Appendices
A Reports on Separate Islamic Deposit Insurance Announcement
This section presents anecdotal evidence on the concept of deposit insurance from a
religious perspective as well as the announcements of separate Islamic deposit insur-
ance funds.
1. Reuters Financials, December 3, 2014: Indonesia eyes Islamic repo rules, separate
deposit insurance “... Deposit Insurance Corporation or Lembaga Penjamin Sim-
panan (LPS) plans to create a separate scheme to guarantee Islamic bank de-
posits, according to Bisnis Indonesia newspaper... Lack of Islamic deposit insur-
ance has been a longstanding problems in the industry, which is set to aggravate
due to incoming requirements from Basel III regulatory standards... Analysts
believe creating a separate fund to cover Islamic deposits would also improve
customer perception of the industry."
2. Jordan Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2012: Deposit Insurance for Islamic Banks
“The General Ifta’ Department issued its Fatwa nr (13/2012) relevant to the
permissibility of insuring deposits held with Islamic Banks. The Fatwa stipulates
that: ‘..., the Council considers the legitimate permissibility of establishing the
Fund for Islamic deposit insurance and the soundness of proposed amendments
on the draft Law and its compliance with the respective Shari’ah Principles. And
God knows best’.”
3. Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, February 2015:
Deposit Insurance frameworks for Islamic banks: design and policy considerations (by
Hdeel Abdelhady) “... Jordan was, as of November 2014, amending its law to es-
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tablish an Islamic deposit insurance framework, to operate alongside its existing
conventional system...”
4. The Jakarta Post, August 2, 2016: Sharia compliance in deposit insurance “... Under
the deposit insurance system, a bank pays a premium to the deposit insurer and,
if the bank is wound up, the deposit insurer reimburses the insured depositors.
The acts of the deposit insurer in collecting the premium from the bank and
reimbursing the insured depositors of the bank is deemed to be an interest-based
transaction. Based on the above, deposit insurance does involve the exchange of
money for money and the exchange occurs with different values and at different
times... The interest element... exist in deposit insurance when the deposit
insurer is involved in interest-based transactions or activities.
This can happen when the deposit insurer protects deposits, invests the deposit
insurance funds, lends to troubled banks or obtains external funds (when in
deficit), as all these activities are based on interest. In addition to interest, un-
certainty and gambling, Sharia also does not allow certain other elements to
exist in a deposit insurance system. For instance, deposit insurance funds must
not be used for the purchase of liquor and pork, or any activities prohibited
under Sharia.”
5. Central Bank of Bahrain, 2012: Consumer Information: Deposits & Unrestricted
Investment Accounts Protection Scheme “The Central Bank of Bahrain has issued
on the 13th January 2011, Resolution No. (34) for the year 2010 with respect
to promulgating a Regulation "Protecting Deposits and Unrestricted Investment
Accounts" in accordance with the provisions of Article 177 of the Central Bank
of Bahrain and Financial Institutions Law No. (64) for the year 2006... In order
to maintain a level playing field and to encourage a healthy competitive envi-
ronment between Conventional and Islamic banks, the new scheme provides
protection to unrestricted investment accounts in Islamic banks vis-à-vis the de-
posits in conventional banks. The new scheme requires the establishment of two
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separate funds (Conventional fund and Islamic fund). ”
B Disciplining Based on Bank Insolvency in the Rubin Causal Frame-
work
Let yi,c,t and zi,c,t respectively measure Islamic deposit supply and solvency of bank
i, in country c at time t and dc,t be the announcement ofa separate Islamic deposit
insurance. Consider the following empirical model of testing the degree of market
discipline based on zi,c,t and dc,t:
yi,c,t = β0 + β1zi,c,t + β2zi,c,tdc,t + ei,c,t, (2.7)
where ei,c,t well-behaves. Then, before the announcement of a separate Islamic
deposit insurance, the change in Islamic deposit supply due to a decline in bank
solvency is given by:
E[yi,c,t|zi,c,t = zhigh, dc,t = 0]− E[yi,c,t|zi,c,t = zlow, dc,t = 0] = β1(zhigh − zlow) (2.8)
Thus, β1 measures the degree of market discipline before the announcement of a
separate Islamic deposit insurance. By the same token, after the announcement of a
separate Islamic deposit insurance, the change in deposit supply due to a decline in
bank solvency is given by:
E[yi,c,t|zi,c,t = zhigh, dc,t = 1]− E[yi,c,t|zi,c,t = zlow, dc,t = 1] = (2.9)
β1(zhigh − zlow) + β2(zhigh − zlow)
Thus, β1 + β2 measures the degree of market discipline after the announcement of
a separate Islamic deposit insurance. Finally, the differential change in the deposit
supply moving from before announcement to after announcement is given by:
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E[yi,c,t|zi,c,t = zhigh, dc,t = 1]− E[yi,c,t|zi,c,t = zlow, dc,t = 1] (2.10)
−[E[yi,c,t|zi,c,t = zhigh, dc,t = 0]− E[yi,c,t|zi,c,t = zlow, dc,t = 0]]
= β2(zhigh − zlow)
Thus, β2 measures what happens to the degree of market discipline when we move
from the pre-treatment to the post-treatment observations.
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Chapter 3
Bank Failures and Wage Inequality*
3.1 Introduction
A notable feature of the recent financial crisis has been the spike in local bank failures
in the US, with the share of failing depository institutions approximating the levels
seen towards the end of the savings and loan crisis in the 1990s (see Figure 3.1).
Although there is a growing consensus that local bank failures lead to disruptions in
credit provision, resulting in a decline in economic growth (Gilbert and Kochin (1989);
Ashcraft (2005); Ziebarth (2013); Kandrac (2014)), it is still unclear whether the credit
shocks induced by bank failures affect the whole population equally, or whether they
disproportionately affect the rich or poor. This chapter attempts to fill this gap by
analyzing the effect of local bank failures on the wage differential between skilled
and unskilled workers; or, the skill premium.
There are both supply (worker) and demand (employer) side arguments explain-
ing how bank failures may affect skilled and unskilled workers differentially. On
the supply side, bank failures may amplify adverse economic shocks and unskilled
workers, who may not have as much of savings compared to skilled workers, might
be willing to supply more hours of work to smooth consumption. On the extensive
margin of the labor supply, a similar effect may occur as a household strategy: Due to
*This chapter is a joint work with Christopher Martin Hols from the Bonn Graduate School of
Economics.
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Figure 3.1: Share of commercial bank failures
Notes: Data is obtained from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Failed Bank
List. The figure shows the percentage of failed commercial banks as a share of the total
commercial banks in the US for the time period 1990-2011. Years whose bars are indicated
with red demonstrate the time frame considered in this chapter. We are not able to study the
bank failure episodes after 2009 due to changing community borders, which is an essential
ingredient for the identification strategy of this paper. This is explained in what follows.
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unemployment of one spouse, the other, who would not have participated in the la-
bor force otherwise, may enter into the labor force (Degirmenci and Ilkkaracan, 2013).
To the extent that this occurs among unskilled individuals relatively more, it may
exacerbate the wage differentials between skilled and unskilled individuals.
On the demand side, bank failures can influence both aggregate production and
the allocation of credit, which may alter the demand for unskilled and skilled work-
ers with concomitant ramifications on the wage differentials between skilled and un-
skilled workers (Townsend and Ueda (2006)). During episodes of lacking financing
induced by bank failures, an average firm may have to scale down operations and re-
duce labor demand. In doing so, it may tend to protect more educated workers due to
higher firing and future re-recruitment costs, leading to relatively lower demand for
unskilled vis-à-vis skilled workers (Lopez and Oliviella (2014)). On the other hand,
bank failures could trigger firm failures and drive down wages of either one of the
groups that become unemployed due to failure of their employers.
Also, the effects of bank failures on wage inequality may not be homogeneous
across all sectors of an economy. Heterogeneity may arise from the differential ex-
posures of sectors to credit shocks. In particular, sectors may structurally differ in
their dependence on bank credit and their technological ability to pledge collateral
to alleviate the adverse effects of bank failures. For example, for sectors that rely on
a type of capital that cannot be pledged as collateral, relationship lending can be an
important financing mechanism and disruptions to credit relationships as a result of
bank failures may affect these sectors more severely.1 There may also be technological
differences across sectors regarding the degree of complementarity/substitutability of
skilled versus unskilled workers with the type of capital employed in production.
We argue that tangible capital increases the ability of a firm to alleviate the effects
of negative credit shocks induced by local bank failures. Conversely, firms that use
1Boot (2000) demonstrates the importance of relationship lending in eliminating information asym-
metries for borrowers with little collateral value. Kandrac (2014) documents that the negative effects of
bank failures on the real economy was felt more severely for the US. counties where credit relationships
were disrupted more during the 2008 financial crisis.
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more intangible capital as opposed to tangible capital would be relatively more af-
fected by bank failures. We also argue that intangible capital is knowledge-intensive
and, therefore, relatively more complementary with skilled labor than unskilled labor.
Hence, affected firms, which cannot pledge enough collateral, are the ones which are
likely to demand less unskilled labor during episodes of bank failure.
Empirical testing of these hypotheses faces a significant endogeneity problem:
Bank failures do not happen randomly.2 Underlying economic conditions (demo-
graphics, corporate and household leverage, credit-worthiness of the community mem-
bers) which vary over time may cause both the incidence of financial distress (Mian
et al. (2013)) and widening inequality (Kumhof et al. (2015)). Similarly, regulatory
institutions could “forbear” failing certain banks based on community-level economic
trajectories that may coincide with factors affecting wage differentials between skilled
and unskilled workers.3
We address these challenges by following a two-fold empirical methodology. First,
we identify the location of failed bank branches in each Public Use Micro-data Area
(PUMA) for the years 2007-2009.4 We are not able to study the effects of bank failures
after 2009 due to changing PUMA borders with the census of 2010. Following Ashcraft
(2005) and Kandrac (2014), we classify PUMAs with at least one failed bank branch as
affected areas. We then estimate a Mincerian skill-wage equation to test if the wage
gap between skilled and unskilled workers is higher in affected PUMAs. Importantly,
we enrich our regressions with several multi-way fixed effects that control for all time-
varying community, sector as well as community and sector differences that capture
underlying economic conditions across each industry within a PUMA. Conditional
on all these time-varying and sector- as well as community-specific characteristics, we
argue that failures of thrift and depository institutions are exogenous to individual
workers. Hence, a multi-way fixed effects approach enables us to abstract from the
2See Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) for an overarching description of the endogenous relation-
ship between financial distress and inequality.
3See Brown and Dinç (2011) for the determinants of regulatory forbearance.
4PUMAs are geographical units used by the US Census for providing statistical and demographic
information. Section 5 offers an extensive description of PUMAs.
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endogeneity concerns mentioned above.
Our findings indicate that local bank failures indeed widened the wage gap be-
tween skilled and unskilled workers during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. These find-
ings are statistically and economically significant and suggest that local bank failures
explain around 6% to 10% of the average annual wage gap between skilled and un-
skilled workers. We apply several tests to show that these results are not driven
by other confounding factors documented for similar setups such as suppressed un-
skilled wages causing subprime defaults that, in turn, lead to bank failures (Duffie
(2010); Mian and Sufi (2014)).
In the second step, we focus on whether the increase in the skill premium as a re-
sult of bank failures is demand- or supply-driven. To this end, we follow Popov and
Rocholl (2016) and investigate the effect of bank failures not only on price (wages) but
also on quantity (labor hours) measures. Simultaneous consideration of wages (price)
and labor hours (quantity) in a reduced-form model enables us to conclude if the
observed effects are demand- or supply-driven. In addition, we apply several tests to
study the impact of local bank failures on the labor force participation, labor market
attachment of individuals and the adjustment mechanism of labor. We conclude that
the observed effects are indeed driven by a differential decline in unskilled labor de-
mand, not by a reduction in unskilled employment but cuts in working hours of the
unskilled.5 Importantly, local bank failures not having an impact on unemployment
suggests the following: A potential explanation where bank failures push firms into
failures, making unskilled unemployed, and ultimately driving the wage gap, is un-
likely because we can reject the hypothesis that bank failures lead to unemployment.
We further substantiate the demand channel by exploiting the variation of knowl-
edge intensity across sectors. The idea is the following: If credit shocks induced by
bank failures increased the skill premium, it should have done more so in sectors for
which skilled workers are indispensable for production, or to put it differently, sec-
5We also find evidence that bank failures result in the differential decline in full-time unskilled
employment. This is on a par with the adjustment of labor costs through cuts in working hours.
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tors that are knowledge intensive. Following the definition of knowledge intensity by
Claessens and Ueda (2008), we document that the effect of bank failures on the skill
premium positively depends on the knowledge intensity of the sectors.6 The eco-
nomic significance of the results suggests that one standard deviation increase from
the mean in the knowledge intensity results in 2.8% more bank failure-induced skill
premium, which, evaluated at the average, translates into an annual increase of US
$1,260.
In the next step, continuing with the sector approach, we identify a unique channel
for the observed demand-driven wage inequality. We exploit sectoral heterogeneity
across the usage of tangible and intangible capital to test if one observes higher wage
inequality in more affected firms, which use more intangible capital and less tangible
capital. In particular, we document that the effect of bank failures on wage inequal-
ity is differentially higher for sectors that rely more on intangible capital relative to
tangible capital. We attribute this finding to the fact that the type of capital firms
use matters for the transmission of local credit shocks to the labor market. These
results are consistent with knowledge-dependent capital being financed through for-
gone earnings of unskilled workers when total financing capacity shrinks.7
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the liter-
ature review and the contribution of this study. Section 3 provides background infor-
mation on the institutional setup. Section 4 explains the mechanism through which
bank failures lead to increased wage inequality. Section 5 describes the data used.
Section 6 presents the empirical methodology employed in the study and presents
the baseline results. Section 7 establishes the channel through which bank failures
widen the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers. Section 8 presents the
additional robustness tests and, finally, Section 9 concludes.
6The ratio of research and development (R&D) expenditures to sales is the measure proposed by
Claessens and Ueda (2008).
7Even if the firms reliant on intangible capital (hence, more affected) might fail after their banks
fail, laying off and ultimately driving down the wages of skilled workers, these can only lead to the
underestimation of our results.
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3.2 Literature Review
“The bank failure channel” as a term is brought up to summarize the mechanisms
through which bank failures can influence the real economy (Ramirez and Shively
(2012)). There are two main channels through which this can happen: (i) Wealth ef-
fect - a bank failure can result in the loss of wealth for uninsured depositors or other
creditors. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Calomiris (1993) show that the adverse
wealth effects induced by bank failures can be felt in the real economy through a re-
duction in consumer spending. (ii) Credit effect - a bank failure can result in disrup-
tions in bank-firm credit relationships, in which case bank-dependent firms may face
an increased cost of funds. Besides, a local bank failure can lead to credit crunches
not only through a contraction in loan supply but also more apprehensive lending
behavior by surviving banks in view of increasing uncertainty in the local economy
(Bernanke (1983); Calomiris and Mason (2003)).
We rule out the possibility that the bank failures observed during the recent finan-
cial crisis created an adverse wealth effect for several reasons. First, the US Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act, introduced in October 2008 increased the deposit insur-
ance coverage from US $100,000 to 250,000 to protect the wealth of depositors and
prevent bank runs. Secondly, Kandrac (2014), Granja (2017) and Vij (2018) argue that
the resolution regime applied in 95% of the failed bank cases during the recent fi-
nancial crisis ensured that the acquiring banks would assume 100% of deposits of
the failed banks. As a result, the deposit franchise value of failed banks was directly
transferred to acquiring banks. In addition to this, Kandrac (2014) and Vij (2018) doc-
ument that it was the contraction in loan supply and disrupted credit relationships
induced by bank failures that led to the observed decline in economic activity in the
US during the recent financial crisis.
Besides, we document suggestive evidence on the apprehensive effects of bank
failures on the lending behavior of surviving banks found by Bernanke (1983) and
Calomiris and Mason (2003) for similar environments. Figure 3.2 plots the lending
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behavior of surviving banks when their peers that operate in the same county fail.
It confirms that the loan growth by the surviving peers drops dramatically, reaching
even negative growth during the recent financial crisis. Therefore, we argue that bank
Figure 3.2: Lending behavior of banks whose peers failed
Notes: This figure shows the mean loan growth for banks whose peers, banks operating in
the same counties, failed. Vertical lines indicate the sample period considered in this chapter.
The data sources are the FDIC Summary of Deposits and the FDIC Call Reports.
failures observed during the recent financial crisis induced negative credit shocks.
This is in line with studies that look at similar environments and claim the credit
effects as the primary channel through which bank failures affected the real economy
throughout US history (Gilbert and Kochin, 1989; Ashcraft, 2005; Ziebarth, 2013; Kan-
drac 2014; Vij, 2018). These studies conclude that negative credit shocks induced by
bank failures result in a decline in economic activity. We contribute to this literature
by focusing on the distributional effects of bank failures. In particular, we show that
bank failures result in differential demands widening the wage gap between skilled
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and unskilled workers.
This study also contributes to the newly emerging literature on how finance affects
wage inequality. Beck et al. (2010) showed that branch deregulation decreases overall
income as well as wage inequality, while Jerzmanowski and Nabar (2013) showed
that the effect of branch deregulation reduces wage inequality. Larrain (2015) found
that financial capital account opening by eastern European countries increased the
wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers through the channels of capital-skill
complementarity and skill-biased technical change. This study also contributes to
this stock of evidence by introducing the channel of bank failures as a determinant of
wage inequality.
There is an extensive literature setting out the empirical evidence on the rising
skill premium and providing potential explanations (Katz and Murphy (1992); Ace-
moglu (2003); Acemoglu and Autor (2011)). Accelerating demand for skill due to
skill-biased technological change (Katz and Murphy (1992)), changes in the organi-
zation of production such as changes in factory systems (Acemoglu (1999); Beaudry
and Green (2003); Caroli and Van Reenen (2001)) and international trade (Acemoglu
(2003); Burstein and Vogel (2017)) are provided as key explanations for the rising
trend in the skill premium observed since the 1970s in the US. Although our study
has a short-term view and focuses on explaining wage inequality during the recent
financial crisis, it expands the literature on the skill premium by showing that bank
distress has an amplifying effect on it.
Our work is very closely related to previous studies that focus on the impact of
imperfections in the financial market on employment outcomes. The earlier evidence
relied on indirect measures of financing constraints such as balance sheet size of the
firms to pin down the effect of monetary policy on firm employment (Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994); Sharpe (1994); Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999)). More recent evidence
uses measures of external financial dependence introduced by Rajan and Zingales
(1998) to show employment effects. Duygan-Bump et al. (2015) showed that during
episodes of economic downturn, workers in small firms are more likely to become
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unemployed provided that they work in industries with high external financial de-
pendence. Benmelech et al. (2011) showed that shocks abroad matter for domestic
labor market conditions: A sharp decline in prices of real estate in Japan increases un-
employment in US metropolitan statistical areas with Japanese-affiliate banks. Green-
stone et al. (2014) found that the decline in small business lending in the US translates
into low levels of firm creation and higher unemployment. We expand this literature
by analyzing the distributional effects of financial distress in labor markets.
There is also a growing stock of evidence studying the effects of financial distress
on employment outcomes with bank-firm matched data. Chodorow-Reich (2014) ex-
ploited the event of Lehman bankruptcy and documented that firms with former
credit relationships with unhealthy lenders reduced employment by more compared
with healthier lenders’ clients in the US. Similar evidence for Germany was docu-
mented by Popov and Rocholl (2016). They studied the impact of funding shocks on
German savings banks during the US subprime mortgage crisis and found that firms
with credit relationships with affected banks experienced a decline in labor demand.
There are advantages and disadvantages of using bank-firm matched datasets. Al-
though such datasets allow precision in the assignment of treatment, Minamihashi
(2011) documented for the case of Japan that specific types of firm deal with un-
healthy banks and observed real outcomes as bank distress can be explained 80% of
the time by self-selection bias. Moreover, bank-firm matched datasets do not allow
for a holistic analysis of bank distress such as of the apprehensive credit contraction
by surviving banks mentioned above. Therefore, we compare similar communities
with and without bank failure experience to study the overarching effects of negative
credit shocks on wage inequality.
3.3 Resolution of Failed Banks
Vij (2018) stated that bank insolvencies are administered under the FDIC through a
non-judicial process. The financial health of the commercial banks is screened contin-
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uously by their regulators at either state or federal level and the case of resolving a
bank is launched when regulatory monitoring yields the result that a bank is highly
undercapitalized, meaning its equity to assets ratio is less than 2%. If the regulator
and the FDIC agree on closing the bank, the FDIC enters as the receiver. There is
no judicial option available for the failed bank itself or its creditors to challenge the
receivership by the FDIC (Ragalevsky and Ricardi (2009)).
Overall the FDIC has two primary roles in its capacities regarding managing is-
sues on bank failure. First, it provides deposit insurance services to covered banks.
Secondly, it is in charge of settling affairs in bank failure cases. By doing so, the FDIC
is mandated to choose the resolution scheme that is least costly for itself. To this end,
it initially undertakes procedures to value the assets and liabilities of failed banks. It
then evaluates which option is least costly from the perspective of the deposit insur-
ance fund (FDIC (2014)).
During the recent financial crisis, the primary resolution mechanism adopted by
the FDIC for an overwhelming majority of bank failures was the P&A transaction.
Under such an arrangement, the failed banks are auctioned to healthy banks through
a process very similar to a first price sealed bid auction. The winning bank comes into
agreement with the FDIC on whether the assets would be sold to another bank, and
if so, at what price and whether the FDIC would share the potential future losses as
a result of maintaining troubled assets of a failed bank, i.e., loss-sharing agreement.
Kandrac (2014) stated that during the recent financial crisis, loss-sharing contracts
were commonly applied to preserve the credit relationships between the borrowers
and the local bank branch.
One may argue that due to the presence of an acquirer, the adverse credit effects of
bank failures should be negligible. However, Vij (2018) showed that the business lend-
ing portfolio of an acquiring bank significantly shrinks after the acquisition process.
Moreover, Granja et al. (2017) showed that although the P&A mechanism meant that
there was almost always an acquiring bank for failed banks, there was a suboptimal
allocation of failed banks to potential acquirers, leading to a disruption of existing
64
CHAPTER 3. SKILL PREMIUM 3.4. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
credit relationships. Therefore, it is credible that bank failure episodes observed dur-
ing the recent financial crisis led to negative credit shocks.
3.4 Hypothesis Development
Previous literature shows that during episodes of financial distress when firms have
to cut down production and input costs, they may have skill-specific labor demand
(Lopez and Oliviella (2014)). In particular, firms may tend to protect more educated
workers due to higher firing and future re-recruitment costs, leading to relatively
lower demand for unskilled versus skilled workers. Besides, employment protection
legislation (EPL) could also create skill-specific unemployment risks (Bennett (2016)),
which may favor skilled vis-à-vis unskilled workers, especially during times of re-
duced financing. This leads us to form our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Local bank failures will increase wage inequality between skilled and un-
skilled workers (the skill premium) by, in relative terms, inducing firms to demand more skilled
vis-à-vis unskilled labor, widening the wage gap between the two types of workers.
It should be noted that Hypothesis 1 does not necessarily state that firms will
demand, in absolute terms, more skilled and less unskilled labor as a result of bank
failures. It instead argues that although there can be a decline in the labor demand
overall, reduction in the demand for unskilled labor will be relatively more severe
than that of skilled labor, which ultimately widens the wage gap between skilled and
unskilled workers.
Moreover, observed effects of banks failures on wage inequality may be heteroge-
neous across sectors of the economy. First, it can be argued that how firms would be
affected by bank failure-induced credit shocks is very much dependent on how much
firms rely on external finance as opposed to internal finance. Rajan and Zingales
(1998) showed, in their seminal contribution, that for technological reasons, sectors
are heterogeneous regarding their need for external finance. It is therefore plausible
to claim that, holding everything else constant, industries that rely more on external
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finance are likely to be more affected by bank failures. Thus, to the extent that ex-
ternally dependent sectors demand more skilled labor vis-à-vis unskilled labor, bank
failures may widen the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers.
Second, the heterogeneity in firms’ exposure to credit shocks induced by bank
failures can also stem from the heterogeneity in firms’ ability to pledge collateral. It
has been extensively shown that during financial distress episodes, determinants such
as collateral constraints and debt overhang tighten the financial constraints faced by
firms. Put differently, in financial distress situations, in which information asymme-
tries are exacerbated, a firm’s ability to be able to pledge collateral could be vital for
accessing scarce credit. Moreover, firms which, for technological reasons, are less ca-
pable of pledging collateral can rely more on relationship lending. Establishing and
maintaining relationships with borrowers is a crucial way to alleviate information
asymmetries by banks. Learning about borrowers allows banks to eliminate negative
NPV projects over time and overcome adverse selection (Boot (2000); Ongena and
Smith (2001); Degryse and Ongena (2001), (2005); Degryse et al. (2018)). Therefore, if
bank failures lead to disruptions in credit relationships, it is expected that firms that
cannot easily pledge collateral would be affected more severely by this. Overall, if
firms that are less able to pledge collateral happen to be the firms that demand more
skilled as opposed to unskilled labor, financial distress situations can indeed increase
the wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers.
The following question then arises: What is the link between a firm’s exposure to
credit shocks and its relative demand for skilled versus unskilled labor?
The type of labor a firm demands is very much dependent on the type of capital
a firm employs. At the same time, the type of capital a firm uses can also determine
how much a firm would be exposed to negative credit shocks (disruptions in credit re-
lationships, credit crunches, apprehensive lending by surviving peers etc.) from local
bank failures. Intangible capital, which is arguably more knowledge-dependent than
tangible capital, complements skilled labor more than unskilled labor (Hall (2000)
(2001)). Firms that have relatively more intangible capital naturally have more elastic
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demand for unskilled labor compared to firms that operate with more tangible capital.
However, as outlined by previous literature (Almeida and Campello (2008); Rampini
and Viswanathan (2010)), tangible capital has a comparative advantage in terms of
serving as collateral vis-à-vis intangible capital. Assets that are more tangible sustain
more external financing because such assets mitigate contractibility problems: Espe-
cially during episodes of financial distress such as bank failures, in which information
asymmetries and contractibility problems are exacerbated, possession of tangible cap-
ital that can be pledged as collateral is arguably vital to alleviate the negative effects
of credit contractions.
Hence, during episodes of bank failures, firms that rely relatively more on intan-
gible capital would be more affected by credit contraction. These are the firms that
demand more skilled labor as opposed to unskilled labor. In a way, the affected firms,
which cannot pledge enough collateral, are the ones which are likely to demand less
unskilled labor in episodes of bank failures. In other words, when bank failures hit
the local economy and lead firms to decrease input costs, the most affected sectors are
the ones that rely more on skilled labor for sustaining production and that can give
up employing unskilled labor relatively easily.
It should also be noted that the extent to which firms would be affected by bank
failures does not only depend on the share of tangible capital in the overall capital.
It also depends on to what extent firms are dependent on external finance. In fact,
for firms that rely on external finance to a lesser degree or not at all, the effects of
bank failures would be very indirect and minimal. Therefore, while testing the effect
of intangibility on the gap between skilled and unskilled workers, we need to control
for external dependence so that the sectors can be comparable to one another in terms
their reliance on the external finance 8. This leads us to form our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Holding dependence on external finance constant, the effects of bank fail-
ures on the skill premium will be higher in sectors that rely more on intangible capital vis-à-vis
8Although we control for sectors’ dependence on external finance, in one specification, we also
show the effect of interaction of intangibility and external dependence
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tangible capital.
It is important to note that the hypotheses we describe in this section need not
be the only answers to why and how bank failures may affect wage inequality. For
example, one potential explanation for how the effects of bank distress have been
felt in labor markets could be skill-biased technological change as documented for
similar environments by Jerzmanowski and Nabar (2013) and Larrain (2015). Due to
data limitations, we are unable to study the long-term effects or any other potential
channel that may link bank failures with wage inequality. What we can do, however,
is to control for all factors that are changing at community, sector and time levels
through multi-way fixed effects to control for the unobserved confounders, which is
explained in detail in the next section.
3.5 Data
We follow Kandrac (2014) and take each PUMA as a separate unit of analysis. PUMAs
are geographic divisions created by the US Census with the aim of providing statisti-
cal and demographic information. The reason for focusing on PUMA classification as
opposed to more granular geographical units such as zip code or census tract is that
PUMAs are the most granular geographic designation in the American Community
Survey, from which we obtain American workforce information. In total, there were
2,071 PUMAs, as of the 2000 Census. PUMAs comprises at least 100,000 people and
are always contained in a state.
We proceed by (1) identifying PUMAs affected by the failure of a financial institu-
tion in a given year, and (2) measuring the subsequent wage gap between skilled and
unskilled workers. Even though the outreach of a bank branch may go beyond PUMA
borders, we only focus on the effects in the PUMAs in which failed banks operated
(Ashcraft (2005); Kandrac (2014)). The literature on relationship banking suggests that
physical distance to a bank branch is a crucial factor in establishing bank-customer
relationships (Whitehead (1982); Hannan (1991); Laderman (2008); Kandrac (2014)).
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Moreover, to observe a PUMA-level effect, it is not essential that the market for an
individual branch is limited to a single PUMA, but it is sufficient that a branch is
mostly involved in the PUMA in which it operates. In either case, any potential ad-
verse credit shocks induced by the failure of a bank would mainly be felt in areas
geographically closest to a bank. Even though the impact would be felt more in the
former case, it would nevertheless result in underestimating the actual effect.
To begin with, we pinpoint the geographical location of each bank branch nation-
wide for 2007-2009. The FDIC’s Summary of Deposits contains latitude and longitude
information of each bank branch. This makes it possible for us to pinpoint the exact
location of each bank branch. We then draw 2071 polygons on a physical US Map by
using information on PUMA borders’ coordinates as stated in Census 2000 from the
Missouri Census Data Center. By applying a method that matches points to polygons,
we can assign a PUMA code for each bank branch. Combining this information with
the List of the FDIC’s Failed Banks, we obtain the number of failed banks in each
PUMA for each year. Figure 3.3 displays a heat map of the bank failure experiences
of each PUMA in the continental US. Next, we gather worker-level information for
each community from the American Community Survey (ACS). It is a current survey
conducted by the US Census Bureau. It regularly collects information on par with the
prior decennial census such as demographic, workforce, socio-economic and housing
characteristics. The data collected by the ACS is mainly used to measure state-level
statistics, allocate funding and track demographic characteristics of US states. Nearly
295,000 individuals/households respond the survey every month, which makes it the
largest household survey of the US Census Bureau. It is crucial to note that the survey
is intentionally done on a large number of people to ensure that it is always represen-
tative at PUMA- and state-levels as well as nationwide.
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Figure 3.3: Bank failures by PUMA
Notes: Geo-code data of PUMA borders are obtained from the Missouri Census Data Center.
Data on bank failure episodes are obtained from the FDIC’s list on bank failures, which is
merged with the FDIC Summary of Deposits. This figure highlights the bank failure episodes
in PUMAs, with borders as of Census 2000. PUMA borders changed substantially with Census
2010.
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Figure 3.4: Subsample: Bank failures by PUMA
Notes: Geo-code data of PUMA borders are obtained from the Missouri Census Data Center.
Data on bank failure episodes are obtained from the FDIC’s list of bank failures, which is
merged with the FDIC Summary of Deposits. This figure highlights the bank failure episodes
in 414 randomly sampled PUMAs, with borders as of Census 2000. PUMA borders changed
substantially with Census 2010.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Wage 45025.164 53641.319 4.348 729834 1143681
Hours 1759.665 812.025 7.5 5049 1222378
Labor Force 0.621 0.485 0 1 1883442
FAILED 0.212 0.409 0 1 1880454
EDUC 0.538 0.499 0 1 1883442
EDUC*FAILED 0.119 0.324 0 1 1880454
Level of education 2.698 1.190 0 5 1883442
Employed 0.590 0.492 0 1 1883442
Layoff 0.020 0.140 0 1 1883442
Fulltime 0.613 0.487 0 1 1222378
Available 0.228 0.659 0 1 1883442
Searching 0.058 0.234 0 1 1883442
Experience 5.935 4.531 1 15 1454709
Experience2 55.748 67.882 1 225 1454709
Foreign Born 0.125 0.331 0 1 1883442
Race 1.845 1.677 1 7 1883442
Female 0.519 0.5 0 1 1883442
EDUC*Experience 2.772 4.066 0 15 1454709
EDUC*Experience2 24.219 50.768 0 225 1454709
Age 47.583 18.923 16 95 1883442
Age2 2622.218 1911.461 256 9025 1883442
Married 0.545 0.498 0 1 1883442
Married*Child 0.231 0.421 0 1 1814114
Female*Child 0.201 0.401 0 1 1814114
Notes: The exact definitions of all variables are given in the text and Table 3.2. Note that
EDUC is a dummy variable whereas Level of education is a categorical variable.
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Figure 3.5: Fractional histogram of wages versus log(wages)
(a) Annual wages (b) Logarithm of annual wages
Notes: Data are obtained from the American Community Survey for the period 2008-2010. Panel (a) depicts the fractional histogram of annual
wages whereas Panel (b) depicts the factional histogram of annual natural logarithm of wages. In order to make the panels comparable to
one another, heights of the bars are scaled so that the sum of heights equals 1 in both panels.
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We obtain information on yearly gross wages, the annual number of hours worked,
the industry of a worker, schooling as well as demographic characteristics (age, sex,
marital status and the like) from the ACS for the period 2008-2010. Although bank
failure episodes were experienced even after 2010 (see Figure 3.1), it is not possible to
extend the analysis to a broader time horizon because the PUMA borders significantly
changed following the Census 2010 classification in 2011. Also, due to the immense
size of the ACS (around 12 million observations for the period 2008-2010) and lack
of computing power, it is not feasible to conduct the analysis with the entire dataset.
Thus, we carry out a random sampling of 414 PUMAs (equivalent to taking a random
sample of around 20% of all PUMAs) and analyze the effect of bank failures on labor
market outcomes on this subgroup of PUMAs.9 Figure 3.4 shows the PUMAs we
are left with after random sampling. This subsample gives a fair picture of the bank
failure episodes and includes PUMAs from all regions. Importantly, the observations
remaining in the working-sample are still representative of their respective PUMAs.
We follow Jerzmanowski and Nabar (2013) and only focus on workers of working
age and in or out of the labor force. That is, individuals who are below the age
of 15 and above the age of 65 are not included in the sample. Table 3.1 outlines
the summary statistics of the key dependent and independent variables (covariates)
used in the analysis. The primary outcome variable of the study is annual wages.
Table 3.1 shows that this variable has a mean value of US $45,025. Previous literature
such as Lydall (1959) and Lillard and Willis (1978) mentioned the skewed distribution
of annual earnings in setups with wage-schooling models. This observation is also
eminent in our sample (see Figure 3.5).
Panel (a) in Figure 3.5 demonstrates that the histogram of yearly wages is right-
skewed to a significant extent. To correct for this, and also in line with the theory of
deriving skill-wage equations (Mincer (1974)), we focus on the natural logarithm of
wages throughout the analysis. The fractional histogram of the annual wages after
9We also run baseline regressions with the entire sample and confirm the findings generated
through the subsample.
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taking the natural logarithm is depicted in Figure 3.5, Panel (b). It is indeed evident
that the natural logarithm of wages ensures penalization of outliers and pulls together
the distribution.10
Importantly, we use annual wages as opposed to hourly wages in our regression
following Jermanowski and Nabar (2013) and Larrain (2015). It is a well-established
phenomenon that hourly wages cannot be adjusted downwards (wage rigidity). In
other words, the downward responsiveness of wages to economic shocks is almost
zero (Götte et al. (2007)). For our setup, this may imply that there is no change in
the average hourly wage gap between skilled and unskilled individuals following a
bank failure. Therefore, focusing on annual wages gives a complete picture of the
skill premium characteristics. To illustrate this, for an individual who switches from
full-time to part-time work due to a decline in demand for her labor, the hourly
wage may still stay the same, but her annual earnings undergo a dramatic decrease.
The literature on how firms adjust labor costs supports this example by pointing out
that even though wages are rigid, this may not necessarily imply a rigid labor cost
structure for firms as the cost adjustment can also be through working hours (Babecký
et al. (2012)).
Another outcome variable used throughout the study is annual hours worked,
which we constructed using the information on the number of weeks as well as
weekly working hours provided in the ACS. In particular, the ACS offers six inter-
vals within which the weekly hours worked lie. We take the average of each interval
and multiply this by the number of weeks worked to build a proxy for the otherwise
unknown number of working hours in a given year. Table 3.1 shows that this variable
has a mean value of 1759 hours. We also use binary variables of labor force partici-
pation, employment, job-search, availability for work and being laid off as dependent
variables to understand the labor adjustment mechanisms better. Table 3.1 shows the
10The wage distribution shown in Figure 3.5 refers to the nation-wide wage distribution for our
sample period. It assumes that one dollar is worth the same everywhere. Although this may not
necessarily hold, we are do not have a PUMA-level price measure to account for real wages. In addition,
our presentation is in line with Mincer (1974) and other studies with skill-wage equation.
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shares for these categories in our sample.
Our “treatment” variable, FAILED, is a binary variable with a value of one (1) for
PUMAs in which a failed bank branch is located and zero (0) elsewhere. As Table 3.1
indicates, around 21% of observations are associated with a PUMA in which at least
one bank failure occurred during the period 2007-2009. We follow Jerzmanowski and
Nabar (2013) and focus on a binary classification of skill. In particular, we classify
individuals with a college degree or above as skilled and unskilled otherwise and en-
code this relationship as EDUC. Table 3.1 indicates that nearly half of the individuals
are skilled, following this classification. The identification strategy of this study lies
in measuring the average wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in PUMAs
with or without a failed bank experience, which is depicted as the interaction term,
EDUC ∗ FAILED. Around 12% of the workers are skilled and located in PUMAs with
bank failures.
Our regressions are also enriched by several covariates in the form of continu-
ous, categorical and dummy variables, as shown in Table 3.1. In particular, we have
standard Mincerian skill-wage control variables such as experience and experience
squared (measuring the decreasing returns to experience) as well as additional con-
trol variables such as age, age squared, race, sex, marital status, maternity or paternity
status, being born in a foreign country, and interactions of these variables. Definitions
of the control variables as well as other variables used throughout this chapter are
provided in Table ??.
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Table 3.2: Other variables
Name Type Description
Level of education Categorical Individual-level integer scores from one to five, five indicating the highest-level education
Employed Dummy Indicator variable with value one if an individual is employed
Layoff Dummy Indicator variable with value one if an individual is laid-off
Fulltime Dummy Indicator variable with value one if an individual works full-time
Available Dummy Indicator variable with value one if an individual is available for work
Searching Dummy Indicator variable with value one if an individual is looking for work
Experience Categorical Individual-level integer scores from one to fifteen, one indicating the highest-level experience
Experience2 Categorical Squared value of experience variable as explained above
Foreign born Dummy Indicator variable with value one if an individual was born abroad (not in the US).
Race Categorical Individual-level integer scores from one to seven, each score being attributed to a different race
Female Dummy Indicator variable with value one for female individuals in the sample and zero otherwise
E*Experience: Categorical Interaction of experience scores and EDUC
E*Experience2 Categorical Interaction of squared experience scores and EDUC
Age Absolute number Age of a selected individual in the sample
Age2 Absolute number squared value of Age variable.
Married Dummy Indicator variable with value one for married individuals in the sample and zero otherwise
Married*Child Dummy Indicator variable with value one for married with children individuals in the sample and zero otherwise
Female*Child Dummy Indicator variable with value one for female individuals with children and zero otherwise
Notes: This table presents the type and description of the covariates used in the analysis.
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3.6 Method and Results
3.6.1 Baseline Results
Following Jerzmanowski and Nabar (2013), we first estimate a standard Mincerian
earnings equation of the following form:
ln(w)ipt = αp + αt + β1EDUCipt + β2FAILEDpt−1 + β3EDUCipt ∗ FAILEDpt−1
+ δXipt + eipt (3.1)
where, i stands for individual, p stands for PUMA and t stands for the year. FAILED
takes the value one (1) for the year that comes after the bank failure and zero (0)
otherwise. X is the vector of covariates, including experience and experience squared
of the Mincerian skill-wage model. Following Ashcraft (2005) and Kandrac (2014),
we include FAILED with a one-year lag to lessen the concerns regarding reverse
causality. EDUC is a dummy variable that takes the value one (1) for individuals
with a high school diploma or with a lower degree of education and zero (0) for the
ones who have some college (or more advanced) education.
PUMAs can be significantly different from each other. Based on the discussion
in Section 1, there may be PUMA-level time-varying omitted factors that may lead
to overestimation. To address this concern, we enrich the model above by including
several multi-way fixed effects:
ln(w)ipt = αpt + β1EDUCipt + β2FAILEDpt−1 + β3EDUCipt ∗ FAILEDpt−1
+ δXipt + eipt (3.2)
ln(w)ispkt = αspk + αpkt + β1EDUCispkt + β2FAILEDpt−1 + β3EDUCispkt ∗ FAILEDpt−1
+ δXisptk + eispkt (3.3)
ln(w)ispkt = αspkt + β1EDUCispkt + β3EDUCispkt ∗ FAILEDpt−1
+ δXispkt + eispkt (3.4)
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where s stands for the sector (based on three-digit SIC classification) and k stands for
age cohort. In equations (3.2) and (3.4) we are unable to estimate the individual effect
of FAILED on ln(w) since the multi-way fixed effects capture the entire variation that
is changing at least at PUMA-year level. Sector fixed effects control for any potential
wage difference attributable to the differences in sectors. Following the seminal con-
tribution of Polachek (2008), we also include fixed effects for different age cohorts (for
each age observed we include a dummy variable in the regressions). Our dataset is a
repeated cross-section with a panel dimension at the PUMA-level. That is, although
we can observe the same PUMAs over time, we are unable to track individuals over
time. Tracking individuals would have been useful to observe the characteristics of in-
dividuals that may create wage differentials. However, by including age-cohort fixed
effects, we are at least able to follow the same age cohort over the years within a
PUMA, and, hence, can abstract from the potentially confounding effects that an age
group could have on wages.
In Table 3.3, we present the estimation results arising from these equations. Columns
(1) and (3) show that although average annual wages decline more in PUMAs with
bank failure, the average wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers widens,
i. e., the skill premium is significantly higher in PUMAs that saw bank failures in
the previous year. In columns (2) and (4), we repeat the same exercise by controlling
for all characteristics that change in PUMA and year by including PUMA-Year and
PUMA-Ind-Age-Year fixed effects. Although we are unable to estimate the average
effect of bank failures on the overall decline in wages (as PUMA-year fixed effects
capture the entire variation in these dimensions), we are still able to estimate the
interaction term. Overall, the estimation results in columns (2) and (4) verify the find-
ings in columns (1) and (3). Therefore, the findings presented in Table 3.3, columns (1)
to (4) suggest a strong positive relationship between bank failures and the wage gap
between skilled and unskilled workers, with the direction of impact going from bank
failures to the skill premium. In other words, bank failures result in widening wage
inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. Moreover, these findings are also
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Table 3.3: Baseline results: The effects of bank failures on the skill premium
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage)
FAILED -0.0351∗∗∗ -0.0428∗∗∗ -0.0425∗∗∗ -0.0420∗∗∗
(0.00935) (0.0108) (0.00750) (0.0107)
EDUC 0.789∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0108) (0.0149) (0.00831) (0.00831) (0.0109) (0.0150)
EDUC × FAILED 0.0454∗∗∗ 0.0489∗∗∗ 0.0426∗∗∗ 0.0466∗∗∗ 0.0566∗∗∗ 0.0594∗∗∗ 0.0415∗∗∗ 0.0456∗∗∗
(0.0117) (0.0121) (0.0115) (0.0172) (0.00807) (0.00830) (0.0114) (0.0172)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extra Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PUMA FE Yes No No No Yes No No No
Year FE Yes No No No Yes No No No
PUMA -Year FE No Yes No No No Yes No No
PUMA -Ind-Age FE No No Yes No No No Yes No
Ind-Age-Year FE No No Yes No No No Yes No
PUMA -Ind-Age-Year FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 911368 911368 654517 571112 911368 911368 654517 571112
R2 0.168 0.170 0.818 0.885 0.375 0.376 0.819 0.885
Notes: The sample period is 2008-2010. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of
annual wages. Columns (1) and (5), (2) and (6), (3) and (7), (4) and (8) show the estimation
results of equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4) respectively. EDUC is a dummy variable taking
the value of one (1) for individuals with an undergraduate degree or above and zero (0)
otherwise. FAILED is a dummy variable taking the value of one (1) for individuals residing
in PUMAs that experience at least one bank failure during the sample period and zero (0)
otherwise. In line with equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4), each column includes one- or
multi-way fixed effects. Controls include the following variables: Experience, Experience2
Foreign born, Race, Female, EDUC*Experience and EDUC*Experience2. Extra controls include
the following variables: Age, Age2, Married, Married*Child, Female*Child. Whenever Age
fixed effects are included, Age and Age2 are dropped from the regressions. Standard errors
are shown in parentheses and are clustered by PUMA. *, **, *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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economically significant: Bank failures are associated with roughly a 5% increase in
the skill premium in the most conservative specification.11 Considering all specifica-
tions, it is also evident that bank failures account for 6% to 10% of the skill premium
observed in our data.
Regression estimations in Table 3.3 columns (1) to (4), use several control variables
which are used as standard controls in estimating the Mincerian earnings functions.
Following Jerzmanowski and Nabar (2013), we include the following additional con-
trol variables, Age, Age− squared, married, married− child, f emale− child, to ensure
that the results are not driven by age, marriage, maternity (paternity) status and any
interaction of the latter two.12 We display these results with additional control vari-
ables in columns (5) to (8) of Table 3.3 and confirm the robustness of the previous
findings to these additions.
We also investigate the effect of bank failures on the wages of skilled workers.
That is, we consider a linear combination test where we fix EDUC = 1 and investi-
gate what happens to average wages moving from FAILED = 1 to FAILED = 0. This
is equivalent to testing whether the sum of the estimated coefficients of FAILED and
EDUC ∗ FAILED equals zero. Note that this test can only be applied to columns (1),
(3), (5) and (7) because the coefficient of FAILED can only be estimated in these spec-
ifications. Performing this hypothesis test, we find that in none of the specifications
the effect of bank failures on skilled wages is significant (p values ranging between
0.174 and 0.986 across columns).
3.6.2 Bank Failures versus Local Recessions
Our fixed effects varying in PUMA and year dimensions help account for a potential
confounding effect of local recessions. However, so far it has not been clear whether
the estimated coefficient of EDUC × FAILED would remain significant if we included
11According to Halvoren and Palmquist (1980), the effect of dummy variables in semi-logarithmic
equations is (exp(β3) − 1). Kennedy (1981) proposed a variance correction for this interpretation,
which has a negligible impact here.
12Whenever we include age-cohort fixed effects, we are unable to estimate the individual impact of
Age and Age− squared.
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a variable capturing local recessions interacted with EDUC in our regressions.
As the time dimension of our study is quite short, it is not plausible to include
measures of recessions based on the concept of the business cycle. Another limitation
is that there is no GDP data to measure recessions at the PUMA level. Therefore,
we use two alternative proxies for recessions. First, we receive quarterly state-level
economic growth data from the Kansas FED and create a recession dummy variable
taking the value one (1) for PUMAs whose states were in a recession, characterized
by negative economic growth, for at least one quarter (encoded as REC). Second,
from our ACS data set, we calculate the growth of the mean household income for
each PUMA, which would arguably serve as a proxy for the local average economic
situation (encoded as GROWTH). We interact both of these measures with EDUC and
include them in our regressions to test whether the effect of bank failures would still
hold.
Table 3.4 shows that the baseline results hold even when we interact the proxies of
recessions and economic growth with EDUC.
3.6.3 Testing for Reverse Causality
In the baseline results, we document that bank failures of year t − 1 lead to wage
inequality in year t. The reason for lagging the bank failures variable by one year is
to reduce the concerns regarding the reverse causality channel that either declining
wages or more wage inequality lead to bank failures in the communities. Taking a
one-year lag of the treatment variable ensures that there is time consistency in the
direction of the effect observed, however, it cannot take care of the reverse causality
concerns attributable to structural reasons.
In particular, during the recent financial crisis, it is well documented that former
subprime borrowing on mortgage credit against home equity led to a deterioration of
household wealth and subsequent mortgage defaults with the sharp decline in house
prices (Mian and Sufi (2011)). It has also been documented that counties that expe-
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Table 3.4: Recessions versus bank failures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage)
FAILED -0.0421∗∗∗ -0.0421∗∗∗
(0.0109) (0.0106)
EDUC 0.389∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0111) (0.0197) (0.0151)
EDUC × FAILED 0.0389∗∗ 0.0407∗∗∗ 0.0368∗ 0.0420∗
(0.0122) (0.0115) (0.0179) (0.0170)
REC 0.00629
(0.00115)
EDUC × REC 0.00718 0.0223
(0.0123) (0.0172)
GROWTH 0.0202
(0.0647)
EDUC × GROWTH 0.0292 0.128
(0.0726) (0.104)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extra controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puma-Ind-Age FE Yes Yes No No
Ind-Age-Year FE Yes Yes No No
Puma-Ind-Age-Year FE No No Yes Yes
N 654517 654517 571112 571112
R2 0.819 0.819 0.885 0.885
Notes: The sample period is 2008-2010. The dependent variable in all columns is the natural
logarithm of annual wages. EDUC isa dummy variable taking the value of one (1) for indi-
viduals with an undergraduate degree or above and zero (0) otherwise. FAILED is a dummy
variable taking the value of one (1) for individuals residing in PUMAs that experience at least
one bank failure during the sample period and zero (0) otherwise. Each column includes one-
or multi-way fixed effects. Controls include the following variables: Experience, Experience2
Foreign born, Race, Female, EDUC*Experience and EDUC*Experience2. Extra controls in-
clude the following variables: Age, Age2, Married, Married*Child, Female*Child. Whenever
Age fixed effects are included, Age and Age2 are dropped from the regressions. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered by PUMAs. *, **, *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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rienced the hardest deterioration in household balance sheets (comprising mostly of
housing equity) incurred the highest employment in non-tradable sectors through ei-
ther suppression of consumer demand or decline in collateral value (Mian and Sufi
(2014)). Translated into our setup, one can argue that relatively more suppressed
unskilled wages lead to subprime defaults, which then lead to bank failures in com-
munities that experienced sharper declines in house prices. Although PUMA-year
fixed effects would control the elevated effect of subprime defaults at the community
level, we still provide an additional test.
To this end, we take stock of the findings of Martin (2011) who argues that states
that experienced the severest subprime foreclosures (California, Connecticut, Florida,
Nevada and New Jersey) in 2008 were also the ones whose labor market conditions
were affected most intensely during the recent financial crisis. Therefore, we argue
that removing these states from our sample would, at least to a certain degree, tackle
the reverse causality concerns. In Table 3.5, we present the results with and without
these “core states”. The first four columns of Table 3.5 show the results for core
states (California, Connecticut, Florida, Nevada and New Jersey) and the last four
columns show the results from a sample without these core states. It is indeed evident
that across the most conservative specifications (columns (4) and (8)), the coefficient
sizes are higher for core states. However, the baseline results presented in Table 3.3
still hold, suggesting that the impact of reverse causality is negligible here. As the
classification of core states seems arbitrary, in Table 3.6, we also exclude the next five
states (Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Ohio and Rhode Island) that experienced high
subprime foreclosures. The estimation findings indicate that the baseline results still
hold even after this adjustment. Therefore, we argue that a potential reverse causality
from suppressed unskilled wages leading to subprime defaults that ultimately result
in bank failures has a negligible impact here. It is plausible to argue that the direction
of effect goes from bank failures to wage inequality.
84
CHAPTER 3. SKILL PREMIUM 3.6. METHOD AND RESULTS
Table 3.5: A test for reverse causality: Results with and without the core states
Core states Without core states
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage)
FAILED -0.00439 -0.123∗∗∗ -0.0448∗∗∗ -0.0334∗∗
(0.00937) (0.0319) (0.00873) (0.0122)
EDUC 0.611∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗
(0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0269) (0.0355) (0.00891) (0.00890) (0.0122) (0.0167)
EDUC × FAILED 0.0364∗∗∗ 0.0393∗∗∗ 0.0422∗ 0.0708∗ 0.0602∗∗∗ 0.0626∗∗∗ 0.0394∗∗ 0.0384∗
(0.0100) (0.0105) (0.0192) (0.0335) (0.0101) (0.0103) (0.0137) (0.0175)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extra controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PUMA FE Yes No No No Yes No No No
Year FE Yes No No No Yes No No No
PUMA -Year FE No Yes No No No Yes No No
PUMA -Ind-Age FE No No Yes No No No Yes No
Ind-Age-Year FE No No Yes No No No Yes No
PUMA -Ind-Age-Year FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
N 187286 187286 132284 116774 724082 724082 519660 454338
R2 0.346 0.347 0.827 0.884 0.382 0.383 0.821 0.886
Notes: The core states include California, Connecticut, Florida, Nevada and New Jersey. The
sample period is 2008-2010. The dependent variable in all columns is the natural logarithm of
annual wages. EDUC is a dummy variable taking the value of one (1) for individuals with an
undergraduate degree or above and zero otherwise. FAILED is a dummy variable taking the
value of one (1) for individuals residing in PUMAs that experience at least one bank failure
during the sample period and zero (0) otherwise. Each column includes one- or multi-way
fixed effects. Controls include the following variables: Experience, Experience2 Foreign born,
Race, Female, EDUC*Experience and EDUC*Experience2. Extra controls include the following
variables: Age, Age2, Married, Married*Child, Female*Child. Whenever Age fixed effects are
included, Age and Age2 are dropped from the regressions. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses and are clustered by PUMAs. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels.
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Table 3.6: A test for reverse causality: Exclusion of additional core states
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage)
FAILED -0.0419∗∗∗ -0.0332∗
(0.00957) (0.0131)
EDUC 0.556∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗
(0.00995) (0.00994) (0.0138) (0.0194)
EDUC × FAILED 0.0590∗∗∗ 0.0615∗∗∗ 0.0404∗∗ 0.0480∗
(0.0114) (0.0117) (0.0145) (0.0219)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extra controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puma FE No No No No
Year FE No No No No
Puma-Year FE No No No No
Puma-Ind-Age FE Yes No Yes No
Ind-Age-Year FE Yes No Yes No
Puma-Ind-Age-Year FE No Yes No Yes
N 587129 587129 421704 368818
R2 0.380 0.381 0.819 0.883
Notes: Regressions are run excluding core states: California, Connecticut, Florida, Nevada,
New Jersey, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Ohio and Rhode Island. The sample period is
2008-2010. The dependent variable in all columns is the natural logarithm of annual wages.
EDUC isa dummy variable taking the value of one (1) for individuals with an undergraduate
degree or above and zero (0) otherwise. FAILED is a dummy variable taking the value of one
(1) for individuals residing in PUMAs that experience at least one bank failure during the
sample period and zero (0) otherwise. Each column includes one- or multi-way fixed effects.
Controls include the following variables: Experience, Experience2 Foreign born, Race, Female,
EDUC*Experience and EDUC*Experience2. Extra controls include the following variables:
Age, Age2, Married, Married*Child, Female*Child. Whenever Age fixed effects are included,
Age and Age2 are dropped from the regressions. Standard errors are shown in parentheses
and are clustered by PUMAs. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
86
CHAPTER 3. SKILL PREMIUM 3.6. METHOD AND RESULTS
3.6.4 Supply versus Demand
Although previous results confirm that bank failures are associated with higher wage
inequality, they are inconclusive as to whether this relationship is associated with
demand-side or supply-side explanations. That is, it is still unclear if the observed
effect is driven by a negative credit shock making employees (firms) demand relatively
less for unskilled workers or if unskilled individuals increase the supply of labor
during times of financial distress, driving down their average wages. However, the
Mincerian earnings equation above does not exclude the fact that the effect could
be supply-driven. In what follows, we investigate whether demand- or supply-side
explanations are more credible.
Binary Labor Supply Decision and Labor Market Attachment
In this section, we investigate the binary labor supply decision of individuals, i.e.
the decision of workers to supply labor or not. This binary decision is congruent with
being in or out of the labor force. The results in Table 3.3 indicate that bank failures are
associated with an increase in the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers.
One could presume that bank failures could affect the skill premium if it changed
the relative supplies of skilled and unskilled labor. In particular, if the labor force
participation of unskilled workers increased relative to the labor force participation
of skilled workers after bank failures, the increase in the relative supply of unskilled
workers could drive down their wages relative to the wages of skilled workers.
In Table 3.7, we study the impact of bank failures on labor force participation for
skilled versus unskilled workers. Namely, we run the previous set of regressions with
a dependent variable of labor force participation status, which is a binary variable
taking one (1) for individuals who are in the labor force and zero (0) otherwise. This
is equivalent to testing if bank failures had an impact on the labor force participation
decision of a given individual in a linear probability framework. The insignificance of
the coefficients of FAILED as well as EDUC ∗ FAILED indicates bank failures neither
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Table 3.7: The effects of bank failures on labor force participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Labor Force Labor Force Labor Force Labor Force
FAILED 0.000886 0.000449
(0.00334) (0.00331)
EDUC 0.0440∗∗∗ 0.0493∗∗∗ 0.0464∗∗∗ 0.0518∗∗∗
(0.00332) (0.00473) (0.00329) (0.00471)
EDUC × FAILED -0.00383 -0.00253 -0.00330 -0.00191
(0.00354) (0.00490) (0.00351) (0.00489)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extra Controls No No Yes Yes
PUMA FE No No No No
Year FE No No No No
PUMA-Year FE No No No No
PUMA-Ind-Age FE Yes No Yes No
Ind-Age-Year FE Yes No Yes No
PUMA-Ind-Age-Year No Yes No Yes
Observations 802483 698436 802483 698436
R2 0.695 0.803 0.697 0.804
Notes: The sample period is 2008-2010. The dependent variable is Labor Force, which is a
dummy variable taking the value of one (1) for individuals in the labor force and zero (0)
otherwise. EDUC is a dummy variable taking the value of one (1) for individuals with an
undergraduate degree or above and zero (0) otherwise. FAILED is a dummy variable taking
the value of one (1) for individuals residing in PUMAs that experience at least one bank failure
during the sample period and zero (0) otherwise. Each column includes one- or multi-way
fixed effects. Controls include the following variables: Experience, Experience2 Foreign born,
Race, Female, EDUC*Experience and EDUC*Experience2. Extra controls include the following
variables: Age, Age2, Married, Married*Child, Female*Child. Whenever Age fixed effects are
included, Age and Age2 are dropped from the regressions. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses and are clustered by PUMAs. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels, respectively.
88
CHAPTER 3. SKILL PREMIUM 3.6. METHOD AND RESULTS
Table 3.8: The effects of bank failures on labor market attachment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Available Available Searching Searching
FAILED -0.00179 0.00808∗∗
(0.00550) (0.00291)
EDUC -0.0368∗∗∗ -0.0300∗∗∗ -0.0122∗∗∗ -0.00974∗∗
(0.00544) (0.00737) (0.00266) (0.00341)
EDUC × FAILED 0.000472 0.00590 -0.00596∗ -0.00358
(0.00548) (0.00783) (0.00302) (0.00429)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extra controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
PUMA FE No No No No
Year FE No No No No
PUMA-Year FE No No No No
PUMA-Ind-Age FE Yes No Yes No
Ind-Age-Year FE Yes No Yes No
PUMA-Ind-Age-Year No Yes No Yes
N 802483 698436 802483 698436
R2 0.648 0.772 0.640 0.760
Notes: The sample period is 2008-2010. Available is an indicator variable with a value of
one (1) if an individual is available for taking a job and zero (0) otherwise. Searching is an
indicator variable taking a value of one (1) if an individual is currently looking for work.
EDUC is a dummy variable taking the value of one (1) for individuals with an undergraduate
degree or above and zero (0) otherwise. FAILED is a dummy variable taking the value of one
(1) for individuals residing in PUMAs that experience at least one bank failure during the
sample period and zero (0) otherwise. Each column includes one- or multi-way fixed effects.
Controls include the following variables: Experience, Experience2 Foreign born, Race, Female,
EDUC*Experience and EDUC*Experience2. Extra controls include the following variables:
Age, Age2, Married, Married*Child, Female*Child. Whenever Age fixed effects are included,
Age and Age2 are dropped from the regressions. Standard errors are shown in parentheses
and are clustered by PUMAs. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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change local labor force participation, nor do they increase the probability of unskilled
workers supplying labor in the sense of deciding on participating in the labor market
than skilled workers.13
To better understand the labor supply decision and to test whether bank fail-
ures led to any particular change in the labor market attachment of workers, we also
run other linear probability models with dependent binary variables of “available for
work” and “searching job”. We are after testing whether bank failures led to differ-
ential reservation wages for skilled and unskilled individuals, affecting subsequent
wages for skilled versus unskilled workers in the labor market. We present the find-
ings arising from these regressions in Table 3.8.
Table 3.8 shows that there is no evidence of bank failures resulting in differential
reservation wages which might have made certain types of worker more attached
to the labor markets, ultimately driving down the wages for those types of worker.
These results strongly indicate that the extensive margin of the labor supply of skilled
vs. unskilled workers was not affected by bank failures.
Hours of Work
Next, we focus on the labor hours to test the intensive margin of the labor supply. In
particular, we study whether there is a differential change in annual hours worked
by skilled versus unskilled workers. To this end, we run the following regressions,
13Though not presented here, we also run the analogous logit regressions and confirm these find-
ings.
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which are analogous to previous baseline equations:
ln(h)ipt = αpt + γ1EDUCipt + γ2FAILEDpt−1 + γ3EDUCipt ∗ FAILEDpt−1
+ δXipt + eipt (3.5)
ln(h)ispkt = αspk + αpkt + γ1EDUCispkt + γ2FAILEDpt−1 + γ3EDUCispkt ∗ FAILEDpt−1
+ δXisptk + eispkt (3.6)
ln(h)ispkt = αspkt + γ1EDUCispkt + γ3EDUCispkt ∗ FAILEDpt−1
+ δXispkt + eispkt (3.7)
which is the analog of the wage equations presented formerly. In a reduced-form
model, in which the wage equation is a “price” equation and the hours equation is
a “quantity” equation, one can investigate whether there is a significant supply or
demand effect. For this purpose, we expect both β3 (from equations 3.1-3.4) and γ3
to be negative. Observing that both of these coefficients are negative and significant,
one can conclude that there is a significant demand-driven effect (Popov and Rocholl
(2016)). The idea behind this is that in a simple supply-demand framework, a simul-
taneous decline in the price and the quantity can only be attributed to a downward
shift in the demand. Although, this reduced-form model do not exclude the fact that
there could still be a supply effect, showing negative and significant estimates for the
coefficients of interest would at least ensure that the demand-side explanations are
credible. Table 3.9 columns (1) to (4) show the baseline results, while columns (5) to
(8) indicate the results with additional controls (being on par with Table 3.3, respec-
tively.) Table 3.9 indicates that not just the skill premium but also the differences in
annual working hours between skilled and unskilled workers are bigger after bank
failures. Since both the estimated β3 and γ3 are positive and significant in all spec-
ifications in Table 3.3 and 3.9, we conclude that there is a credible demand-driven
increase in skill premium after bank failures.
To better grasp the adjustment mechanism of labor demand, we consider if the
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Table 3.9: The effects of bank failures on work hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(Hours) log(Hours) log(Hours) log(Hours) log(Hours) log(Hours) log(Hours) log(Hours)
FAILED -0.0143∗∗ -0.0201∗∗ -0.0179∗∗∗ -0.0198∗∗
(0.00578) (0.00864) (0.00529) (0.00865)
EDUC 0.360∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.00845) (0.00849) (0.00793) (0.0117) (0.00548) (0.00551) (0.00798) (0.0118)
EDUC × FAILED 0.0147∗∗ 0.0146∗∗ 0.0143∗ 0.0265∗∗ 0.0196∗∗∗ 0.0193∗∗∗ 0.0139∗ 0.0263∗∗
(0.00688) (0.00708) (0.00834) (0.0121) (0.00516) (0.00534) (0.00833) (0.0122)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extra Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PUMA FE Yes No No No Yes No No No
Year FE Yes No No No Yes No No No
PUMA -Year FE No Yes No No No Yes No No
PUMA -Ind-Age FE No No Yes No No No Yes No
Ind-Age-Year FE No No Yes No No No Yes No
PUMA -Ind-Age-Year FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 911368 911368 654517 571112 911368 911368 654517 571112
R2 0.168 0.170 0.818 0.885 0.375 0.376 0.819 0.885
Notes: The sample period is 2008-2010. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm
of annual work hours. Columns (1) and (5), (2) and (6), (3) and (7), (4) and (8) show the
estimation results of equations (3.7), (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10) respectively. EDUC is a dummy
variable taking the value of one (1) for individuals with an undergraduate degree or above and
zero (0) otherwise. FAILED is a dummy variable taking the value of one (1) for individuals
residing in PUMAs that experience at least one bank failure during the sample period and
zero (0) otherwise. Each column includes one- or multi-way fixed effects. Controls include the
following variables: Experience, Experience2 Foreign born, Race, Female, EDUC*Experience
and EDUC*Experience2. Extra controls include the following variables: Age, Age2, Married,
Married*Child, Female*Child. Whenever Age fixed effects are included, Age and Age2 are
dropped from the regressions. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered by
PUMAs. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.10: Labor adjustment due to bank failures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employed Employed Layoff Layoff Fulltime Fulltime
FAILED -0.00855∗ -0.000812 -0.0122∗
(0.00387) (0.00181) (0.00480)
EDUC 0.0522∗∗∗ 0.0598∗∗∗ -0.00653∗∗∗ -0.00677∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.00381) (0.00516) (0.00177) (0.00244) (0.00487) (0.00676)
EDUC × FAILED 0.00346 0.00491 0.00143 0.00278 0.00888∗ 0.0141∗
(0.00386) (0.00555) (0.00192) (0.00280) (0.00491) (0.00743)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extra controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PUMA FE No No No No No No
Year FE No No No No No No
PUMA-Year FE No No No No No No
PUMA-Ind-Age FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Ind-Age-Year FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
PUMA-Ind-Age-Year No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 802483 698436 802483 698436 703841 613923
R2 0.709 0.811 0.561 0.701 0.749 0.841
Notes: The sample period is 2008-2010. The dependent variables in all columns are indicator
variables. Employed takes the value of one (1) if an individual is employed and zero (0)
otherwise. Layoff takes the value of one (1) if an individual is on layoff and zero (0) otherwise.
Full-time takes the value of one (1) if an individual works full-time and zero (0) otherwise.
EDUC is a dummy variable taking the value of one (1) for individuals with an undergraduate
degree or above and zero (0) otherwise. FAILED is a dummy variable taking the value of one
(1) for individuals residing in PUMAs that experience at least one bank failure during the
sample period and zero (0) otherwise. Each column includes one- or multi-way fixed effects.
Controls include the following variables: Experience, Experience2 Foreign born, Race, Female,
EDUC*Experience and EDUC*Experience2. Extra controls include the following variables:
Age, Age2, Married, Married*Child, Female*Child. Whenever Age fixed effects are included,
Age and Age2 are dropped from the regressions. Standard errors are shown in parentheses
and are clustered by PUMAs. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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bank failures were associated with differential employment, the probability of being
laid-off and being employed full- versus part-time for skilled and unskilled individu-
als. Table 3.10 presents the results of linear probability models of the following binary
dependent variables: Being employed, being on layoff and working full-time.
Table 3.10 indicates that the probability of being employed or being laid-off does
not change differentially for skilled versus unskilled workers after bank failures. What
changes differentially for skilled and unskilled workers, however, is the probability
of being employed full-time. Columns (5) and (6) indicate that there is a differential
decline in the probability of being employed full-time for unskilled workers. This
finding is consistent with a differential decline in labor hours for unskilled workers
and suggests that labor costs are adjusted through employing unskilled labor part-
time, leading to a decline in annual wage earnings of unskilled workers.14
3.6.5 More on the Demand Channel: Knowledge Intensity
The previous sections show robust evidence of a demand-driven increase in the skill
premium. To further substantiate this finding, we exploit the variation in knowledge
intensity across sectors. The underlying idea is that sectors which are, for techno-
logical reasons, more dependent on knowledge-intensive capital are expected to have
relatively more inelastic labor demand for skilled labor and more elastic demand for
unskilled labor (Claessens and Ueda (2008)). Assuming that knowledge-intensive cap-
ital and skilled labor are somewhat complementary and knowledge-intensive firms
have an elastic demand for unskilled labor, it can be expected that firms that depend
more on knowledge-intensive capital will have a lower demand for unskilled labor
during times of financial distress. Therefore, the effect of negative credit shocks on
the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers is expected to be higher in more
knowledge-intensive sectors.
14This is in line with the discussion on the rigidity of downward adjustment in hourly wages and,
hence, employers cutting labor hours to adjust labor costs during episodes of financial distress.
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Figure 3.6: Industry characteristics by high level ISIC classification
(a) R&D (b) Intangibles/assets
(c) Tangibles/assets (d) Knowledge dependence
Notes: Data is obtained from Compustat for the period 1987-2005.
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Following Claessens and Ueda (2008), we calculate knowledge intensity as the ra-
tio of R&D expenditures to sales, which we encode as R&D in the tables. To ensure
that the knowledge intensity measure is not itself affected by bank failures, we take the
average of this ratio for 1987-2005 and run the analysis with a time-invariant sector-
specific knowledge intensity for two-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) clas-
sification. Although we use 2-digit classification in our analysis, we nevertheless
present mean R&D ratio at 1-digit level sector classification in panel (a) of Figure 3.6.
As expected, service, transportation and non-classifiable sectors have higher R&D
ratios than sectors such as mining and agriculture.
To test if the effect of bank failures on the skill premium is differentially higher
in relatively more knowledge-intensive sectors, we interact our variable of interest,
EDUC ∗ FAILED with R&D. That is, this triple interaction term captures the effect of
bank failures on wage premium depending on knowledge intensity. The estimation
results of this triple interaction model are shown in Table 3.11.
The positive and significant estimated coefficient of this triple interaction term
indicates that there is a differentially higher skill premium across sectors, which in-
creases as knowledge intensity increases. Regarding coefficient interpretations of the
triple interaction terms, ceteris paribus, one standard deviation increase from the
mean in R&D (an increase by 1.97) increases skill premium, on average, by around
2.8%, 5.2%, 2.8% and 5.3% based on estimates in columns 1,2,3 and 4 of Table 3.11,
respectively.
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Table 3.11: Knowledge intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage)
FAILED -0.0616∗∗∗ -0.0610∗∗∗
(0.0154) (0.0155)
EDUC 0.464∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗
(0.0148) (0.0203) (0.0150) (0.0205)
EDUC × FAILED -0.0246 -0.0611∗∗ -0.0253 -0.0632∗∗
(0.0176) (0.0265) (0.0175) (0.0265)
EDUC × FAILED × R&D 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0264∗∗∗ 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0267∗∗∗
(0.00188) (0.00383) (0.00188) (0.00382)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extra Controls No No Yes Yes
PUMA FE No No No No
Year FE No No No No
PUMA-Year FE No No No No
PUMA-Ind-Age FE Yes No Yes No
Ind-Age-Year FE Yes No Yes No
PUMA-Ind-Age-Year No Yes No Yes
Observations 431235 379054 431235 379054
R2 0.821 0.886 0.821 0.886
Notes: The sample period is 2008-2010. The dependent variable in all columns is the natural
logarithm of annual wages. EDUC is a dummy variable taking the value of one (1) for indi-
viduals with an undergraduate degree or above and zero (0) otherwise. FAILED is a dummy
variable taking the value of one (1) for individuals residing in PUMAs that experience at least
one bank failure during the sample period and zero (0) otherwise. R&D is sector-level time-
invariant variable. Each column includes one- or multi-way fixed effects. Controls include the
following variables: Experience, Experience2 Foreign born, Race, Female, EDUC*Experience
and EDUC*Experience2. Extra controls include the following variables: Age, Age2, Married,
Married*Child, Female*Child. Whenever Age fixed effects are included, Age and Age2 are
dropped from the regressions. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered by
PUMAs. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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3.7 Transmission to the Labor Market
The results presented so far confirm Hypothesis 1 that bank failures lead to a reduc-
tion in labor demand. In this section, we try to understand the channel through which
the effects of bank failures are transmitted to the labor market, ultimately widening
the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers. In doing so, we turn our atten-
tion to testing Hypothesis 2.
As discussed previously, the type of capital employed by the sectors of the econ-
omy can play an essential role in transmitting the credit market shocks to labor mar-
kets. In episodes of bank failures, sectors that rely relatively more on intangible
capital as opposed to tangible capital would be more affected by credit contraction
(Almeida and Campello (2008)). These are also the firms that demand more skilled
labor as opposed to unskilled labor as we plausibly assume that intangible capital
and skilled labor are complementary inputs (Hall (2000), (2001)). In a way, the af-
fected firms, which cannot pledge enough collateral, are the ones which are likely to
demand less unskilled labor during episodes of bank failure. In other words, when
bank failures hit the local economy and lead firms that cannot substitute to other
forms of financing to decrease input costs, the most affected sectors are the ones that
rely more on skilled labor for sustaining production and that can give up employing
unskilled labor relatively easily.
As in the previous section, we focus on time-invariant sector-variant measures of
capital tangibility and intangibility to test this hypothesis. Following Claessens and
Ueda (2008), we calculate the ratio of intangibles to tangibles as the ratio of intangible
assets as given in Compustat to net property plant equipment (or tangible assets).
As before, to ensure that the knowledge dependence measure is not itself affected by
bank failures, we take the average of this ratio for 1987-2005 and conduct the anal-
ysis with a time-invariant sector-specific knowledge intensity for two-digit Standard
Industry Classification (SIC) classification. We encode this variable as KNOWDEP
throughout the analysis. Although we use 2-digit classification in our study, we nev-
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ertheless present the mean of this ratio for the 1-digit level sector classification in
panel (d) of Figure 3.6. Panels (b) and (c) also present the means of the ratios of
intangible assets to total assets and net property plant equipment to total assets.
To test whether the effects of bank failures on the skill premium will be differ-
entially exacerbated in sectors that rely more on intangible capital vis-à-vis tangible
capital, we interact our variable of interest, EDUC ∗ FAILED with KNOWDEP. That
is, this triple interaction term captures the effect of bank failures on wage premium
depending on knowledge intensity. The estimation results of this triple interaction
model are presented in Table 3.12.
The positive and significant estimated coefficient of this triple interaction term in
all columns of Table 3.12 verifies Hypothesis 2: The effects of bank failures on the
skill premium depend on the use of intangible capital relative to tangible capital in a
sector. Note that our most reliable estimates are presented in columns 3 and 4 where
we include industry-year fixed effects, which also control for sector-level external
dependence differentials across industries constant as required by Hypothesis 2.
Regarding coefficient interpretations of the triple interaction terms, ceteris paribus,
one standard deviation increase in knowledge dependence (an increase by 0.705) in-
creases skill premium, on average, by around 4.1%, 8.0%, 4.1% and 8.1% based on
estimates in columns 1,2,3 and 4 of Table 3.12, respectively.
To further unveil the heterogeneity across sectors, we plot the marginal effect of
bank failures on the skill premium, depending on KNOWDEP in Figure 3.7. 95%
confidence bands from PUMA-level clustering of standard errors are shown with
blue. The dashed vertical lines indicated with red show 25, 50 and 75 percentiles
of knowledge dependence. The figure highlights how the relative use of intangible
to tangible assets may create heterogeneity in transmitting credit market shocks to
the labor market. At the very low levels of intangibility/tangibility (i.e., unaffected,
less skilled labor-dependent) (25th percentile of KNOWDEP), the skill premium even
declines after bank failures. Only at the high levels of intangibility/tangibility (i.e.,
affected, more skilled labor-dependent) (75th percentile of KNOWDEP), we observe
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Table 3.12: Sectoral heterogeneity: Knowledge dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage)
FAILED -0.0460∗∗∗ -0.0452∗∗∗
(0.0142) (0.0143)
EDUC 0.469∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0185) (0.0135) (0.0186)
EDUC × FAILED -0.0276 -0.0865∗∗∗ -0.0287 -0.0896∗∗∗
(0.0192) (0.0330) (0.0193) (0.0329)
EDUC × FAILED × KNOWDEP 0.0578∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.0578∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.0244) (0.0121) (0.0244)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extra Controls No No Yes Yes
PUMA FE No No No No
Year FE No No No No
PUMA-Year FE No No No No
PUMA-Ind-Age FE Yes No Yes No
Ind-Age-Year FE Yes No Yes No
PUMA-Ind-Age-Year No Yes No Yes
Observations 481413 420886 481413 420886
R2 0.817 0.883 0.817 0.884
Notes: The sample period is 2008-2010. The dependent variable in all columns is the natu-
ral logarithm of annual wages. EDUC is a dummy variable taking the value of one (1) for
individuals with an undergraduate degree or above and zero (0) otherwise. FAILED is a
dummy variable taking the value of one (1) for individuals residing in PUMAs that experi-
ence at least one bank failure during the sample period and zero (0) otherwise. KNOWDEP
is a sector-level time-invariant variable. Each column includes one- or multi-way fixed effects.
Controls include the following variables: Experience, Experience2 Foreign born, Race, Female,
EDUC*Experience and EDUC*Experience2. Extra controls include the following variables:
Age, Age2, Married, Married*Child, Female*Child. Whenever Age fixed effects are included,
Age and Age2 are dropped from the regressions. Standard errors are shown in parentheses
and are clustered by PUMAs. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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Figure 3.7: Marginal effects of sectoral knowledge dependence on the skill premium
Notes: The figure refers to specification (4) of Table 6 and shows the marginal effects of sectoral
knowledge dependence on bank-failure-induced skill premium. 95% confidence bands from
PUMA-level clustering of standard errors are shown with blue. The dashed vertical lines
indicated with red show 25, 50 and 75 percentiles of knowledge dependence.
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Figure 3.8: Marginal effects of intangibles/assets on the skill premium in sectors more
prone to credit shocks
Notes: The figure refers to a specification with quadruple interaction of EDUC ∗ FAILED,
intangibles/assets and tangibles/assets with PUMA-industry-age-year fixed effects. It shows
the marginal effects of intangibles/assets on bank-failure-induced skill premium when moving
from a sector at 75th percentile of tangibles/assets (sectors unaffected by bank failures) to 25th
percentile of tangibles/assets (sectors affected by bank failures). 95% confidence bands from
PUMA-level clustering of standard errors are shown with blue.
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Figure 3.9: Marginal effects of intangibles/assets on the skill premium in sectors more
prone to credit shocks
Notes: The figure refers to a specification with quadruple interaction of EDUC ∗ FAILED,
KNOWDEP and external dependence with PUMA-industry-age-year fixed effects. It shows
the marginal effects of KNOWDEP on bank-failure-induced skill premium when moving from
a sector at 25th percentile of external dependence (sectors unaffected by bank failures) to 75th
percentile of external dependence (sectors affected by bank failures). 95% confidence bands
from PUMA-level clustering of standard errors are shown with blue.
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an increase in the skill premium after bank failures.
Although at the high and low levels of intangibility/tangibility, the interpretation
of knowledge dependence is clear, one is unable to interpret the cases of what would
happen if both intangibility and tangibility were high or low. To provide a robust-
ness check that in principle also capture these effects we would need to present an
empirical model that includes the interaction of EDUC ∗ FAILED, intangibles/assets,
tangibles/assets, in which we end up with a quadruple interaction term, which makes
coefficient interpretations highly complicated. Nevertheless, we still run the follow-
ing empirical model with quadruple interaction with PUMA-industry-age-year fixed
effects. Figure 3.8 shows the plot of the marginal effect of intangibles/assets, when
we move from a sector at 75th percentile of tangibles/assets (sectors unaffected by
bank failures) to 25th percentile of tangibles/assets (sectors affected by bank failures).
The plot indicates that when sectors are more prone to credit shocks, bank failures
widen the wage gap more in the sectors whose share of intangible capital is higher as
opposed to sectors with lower shares of intangible capital. This confirms the finding
presented in Figure 3.7.
Finally, we consider external dependence. So far, we have controlled the effect
of external finance via our fixed effects. The reason for this was that sectors could
differ in their dependence on external sources. Some sectors may not get affected
by bank failures if their external dependence (e.g. dependence to bank credit) is low
even if they have high intangibility. Therefore, by controlling for external finance, we
have “corrected” for potentially confounding differences across sectors’ dependence
on external financial resources. However, we also present results with a quadruple
interaction of EDUC ∗ FAILED, KNOWDEP and external dependence, as defined
by Rajan and Zingales (1998). External dependence is a time-invariant sector-variant
measure defined as the difference between capital expenditures and cash flows di-
vided by capital expenditures. It captures the amount of desired finance that cannot
be generated by cash flows internally. We calculate external finance from Compustat
for 1987-2005 for all the sectors included previously.
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The analog graph is shown in Figure 3.9. It presents the plot of the marginal effect
of KNOWDEP when we move from a sector at 25th percentile of external dependence
(i.e. a sector relatively unaffected by bank failures) to 75th percentile of external de-
pendence (sectors affected by bank failures). The plot indicates that when sectors are
affected by bank failures more, we observe a higher skill premium in the sectors which
are more knowledge dependent. In fact, for sectors with low levels of knowledge de-
pendence, skill premium after bank failures is insignificant and only for the sectors
that heavily on knowledge dependent capital, skill premium increases significantly.
3.8 Additional Robustness Tests
3.8.1 Heckmann Correction
So far, our wage regressions have been based on a sample of individuals for whom
we can observe wages. If the person is working at the time of the survey, then the
wage we observe would be her labor market wage. However, for people out of the
workforce, we cannot observe a wage. To make sure that an unobserved factor related
to “propensity to work” does not confound our findings on the skill premium, we run
a two-step Heckmann selection model. In the first stage, we consider our previous
covariates plus a variable that can affect the propensity to work but might not nec-
essarily directly affect labor market earnings. To this end, we consider the presence
of elderly (+65 years) people in the household, which is a factor that may affect labor
market participation of individuals due to caring responsibilities, however, should
not necessarily affect the wages of those who already participate in the labor market.
15 The first and second stage estimations for our baseline wage regression and the
regression with KNOWDEP as an interaction term are provided in Table 3.13.
In the first stage regressions, the significance of the coefficients for the variable
15Note that marital status is a common factor included in the first stage of Heckmann correction
models for wage regressions. As we already control for marriage status in our baseline regressions, we
proceed with the presence of the elderly in the household. See Polachek (2008) for details.
105
3.8. ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS TESTS CHAPTER 3. SKILL PREMIUM
Table 3.13: Heckmann correction for selection bias
Baseline Knowledge dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First stage Second stage First stage Second stage
EDUC 0.12010∗∗∗ 0.320754∗∗∗ 0.104441∗∗∗ 0.369497∗∗∗
(0.016706) (0.010746) (0.019708) (0.013290)
EDUC×FAILED -0.039588∗∗ 0.033296∗∗ -0.005299 -0.099415∗∗∗
(0.020610) (0.01411) (0.039268) (0.027227)
EDUC×FAILED×KNOWDEP -0.028431 0.114876∗∗∗
(0.026869) (0.021207)
Senior -0.262436∗∗∗ -0.211127∗∗∗
(0.0176911) (0.020123)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extra controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
PUMA-Ind-Age-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inverse Mills Ratio (λ) -0.18322∗∗∗ -0.188093∗∗∗
(0.004051) (0.004267)
N 1105094 1105094 911368 911368
Consored N 193726 193726 138838 138838
Notes: The sample period is 2008-2010. EDUC is a dummy variable taking the value of one
(1) for individuals with an undergraduate degree or above and zero (0) otherwise. Level of
education is a categorical variable based on years of schooling. FAILED is a dummy variable
taking the value of one (1) for individuals residing in PUMAs that experience at least one bank
failure during the sample period and zero (0) otherwise. KNOWDEP is a sector-level time-
invariant variables. Each column includes multi-way fixed effects. Controls include the fol-
lowing variables: Experience, Experience2 Foreign born, Race, Female, EDUC*Experience and
EDUC*Experience2. Extra controls include the following variables: Married, Married*Child,
Female*Child. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered by PUMAs. *, **,
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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capturing the presence of elderly in the household, encoded as Senior, shows the rel-
evance of the variable. As inverse mills ratio’s are significant, we conclude that there
is indeed a selection bias based on propensity to work in our regressions. However,
correcting for the selection (shown in the columns presenting the second stage results)
suggest that the effect of bank failures on the skill premium is still significant (column
(2)) and this effect increases as sectors’ knowledge dependence increase (column (4)).
3.8.2 Bank Failures and Skill Composition
Under the Neyman-Rubin framework, one crucial assumption to establish a causal
relationship is the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), where treatment
assignment to one group does not affect the potential outcome for the other group
(Rubin (1977)). Following the Neyman-Rubin framework, we would like to give more
credibility to the magnitudes of our coefficients and test whether the results we pre-
sented so far suffer from not satisfying SUTVA.
In our setting, if bank failures induce a change in skill composition and distri-
bution in communities with no experience of bank failures, we may violate SUTVA.
One can possibly think of a scenario of mobility of skilled workers towards unaffected
PUMAs, driving down skilled wages and, hence, decreasing wage disparity relative
to affected PUMAs. Although PUMA-year fixed effects fix all factors changing in
community and year dimensions within a community (intra-community), it cannot
take into account the inter-community effects. Similarly, there could be switching of
skills between different sectors and occupation types.
One test of showing that SUTVA is met in several dimensions of our data (PUMA,
sector and occupation types), looks at whether bank failures change the skill com-
position and distribution. In particular, we concentrate on specifications with within
estimation in which skill composition and distribution are regressed on bank failures.
Finding significant asymmetries in skill composition and distribution within PUMAs,
sectors and occupation types after bank failures would lead us to conclude that our
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Table 3.14: Skill composition and distribution within PUMAs and sectors
Within PUMA Within sector
Skill composition Skill distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EDUC Level of education EDUC EDUC EDUC Level of education Level of education Level of education
FAILED -0.000469 -0.00125 -0.000515 0.000175 0.0000308 -0.00000771 -0.00165 -0.00421
(0.000920) (0.00294) (0.000991) (0.00107) (0.00181) (0.00317) (0.00328) (0.00520)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extra controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PUMA FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No
Ind FE No No Yes No No Yes No No
PUMA-Ind FE No No No Yes No No Yes No
Ind-Year FE No No No Yes No No Yes No
PUMA-Ind-Age FE No No No No Yes No No Yes
Ind-Age-Year FE No No No Yes Yes No No Yes
N 1451995 1451995 1105094 1093746 802483 1105094 1093746 802483
R2 0.841 0.641 0.828 0.846 0.937 0.653 0.692 0.877
Notes: The sample period is 2008-2010. EDUC is a dummy variable taking the value of one
(1) for individuals with an undergraduate degree or above and zero (0) otherwise. Level of
education is categorical variable based on years of schooling. FAILED is a dummy variable
taking the value of one (1) for individuals residing in PUMAs that experience at least one
bank failure during the sample period and zero (0) otherwise. KNOWDEP and R&D are
sector-level time-invariant variables. Each column includes one- or multi-way fixed effects.
Controls include the following variables: Experience, Experience2 Foreign born, Race, Female,
EDUC*Experience and EDUC*Experience2. Extra controls include the following variables:
Age, Age2, Married, Married*Child, Female*Child. Whenever Age fixed effects are included,
Age and Age2 are dropped from the regressions. Standard errors are shown in parentheses
and are clustered by PUMAs. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
results are contaminated by not satisfying SUTVA. Table 3.14 presents the estima-
tion results for within PUMA and within sector regressions. In Table 3.14 the first
two columns refer to within PUMA estimates and the remaining six columns refer
to within sector fixed effects. EDUC is, as defined before, to be skilled or not (cor-
responding to skill composition) and “Level of education” is finer ordered categories
of schooling such as elementary, high school, college and so on (corresponding to
skill distribution). The estimation results clearly show that neither the skill composi-
tion nor the distribution changes within sectors and PUMAs. In other words, there
is no significant switching of one specific type of worker from one PUMA or sector
to the other. This suggests that our baseline results can unlikely be explained by not
satisfying SUTVA across PUMA and sector dimensions.
We also present the same analysis in Table 3.15 for occupation types. The Amer-
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Table 3.15: Skill composition and distribution within occupation types
Skill composition Skill distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EDUC EDUC EDUC Level of education Level of education Level of education
FAILED -0.000666 -0.000317 -0.000160 -0.000738 -0.000221 -0.000757
(0.000998) (0.00110) (0.00234) (0.00284) (0.00319) (0.00589)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extra controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PUMA FE Yes No Yes Yes No No
Year FE Yes No Yes Yes No No
Occp FE Yes No No Yes No No
PUMA-Occp FE No Yes No No Yes No
Occp-Year FE No Yes No No Yes No
PUMA-Occp-Age FE No No Yes No No Yes
Occp-Age-Year FE No Yes Yes No No Yes
N 1105094 1077346 729649 1105094 1077346 729649
R2 0.833 0.858 0.957 0.718 0.766 0.937
Notes: The sample period is 2008-2010. EDUC is a dummy variable taking the value of one
(1) for individuals with an undergraduate degree or above and zero (0) otherwise. Level of
education is a categorical variable based on years of schooling. FAILED is a dummy variable
taking the value of one (1) for individuals residing in PUMAs that experience at least one
bank failure during the sample period and zero (0) otherwise. KNOWDEP and R&D are
sector-level time-invariant variables. Each column includes one- or multi-way fixed effects.
Controls include the following variables: Experience, Experience2 Foreign born, Race, Female,
EDUC*Experience and EDUC*Experience2. Extra controls include the following variables:
Age, Age2, Married, Married*Child, Female*Child. Whenever Age fixed effects are included,
Age and Age2 are dropped from the regressions. Standard errors are shown in parentheses
and are clustered by PUMAs. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
109
3.8. ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS TESTS CHAPTER 3. SKILL PREMIUM
ican Community Survey provides information on occupation types consisting of 539
specific occupational categories arranged into 23 high-level occupational groups. This
classification was created on the basis of the Standard Occupational Classification
(SOC) Manual: 2010, published by the Executive Office of the President, Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) (US Census Bureau (2017)). Table 3.15 displays the
results of within occupation type regressions.
Table 3.15 reiterates the findings that there is no evidence for significant asymme-
tries in skill composition and occupation as a result of bank failures. Overall, Table
3.14 and Table 3.15 indicate that our baseline results can unlikely be explained by not
satisfying SUTVA across PUMA, sector and occupation types.
3.8.3 Migration, Occupation Types, Stable Sample, Winsorizing data
and Two-Way Standard Error Clustering
Another way of showing that our results are robust to individuals switching between
communities is to study the role of migration between PUMAs. Section 5 argues that
to detect a PUMA-level effect, it is not a requirement that the banking market for an
individual branch is confined to a single PUMA, but only that a bank is most heavily
engaged with the community in which it operates. In either case, the incidence of any
potential negative credit shocks as a result of bank failure would fall most heavily on
the area nearest the bank (though the disruption would be stronger in the former case,
leading us to at least estimating a lower bound of the actual effect). Here the under-
lying assumption is that individuals are stable within a PUMA. However, migration
between PUMAs could lead to overestimation of the results if, for an endogenous
reason, highly skilled individuals systematically migrate to PUMAs that experience
bank failure.
Although our data neither shows a systematic migration pattern nor does it show
a mass migration to the extent that it could contaminate results, we still provide a ro-
bustness test against this concern. Our dataset allows us to track individuals’ location
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Table 3.16: Key results with a sample of non-movers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage)
FAILED -0.0300∗∗ -0.0291∗∗ -0.0335∗∗ -0.0329∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0150) (0.0151)
EDUC 0.397∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0152) (0.0116) (0.0153) (0.0140) (0.0189) (0.0141) (0.0189)
EDUC × FAILED 0.0330∗∗∗ 0.0354∗ 0.0317∗∗ 0.0344∗ -0.0509∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.0520∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0181) (0.0125) (0.0181) (0.0203) (0.0337) (0.0204) (0.0337)
EDUC × FAILED × KNOWDEP 0.0639∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.0637∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0251) (0.0127) (0.0250)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extra Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
PUMA FE No No No No No No No No
Year FE No No No No No No No No
PUMA-Year FE No No No No No No No No
PUMA-Ind-Age FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Ind-Age-Year FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
PUMA-Ind-Age-Year No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 573163 501266 573163 501266 421466 369545 421466 369545
R2 0.831 0.894 0.831 0.894 0.829 0.893 0.829 0.893
Notes: The sample period is 2008-2010. The dependent variable in all columns is the natural
logarithm of annual wages. EDUC is a dummy variable taking the value of one (1) for indi-
viduals with an undergraduate degree or above and zero (0) otherwise. FAILED is a dummy
variable taking the value of one (1) for individuals residing in PUMAs that experience at least
one bank failure during the sample period and zero (0) otherwise. Each column includes one-
or multi-way fixed effects. Controls include the following variables: Experience, Experience2
Foreign born, Race, Female, EDUC*Experience and EDUC*Experience2. Extra controls in-
clude the following variables: Age, Age2, Married, Married*Child, Female*Child. Whenever
Age fixed effects are included, Age and Age2 are dropped from the regressions. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered by PUMAs. *, **, *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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for the last 12 months. In particular, we run the regressions only with individuals
who have been living in the same PUMA for at least 12 months. Results of these
estimations are shown in Table 3.16. They confirm our results in the sense that even
only with a sample of non-movers, we can show a statistically and economically sig-
nificant effect of bank failures on the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers
as well as heterogeneity of the effect of bank failures on the skill premium depending
on KNOWDEP.
In addition to migration, one more potential problem could be present. Namely,
the link between skills and wages may not be strong in certain occupation types. That
is, despite requiring little education certain job types may provide high earnings. To
the extent that low skilled people with high earnings leave the labor market whereas
low skilled people with low earnings stay, we may still observe an increase in the skill
premium which is independent of bank failures. So far, we have used several multi-
way fixed effects including a component for sector fixed effects, which can imperfectly
control for the differences across occupation types to the extent that workers in the
same sector are working in similar types of occupation. However, this is a rather
unrealistic assumption. To control for differences in occupation types, we repeat our
baseline regressions by replacing industry components of multi-way fixed effects with
occupation types. Table 3.17 presents the baselines results provided with occupation
types fixed effects. Controlling for all factors that may change across occupation types,
time and communities, our results still suggest that bank failures lead to a widening
wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers.
We also test the robustness of our results to changing sample sizes. So far, the
number of observations has varied across different specifications significantly. There
is a big drop in sample size when we make specifications more conservative each time
by including multi-way fixed effects. In the most conservative specification in which
we focus on the variation across wages within an age cohort, in a sector, in a PUMA
at a given point in time, we sometimes lack sufficient observations to ensure the con-
vergence of the estimates to population parameters. To ensure that different samples
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Table 3.17: Key results with occupation fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage)
FAILED -0.0339∗ -0.0344∗
(0.0140) (0.0140)
EDUC 0.146∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0206) (0.0138) (0.0205)
EDUC × FAILED 0.0347∗ 0.0593∗ 0.0348∗ 0.0592∗
(0.0142) (0.0233) (0.0142) (0.0233)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extra controls No No Yes Yes
Puma FE No No No No
Year FE No No No No
Puma-Year FE No No No No
Puma-Occp-Age FE Yes No Yes No
Occp-Age-Year FE Yes No Yes No
Puma-Occp-Age-Year FE No Yes No Yes
N 592444 523621 592444 523621
R2 0.885 0.934 0.885 0.934
Notes: The sample period is 2008-2010. The dependent variable in all columns is the natural
logarithm of annual wages. EDUC is a dummy variable taking the value of one (1) for indi-
viduals with an undergraduate degree or above and zero (0) otherwise. FAILED is a dummy
variable taking the value of one (1) for individuals residing in PUMAs that experience at least
one bank failure during the sample period and zero (0) otherwise. KNOWDEP and R&D are
sector-level time-invariant variables. Each column includes one- or multi-way fixed effects.
Controls include the following variables: Experience, Experience2 Foreign born, Race, Female,
EDUC*Experience and EDUC*Experience2. Extra controls include the following variables:
Age, Age2, Married, Married*Child, Female*Child. Whenever Age fixed effects are included,
Age and Age2 are dropped from the regressions. Standard errors are shown in parentheses
and are clustered by PUMAs. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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Table 3.18: Stable sample, including winsorizing data and two-way standard error
clustering
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Wage) log(Hours) log(Hours) log(Hours) log(Hours)
FAILED -0.0734∗∗∗ -0.0323∗∗ -0.0232∗∗ -0.00718
(0.0125) (0.0159) (0.00942) (0.0133)
EDUC 0.579∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.00975) (0.00975) (0.0132) (0.0150) (0.00674) (0.00674) (0.0105) (0.0121)
EDUC × FAILED 0.0976∗∗∗ 0.0964∗∗∗ 0.0505∗∗∗ 0.0456∗∗∗ 0.0383∗∗∗ 0.0362∗∗∗ 0.0256∗∗ 0.0287∗∗
(0.0139) (0.0144) (0.0154) (0.0172) (0.00978) (0.0101) (0.0118) (0.0124)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extra Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PUMA FE Yes No No No Yes No No No
Year FE Yes No No No Yes No No No
PUMA -Year FE No Yes No No No Yes No No
PUMA -Ind-Age FE No No Yes No No No Yes No
Ind-Age-Year FE No No Yes No No No Yes No
PUMA -Ind-Age-Year FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 571112 571112 571112 571112 571112 571112 571112 571112
R2 0.397 0.399 0.861 0.885 0.256 0.258 0.815 0.847
[Winsorizing at 1%]
EDUC × FAILED 0.0967∗∗∗ 0.0958∗∗∗ 0.0512∗∗∗ 0.0463∗∗∗ 0.0379∗∗∗ 0.0360∗∗∗ 0.0248∗∗ 0.0288∗∗
(0.0133) (0.0138) (0.0150) (0.0167) (0.00942) (0.00971) (0.0113) (0.0121)
[Two-way standard error clustering: PUMA and sector]
EDUC × FAILED (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0089) (0.0118) (0.00997) (0.0105) (0.0071) (0.0120)
Notes: The sample period is 2008-2010. The dependent variable in columns (1) to (4) is the
natural logarithm of annual wages, whereas the dependent variable in columns (5) to (8) is
the natural logarithm of annual working hours. Columns (1) and (3), (2) and (4), (5) and
(7), (6) and (8) show the estimation results of equations (3.3), (3.4), (9) and (10), respectively.
EDUC is a dummy variable taking the value of one (1) for individuals with an undergraduate
degree or above and zero (0) otherwise. FAILED is a dummy variable taking the value of one
(1) for individuals residing in PUMAs that experience at least one bank failure during the
sample period and zero (0) otherwise. Each column includes one- or multi-way fixed effects.
Controls include the following variables: Experience, Experience2 Foreign born, Race, Female,
EDUC*Experience and EDUC*Experience2. Extra controls include the following variables:
Age, Age2, Married, Married*Child, Female*Child. Whenever Age fixed effects are included,
Age and Age2 are dropped from the regressions. Standard errors are shown in parentheses
and are clustered by PUMAs. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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used throughout the tables do not drive results, we conduct the entire analysis with a
stable sample. The key results with a stable sample are presented in Table 3.18. They
verify the findings demonstrated so far that the observed increases in the skill pre-
mium after bank failures are demand-driven and they are not driven by differential
samples and sample sizes.
In addition, we consider winsorizing our data. Given that extremely low values of
yearly wages and working hours are rather implausible but present in our dataset, Ta-
ble 3.18 also repeats the results with a data where dependent variables are winsorized
at 1% level. It shows that the magnitude of the coefficients and the significance levels
do not change much after winsorizing.
Finally, the results we have presented so far are based on standard error clustering
at the PUMA level. However, this may not be sufficient if wage and hours of work
are correlated beyond PUMAs, e.g. within sectors. To debunk this concern, we repeat
our baseline analysis with two-way standard error clustering at the PUMA and sector
level. Table 3.18 presents the standard errors clustered at both PUMA and sector lev-
els. The findings suggest that our previous results’ statistical significance of previous
results remain valid.
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3.9 Conclusion
Bank failures affect both economic growth and income inequality. While economists
have thoroughly studied the effects of bank failures on economic growth, the poten-
tially enormous impact of such an event on inequality has been underappreciated.
The three volumes of the Handbook of Income Distribution, for example, do not
mention any possible connections between wage inequality and bank failures.
In this chapter, we provide robust evidence that bank failures increase the skill
premium in a big sample of Americans from US PUMAs for the 2007-2009 recession,
which is associated with a large number of bank failures.
We conduct a two-fold empirical methodology. First, we identify the location of
failed bank branches in each PUMA and classifying PUMAs with at least one failed
bank branch as affected areas. We then estimate a Mincerian skill-wage equation
to test if the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers are higher in affected
PUMAs. We estimate various fixed effects specifications, in many of which we control
for time-varying PUMA-specific characteristics to control for all static and dynamic
regional economic conditions.
We find that bank failures lead to an increase in the wage gap between skilled and
unskilled workers by around 5% and the observed effect can credibly be attributed to
demand-side explanations. We also show that the impact of bank failures on wage
inequality is differentially exacerbated for sectors that are knowledge-intensive, which
further substantiates the observed demand effects.
We also show, for the first time in the literature, that the type of capital employed
in sectors of an economy is an essential channel through which the effects of bank
failures are transmitted to local labor markets. In particular, we show that the impact
of bank failures on the skill premium is differentially exacerbated for sectors that rely
more on intangible capital relative to tangible capital. We attribute this finding to the
fact that the type of capital firms use matters for the transmission of local credit shocks
to the labor market. These results are consistent with knowledge-dependent capital
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being financed through forgone earnings of unskilled workers when total financing
capacity shrinks.
The findings of this study open up a new channel, bank failures, as an accelerator
of the skill premium. It also explains one of the potential mechanisms that outlines
how shocks in the financial markets can be transmitted to the labor markets. To our
knowledge, we are the first to show that knowledge-dependent capital matters for the
transmission of such shocks. The sectoral heterogeneity we exploit can also easily be
translated into other setups where the interaction of financial and labor markets is
analyzed.
Our findings can be extended in several directions. First, it would be interesting
to conduct this analysis with a richer dataset in which the researcher can observe the
matched bank-firm and employee to be able to gain a deeper understanding of the
relationship between the firm and bank characteristics and the evolution of wages
under financial distress. Given the importance of lending to small and medium-
sized enterprises, one could test whether the observed effects of bank failures on the
skill premium are different for small and large businesses. Secondly, a theoretical
framework could be built to improve our understanding of the exact mechanisms that
play a role beyond the one that we present here.
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Chapter 4
The Net Interest Margin and the
Branch Network*
4.1 Introduction
The bank branch network is of crucial importance for the flow of credit from savers
to borrowers. The seminal contribution of Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) showed
that bank branch deregulation in the United States benefits economic development
through more efficient lending practices. Furthermore, the deregulation benefits dis-
proportionately poorer households and minorities (Beck et al. (2007); Beck et al.
(2010); Levine et al. (2014)). Recent research (Gilje et al. (2016); Berrospide et al.
(2016); Gilje (2017); Córtes and Strahan (2017)) demonstrated that the bank branch
network is still at the core of distribution of funds, particularly for areas with a large
market share of small banks.
In the United States, the number of banks has been falling persistently in recent
years. Furthermore, the slowdown accelerated in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
Out of 10,170 banks that existed in 2000, 1700 had disappeared by 2009 and a further
2000 had disappeared by 2016.1 In contrast, the number of branches, which stood at
*This chapter is a joint work with Christopher Martin Hols from the Bonn Graduate School of
Economics.
1Bank failures account for 573 of the banks that disappeared. The vast majority of these failures
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Figure 4.1: Number of banks and bank branches in the United States
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Notes: This figure indicates the number of banks (right axis) and the number of bank branches
(left axis) in the United States between 2000 and 2016. Data is taken from the FDIC call reports
and aggregated by the authors.
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100,695 in the last quarter of 2008, decreased to 93,366 in the last quarter of 2015.2
There is extensive literature on how geographical bank branch network diversi-
fication affects banks’ funding costs. Diamond (1984) and Boyd and Prescott (1986)
suggest that geographic diversification can bring additional assets that are imperfectly
correlated with existing assets and this can reduce bank risk and lower funding costs.
Similarly, if banks spread to diverse geographic areas where the economies are im-
perfectly correlated with the bank’s existing local economy, they will be able to use
internal capital markets to respond effectively to local shocks on asset quality and
liquidity (Houston et al. (1997); Houston et al. (1998); Gatev et al. (2009) and Cornett
et al. (2011)). Other studies investigate how geographical bank branch network di-
versification can result in increased funding costs. For example, Brickley et al. (2003)
and Berger et al. (2005) show that distance can make it difficult for bank headquarters
to monitor subsidiaries, which can have a negative impact on efficiency, asset quality
and funding costs.
However, the literature is largely mute on the causality going in the opposite di-
rection, i.e., how funding shocks translated into changes in net interest margins affect
geographical bank branch network diversification. In fact, a reduction in the net in-
terest margins can “. . . reduce gross value of core deposits, and given that branches
have non-interest expenses, maintaining deposit relationships could become a neg-
ative present value business” (Claessens et al. (2017)). If an increase in the funding
costs indeed affects banks’ geographical branch network diversification, consequences
other than for banks’ profits can follow. For example, the literature on banks’ inter-
state expansion in the United States suggests that it accelerates the economic growth
and reduces the poverty rates of individual states (e.g. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996);
Beck et al. (2010)).
In this chapter, we study the effect of a reduction in the net interest margin induced
by higher funding costs on the branch network using a natural experiment. We iden-
took place during the financial crisis.
2The evolution of the number of banks insured by the FDIC and the number of branches of deposit
insured banks can be found in Figure 4.1.
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tify the exogenous reduction through the repeal of Regulation Q in the United States,
i.e. the lift of the ban of interest payments on demand deposits in 2011. The aban-
donment provides a natural experiment for our setting as it increased funding costs
for banks that finance their activities largely through demand deposits more strongly
than for banks that finance themselves to a lesser extent through demand deposits.
As banks are not forced to pay interest on deposits, our results provide additional
insights into the effect of deposit market competition on bank branch networks.
To compensate for the funding costs (induced by the repeal of Regulation Q),
banks might try to expand to new markets or expand market power by creating new
branches in existing markets to decrease funding cost.3 However, additional branches
come at a cost, which might surpass the benefit of market power. Furthermore, some
banking regulations like the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) are tied to banks
having a branch in a certain area. Therefore, banks might be willing to shrink the
branch network to reduce costs and further reduce exposure to clients in poorer ar-
eas, who are protected by these kinds of regulation. In this study, we will test whether
banks increase or decrease their branch networks after a funding shock. Furthermore,
we will analyze how banks’ soundness is affected by this change in the branch net-
work and whether differences in the income of potential clients are associated with
the change in bank risk.
Following the Great Depression, the market for deposits in the United States was
tightly regulated. The Banking Act of 1933 made it illegal to pay interest on demand
deposits and ceilings were imposed on the interest that could be paid on time and
savings deposits. The purpose of this reform was to strengthen the soundness of
banks and to stop excessive competition. Furthermore, banks would save interest
expenditures, which would make it easier to pay the cost of deposit insurance.4 In the
1960s, Benston (1964) and Cox (1967) argued that the introduction of interest ceilings
was unjustified in the first place since banks that paid higher interest on deposits were
3Drechsler et al. (2017) suggested that banks pay lower funding costs in their deposits if their
market power is greater.
4See Preston (1933).
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not riskier than other banks before the Great Depression.
Over the years, Regulation Q, which is the chapter of the financial regulations of
the United States that dealt with the interest ceilings, was modified frequently. Until
the 1980s, the interest ceilings on time and savings deposits were gradually increased
and in the 1980s, these interest ceilings were finally abandoned. However, the ban
on interest payments on demand deposits was kept in place until the recent financial
crisis. In response to the crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act was passed, which lifted the
ban on demand deposits for the first time in over 70 years. In the aftermath of the
reform, the market for demand deposits expanded rapidly from US $568.1 billion in
the second quarter of 2011 to US $1,024.4 billion in the fourth quarter of 2013.5
Our results suggest that banks that relied more heavily on demand deposits before
the deregulation took place experienced an increase in their interest expenses and a
reduction in their net interest margin. This was compensated by a gradual reduction
in their branch network by around 10% of affected banks’ total branch network.6 This
indicates that the funding shock caused by the new regulation induced a reduction
in the branch network. As the aggregate number of branches falls, it is unlikely that
other banks will fill the gap and open new branches where affected banks closed
down branches. Furthermore, banks’ assets become safer and hold less capital, which
is in line with the evidence that geographical diversification does not translate into
lower risk for banks (Demsetz and Strahan (1997); Acharya et al. (2006); Berger et al.
(2010)). In addition, the offices they build are located in richer neighborhoods and
they give credit in areas that have a higher per capita income, while the individual
income of the applicants does not increase. This indicates that banks react with a
geographical concentration around safer markets.
Our findings contribute to several strands of the literature. First, we add to the
literature on the effect of interest rate ceilings. The interest rate ceilings adopted
5Figure 4.3 presents the development of the number of demand deposits in the United States.
6We also investigate the presence of other cost-cutting measures by banks. We find that bank
premises as well as the number of employees are differentially lower for the affected banks after the
repeal of Regulation Q. These findings further strengthen our results related to branch closures.
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after the Great Depression have been frequently analyzed over the past decades. Ben-
ston (1964) and Cox (1967) were the first to analyze whether the banks that paid
higher interest on deposits engaged in hazardous business practices before the Great
Depression and both rejected this hypothesis. Mingo (1978) studied the flexibility
that financial institutions had under Regulation Q to rely on interest-bearing or non-
interest-bearing liabilities and found that there is a negative relationship between
bank risk and interest payments; that is banks become safer if they have a higher share
of interest expenses to total expenses. Taggart (1978) suggested that pricing controls
make it possible for banks to extract monopoly rents by analyzing savings banks from
Massachusetts. James (1982) and James (1983) analyzed the effect of changes in the
interest cap on savings deposits and found that banks’ stock market value decreases
when the caps are increased suggesting that banks gained rents from the caps. The in-
terest ceilings had macroeconomic consequences. Mertens (2008) showed that deposit
rate ceilings are in part responsible for the volatility of output and inflation and that
the lift of deposit caps could be partially responsible for the great moderation. Koch
(2015) studied the role of the interest ceilings in the United States on bank lending
and found that whenever interest ceilings were binding lending by banks contracted
sharply.
Second, we contribute to the literature on the real effects of bank branch networks
in a developed economy. Gilje et al. (2016) showed that the branch network of banks
still plays an important role in the transmission of liquidity shocks to the real econ-
omy. Using the recent shell gas boom caused by hydraulic fracturing (fracking), they
showed that banks only expanded their lending in areas where they had branches
before the shell gas boom started, as these were the only areas where they have an
informational advantage. Gilje (2017) analyzed the effect of the branch network on
lending markets. He found that local lending markets benefit from the internal capi-
tal market of banks that are connected through branches. Córtes and Strahan (2017)
used property damage to show that banks redirect funds to other branches in the
aftermath of natural disasters. This shows how important the branch network is in
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order to absorb shocks. Work by Benston (1965), Evanoff (1988) and Berger et al.
(1997) mostly studied the efficiency of bank branch networks. Benston (1965) raised
the question whether unit or branch banking is more efficient and found that banks
with more branches have a higher operational cost arising from higher overhead ex-
penses. Evanoff (1988) analyzed the effect of bank branches on the accessibility of
banking services. He found that accessibility is improved when the bank branch
network is expanded. Berger et al. (1997) found that banks operate with too many
branches and that reducing branches would minimize costs.
Third, we contribute to the literature on the effect of distance in banking. Petersen
and Rajan (2002) suggested that the distance between lenders and borrowers is an im-
portant determinant of the interest rate firms have to pay on their loans and whether
or not a loan is approved by the lender. Degryse and Ongena (2005) observed that
banks engage in spatial price discrimination; the distance from the borrower to the
lender decreases the interest rate while the distance between the borrower and a com-
petitor bank increases the interest rate. Butler (2008) observed that proximity between
borrowers and financial intermediaries plays an important role in the bond market.
His results suggest that local investment banks are able to offer lower fees and are
able to place bonds with lower yields. The effect is particularly strong for firms with-
out credit rating. Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) observed that physical distance is
important for the lenders ability to gain private information about the borrower. This
leads to a trade-off between the higher availability of credit for firms nearby at the
cost of higher interest rates. In contrast, Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012) found that
distance between borrowers and lenders increases the lending spread. However, they
used syndicated loans of large companies, which are less affected by spatial price
discrimination and rent extraction of the lenders. Bellucci et al. (2013) presented re-
sults that are in contrast to the results of Degryse and Ongena (2005). They suggested
that the distance between lenders and borrowers increases the interest rate on loans.
Herpfer et al. (2017) were the first to analyze how exogenous changes in the distance
between lenders and borrowers affect the interest rate and availability of credit. They
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observed that a lower distance increases the interest rate in existing bank-borrower re-
lationships but also increases the probability of initiating a new relationship between
a lender and a borrower. We contribute to this literature as we show that banks trans-
form their branch network strategically to be close to potentially safer borrowers after
a shock to their profitability.
Finally, we add further evidence on the interaction of finance and inequality. A
seminal contribution by Beck et al. (2007) showed that financial development ben-
efits the poor over-proportionally. The lowest quintile in the wealth distribution is
responsible for more than 60 % of the impact of financial development. Beck et al.
(2010) found that the income distribution of states which started the financial dereg-
ulation between the 1970s and 1990s earlier reduced income inequality, and financial
deregulation especially benefited people in the lower part of the income distribution.
Levine et al. (2014) showed that banking deregulation in the same period especially
improved the labor market opportunities of black workers by improving bank effi-
ciency, lowering entry barriers for non-financial firms and the competition for labor.
Using two new datasets on income inequality, Tan and Law (2012) studied nonlinear
dynamics between financial development and inequality. They found that financial
deepening reduces income inequality at first. Following Greenwood and Jovanovic
(1990) they tested if the relationship is reversed U-shaped. However, they observed
that the U-shape is not inverted as Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) proposed. So,
financial development leads to a wider income distribution when financial develop-
ment increases above a certain threshold. Larrain (2015), using sectoral data, showed
that opening capital accounts increases income inequality because capital and highly
skilled labor are complements and capital inflows boost the income of highly-skilled
workers through this channel. Reilly et al. (2016) studied the effect of financial dereg-
ulation on high school graduation. They found that financial deregulation increases
high school graduation rates, but this effect is heterogeneous; white individuals were
significantly affected, while non-whites were not. We add further evidence to these
results as we show that the deregulation of interest payment on deposits reduces the
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number of branches and the availability of credit differentially more in poorer neigh-
borhoods.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
institutional framework and the data. Section 3 presents the results at the bank level,
the branch level and the mortgage credit level, and Section 4 concludes.
4.2 Institutional Framework and Data
4.2.1 Relationship between Funding Cost and Bank Branches
Our primary object of interest is the effect of a funding shock on the bank branch
network. To elaborate on this, one more general issue has to be clarified: Why do
banks open branches and take retail deposits in the first place? Banks could finance
themselves using capital markets paying the short-term interest rate and use these
funds to lend to their customers. However, evidence from Drechsler et al. (2017)
indicates that banks have market power in the deposit market and are therefore able to
fund themselves more cheaply than using short-term bonds. Following the literature
on the impact of distance in bank lending, we assume that at least part of this market
power arises from the existing branch network. However, sustaining an elaborate
network of bank branches is costly. Even in the absence of interest payments, which
was the case as long as Regulation Q was in place, banks will compete for depositors
but can only do so using non-financial measures. One possibility would be to offer
cheaper service, i.e. lower fees while the alternative is to build more branches to be
close to customers. Once interest payments on deposits are permitted, this increases
the costs of funding, especially for banks that had a lot of demand deposits in their
balance sheets, assuming that they want to sustain the same deposit base, while the
operational costs remain unchanged.7 Even if banks attract more depositors after they
7Banks had the choice of paying interest but were not forced to. However, banks might obviously
face problems attracting new depositors and keeping the old depositors if they decide not to pay any
interest.
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are allowed to pay interest on deposits and lend more to customers, their margin will
decline as the interest rates on earning assets remain constant or even decline due to
the higher supply of credit.
In the spirit of Drechsler et al. (2017), we consider a simple model of bank funding
to study the reaction to the abandonment of Regulation Q. Banks can invest one dollar
today and gain income y tomorrow. We fix asset returns as well as bank size as we
want to highlight the effect on the funding side of the bank. This dollar has to be
raised entirely through deposits as the bank does not own any equity.8 There are two
ways of raising deposits: (1) paying an interest rate equal to the short-term interest
rate r, or (2) opening branches at the proportional cost c(γ). The cost is increasing in
γ, which is the share of deposits raised through branches. β(γ) is the interest paid on
deposits and it decreases in γ. As customers have to travel less far to the branch if it
is closer to their location, they might be willing to accept lower deposit rates (Degryse
and Ongena (2005)). The problem of the bank is therefore:
min
γ
cost = γ(c(γ) + β(γ)) + (1− γ)r , γ ∈ [0, 1]
If we assume that c(0) = 0 and r > 0, then there exists an interior solution in
which banks use both deposit funding as well as market funding.
Let us now consider the two cases before and after the lifting of the deposit rate
ceiling. Once the deposits ceiling is in place, the interest paid on deposits is β(γ) = 0.
Therefore, it is optimal for the bank to build sufficient branches such that the marginal
cost of the branch network is equal to wholesale funding and hence:
γc′(γ) + c(γ) = r
After the ceiling is lifted, the banks’ problem changes. If the bank has higher
8The income prospects, as well as the capital structure of the bank, are irrelevant for our argument
as there is no risk in this model. Therefore, we abstract from them as the bank is entirely deposit-
funded and asset returns are fixed and independent from the bank’s funding structure.
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market power (higher γ), its interest payments on deposits will decrease.9 Therefore,
the cost-minimizing number of branches is given by
γ(c′(γ) + β′(γ)) + c(γ) + β(γ) = r
with β(γ) > 0 and β′(γ) < 0. This leads to the conclusion that depending on
whether γβ′(γ) + β(γ) ≶ 0, banks will build more or fewer branches after deregula-
tion and interest rates depend on market power. If the interest rate paid on deposits is
close to the market rate or the sensitivity to market power is low, the branch network
will decrease in size, while banks will expand their branch networks if interest rates
are highly sensitive to market power.
4.2.2 Data
Our analysis makes use of three data sources. First, we use bank balance sheet infor-
mation for all depository institutions in the United States, which we obtain from the
Statistics on Depository Institutions (SDI), provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), for 8 quarters before (2009Q3) and after (2013Q3) the reform took
place.10 This gives us a sample of more than 7,000 banks over 16 quarters. A list of
all variables used in the analysis can be found in Table 4.1. Following Kashyap et al.
(2002), we attempt to minimize the number of observations excluded from our sam-
ple to avoid a potential sample selection bias. Therefore, we do not account for bank
mergers in our sample. Although bank mergers were common for our sample period,
dropping banks that engage in merger activities does not alter any of our principal
results, which we document in a following section in this chapter.
The summary statistics for the entire time span can be found in Table 4.2, the
summary statistics after winsorizing are presented in Table 4.3 and the summary
statistics for the second quarter of 2011 (one quarter before Regulation Q was in place)
9In this context, higher market power arises from the reduced distance to the customer.
10As all banks that offer insured deposits are part of the sample, we also include banks with new
business models like internet banks. However, they account for only a very small share of our banks
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Table 4.1: Variables definitions
Variable Definition
Number of Branches The number of physical domestic branches located in the United States
a bank operates with.
Number of Branches
per $ bil. of Deposits
The number of physical domestic branches located in the United States
a bank operates with rescaled by the amount of deposits.
Share of Demand
Deposits
The share of a bank’s liabilities financed by demand deposits.
Share of Deposits The share of a bank’s liabilities financed by total deposits.
Number of Employ-
ees
The number of employees in FTE (Full Time Equivalent).
Number of employ-
ees per $ bil. of De-
posits
The number of employees in FTE (Full Time Equivalent) rescaled by
the amount of deposits.
Bank Premises Real estate and equipment owned by the bank and used for its opera-
tions as a share of total assets.
Interest Expenses The ratio of interest expenses to total deposits.
Net Interest Margin The ratio of net interest income to total assets.
Nonperforming As-
sets
The ratio of nonperforming assets to total assets. Nonperforming as-
sets are assets whose payment is more than 90 days overdue and real
estate owned by the bank not used for operations, i.e. real estate from
mortgage delinquencies.
Risk-weighted
Assets
The ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets.
Capital Asset Ratio The ratio of total equity to total assets.
Average of Branch
Median Income
The average over the median income of the zip-code where the branch
is located.
All loans - Areas The average income of the areas in which loan applicants from the
HMDA database resident in.
Bank Size The log size of a bank’s total assets.
Profitability A bank’s return on assets.
Liquidity A bank’s ratio of securities to total assets.
Share of agricultural
Loans
The ratio of loans financing agricultural production and loans secured
by farm land to total assets.
Share of C&I Loans The ratio of commercial and industrial loans and loans secured by
non-farm non-residential owner-occupied properties to total assets.
Share of mortgage
Loans
The ratio of loans secured by single family and multi-family home to
total assets.
Share of consumer
Loans
The share of consumer loans to total assets.
Z-score The sum of a bank’s return on assets and capital ratio divided by
standard deviation of return on assets.
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics - bank level - complete interval - not winsorized
Obs. Mean Median S.D. Min Max
Number of Branches 113146 13.09 3.00 138.17 0.00 6728.00
Number of Branches
per $ bil. of Deposits
113122 62.27 26.03 3091.22 0.00 1.00e+06
Share of Demand De-
posits
113011 11.37 10.25 8.13 0.00 97.64
Share of Deposits 113146 82.99 85.03 9.58 0.00 115.19
Number of Employees 113011 276.75 38.00 4624.24 0.00 231333.00
Number of Employees
per $ bil. of Deposits
113011 272.96 247.00 440.73 0.00 77294.69
Bank Premises 113011 1.78 1.48 1.45 0.00 28.37
Interest Expenses 112987 3.60 0.65 227.17 -0.00 35630.20
Net Interest Margin 113011 2.18 2.11 2.58 -1.61 759.90
Non-performing As-
sets
113011 2.68 1.52 3.56 0.00 49.07
Risk-weighted Assets 113011 65.33 66.58 13.93 0.00 199.67
Capital Asset Ratio 113011 11.37 10.25 6.63 -214.95 100.00
Average of Branch Me-
dian Income
107580 10.81 10.78 0.30 9.20 12.25
All Loans - Areas 38206 11.06 11.06 0.18 9.97 11.61
Bank Size 113146 1211.25 1196.89 134.88 421.95 2139.01
Profitability 113011 0.24 0.33 15.52 -5084.11 202.89
Liquidity 113146 21.64 18.81 15.93 -0.02 99.51
Share of Agricultural
Loans
105728 8.14 2.37 12.01 0.00 85.93
Share of C&I Loans 113146 24.05 22.31 14.79 0.00 96.15
Share of Mortgage
Loans
113146 21.39 18.12 15.38 0.00 100.93
Share of Consumer
Loans
113011 3.69 2.23 6.40 0.00 105.69
Observations 113146
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Ratios
are stated in percentage points, and Bank Size is the logarithm of the bank size multiplied by
100. Number of branches and Number of branches per bil. $ of deposits are not rescaled.
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics - bank level - complete interval
Obs. Mean Median S.D. Min Max
Number of Branches 113146 7.15 3.00 13.85 1.00 102.00
Number of Branches per $
bil. of Deposits
113122 31.96 26.03 27.82 2.14 254.32
Share of Demand De-
posits
113011 11.37 10.25 8.13 0.00 97.64
Share of Deposits 113146 82.99 85.03 9.58 0.00 115.19
Number of Employees 113011 109.52 38.00 280.37 4.00 2309.00
Number of Employees per
$ bil. of Deposits
113011 261.40 247.00 119.89 71.63 1080.14
Bank Premises 113011 1.76 1.48 1.34 0.02 6.56
Interest Expenses 112987 0.84 0.65 0.70 0.07 5.81
Net Interest Margin 113011 2.16 2.11 1.10 0.49 5.37
Non-performing Assets 113011 2.46 1.52 2.65 0.00 10.23
Risk-Weighted Assets 113011 65.35 66.58 13.56 26.07 96.34
Capital Asset Ratio 113011 11.20 10.25 4.43 5.13 42.24
Average of Branch Me-
dian Income
107580 10.81 10.78 0.30 9.20 12.25
All Loans - Areas 38206 11.06 11.06 0.18 9.97 11.61
Bank Size 113146 1211.25 1196.89 134.88 421.95 2139.01
Profitability 113011 0.24 0.33 15.52 -5084.11 202.89
Liquidity 113146 21.64 18.81 15.93 -0.02 99.51
Share of Agricultural
Loans
105728 8.14 2.37 12.01 0.00 85.93
Share of C&I Loans 113146 24.05 22.31 14.79 0.00 96.15
Share of Mortgage Loans 113146 21.39 18.12 15.38 0.00 100.93
Share of Consumer Loans 113011 3.69 2.23 6.40 0.00 105.69
Observations 113146
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Ratios
are stated in percentage points, and Bank Size is the logarithm of the bank size multiplied by
100. Number of branches and Number of branches per bil. $ of deposits are not rescaled.
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Table 4.4: Summary statistics - bank level - second quarter 2011
Obs. Mean Median S.D. Min Max
Number of Branches 7522 7.14 3.00 13.84 1.00 102.00
Number of Branches per $ bil.
of Deposits
7520 32.00 26.09 27.48 2.14 254.32
Share of Demand Deposits 7513 11.16 10.11 7.86 0.00 87.41
Share of Deposits 7522 83.20 85.25 9.49 0.00 100.85
Number of Employees 7513 109.60 37.00 281.29 4.00 2309.00
Number of Employees per $
bil. of Deposits
7513 262.75 249.48 119.35 71.63 1080.14
Bank Premises 7513 1.76 1.49 1.34 0.02 6.56
Interest Expenses 7511 0.59 0.56 0.33 0.07 5.81
Net Interest Margin 7513 1.74 1.73 0.41 0.49 5.37
Non-performing Assets 7513 2.60 1.62 2.74 0.00 10.23
Risk-Weighted Assets 7513 64.87 66.00 13.25 26.07 96.34
Capital Asset Ratio 7513 11.25 10.29 4.44 5.13 42.24
Average of Branch Median
Income
7469 10.81 10.78 0.30 9.20 12.25
All Loans - Areas 2518 11.06 11.06 0.18 10.04 11.60
Bank Size 7522 1210.37 1195.26 134.57 451.09 2130.61
Profitability 7513 0.27 0.34 2.00 -131.87 80.90
Liquidity 7522 22.36 19.68 16.01 0.00 99.28
Share of Agricultural Loans 6805 8.35 2.70 11.98 0.00 81.53
Share of C&I Loans 7522 24.18 22.53 14.81 0.00 94.89
Share of Mortgage Loans 7522 21.27 18.13 15.26 0.00 97.76
Share of Consumer Loans 7513 3.67 2.22 6.50 0.00 100.45
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis in the
quarter before the reform took place. Ratios are stated in percentage points, and Bank Size
is the logarithm of the bank size multiplied by 100. Number of branches and Number of
branches per bil. $ of deposits are not rescaled.
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Table 4.5: Summary statistics - normalized differences without matching
Mean Normalized Observations
Untreated Treated Difference Untreated Treated
Number of Branches 8.20 3.99 -0.24 5,635.00 1,887.00
Number of Branches
per $ bil. of Deposits
30.07 37.76 0.19 5,633.00 1,887.00
Share of Demand De-
posits
7.74 21.41 0.85 5,635.00 1,878.00
Share of Deposits 82.33 85.79 0.28 5,635.00 1,887.00
Number of Employees 128.61 52.54 -0.22 5,635.00 1,878.00
Number of Employees
per $ bil. of Deposits
249.26 303.25 0.31 5,635.00 1,878.00
Bank Premises 1.75 1.78 0.02 5,635.00 1,878.00
Interest Expenses 0.65 0.40 -0.53 5,633.00 1,878.00
Net Interest Margin 1.72 1.80 0.13 5,635.00 1,878.00
Non-performing Assets 2.76 2.10 -0.18 5,635.00 1,878.00
Risk-weighted Assets 65.68 62.45 -0.17 5,635.00 1,878.00
Capital Asset Ratio 11.31 11.06 -0.04 5,635.00 1,878.00
Average of Branch Me-
dian Income
10.82 10.78 -0.10 5,598.00 1,871.00
All Loans - Areas 11.07 11.03 -0.14 2,009.00 509.00
Bank Size 1,228.62 1,155.86 -0.39 5,635.00 1,887.00
Profitability 0.27 0.30 0.01 5,635.00 1,878.00
Liquidity 22.06 23.25 0.05 5,635.00 1,887.00
Share of Agricultural
Loans
8.19 8.80 0.04 4,954.00 1,851.00
Share of C&I Loans 24.18 24.20 0.00 5,635.00 1,887.00
Share of Mortgage
Loans
23.14 15.69 -0.36 5,635.00 1,887.00
Share of Consumer
Loans
3.52 4.14 0.08 5,635.00 1,878.00
Notes: This table presents the mean and normalized differences of our treatment and control
group of the variables used in the analysis in the quarter before the reform took place. Ratios
are stated in percentage points, and Bank Size is the logarithm of the bank size multiplied by
100. Number of branches and Number of branches per bil. $ of deposits are not rescaled.
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Table 4.6: Summary statistics - normalized differences with matching
Mean Normalized Observations
Untreated Treated Difference Untreated Treated
Number of Branches 4.38 4.63 0.02 1,209.00 1,238.00
Number of Branches
per $ bil. of Deposits
33.28 36.30 0.08 1,209.00 1,238.00
Share of Demand De-
posits
9.03 20.97 0.82 1,209.00 1,230.00
Share of Deposits 83.77 85.61 0.17 1,209.00 1,238.00
Number of Employees 59.07 62.02 0.01 1,209.00 1,230.00
Number of Employees
per $ bil. of Deposits
260.38 296.96 0.22 1,209.00 1,230.00
Bank Premises 1.75 1.78 0.02 1,209.00 1,230.00
Interest Expenses 0.62 0.42 -0.51 1,209.00 1,230.00
Net Interest Margin 1.73 1.78 0.09 1,209.00 1,230.00
Non-performing Assets 2.73 2.29 -0.11 1,209.00 1,230.00
Risk-Weighted Assets 65.19 63.41 -0.10 1,209.00 1,230.00
Capital Asset Ratio 11.25 10.91 -0.06 1,209.00 1,230.00
Average of Branch Me-
dian Income
10.79 10.79 0.00 1,203.00 1,227.00
All Loans - Areas 11.06 11.04 -0.09 372.00 367.00
Bank Size 1,172.82 1,171.78 -0.01 1,209.00 1,238.00
Profitability 0.24 0.28 0.03 1,209.00 1,230.00
Liquidity 22.89 22.26 -0.03 1,209.00 1,238.00
Share of Agricultural
Loans
9.60 8.50 -0.06 1,120.00 1,209.00
Share of C&I Loans 24.83 24.97 0.01 1,209.00 1,238.00
Share of Mortgage
Loans
19.23 16.71 -0.14 1,209.00 1,238.00
Share of Consumer
Loans
3.38 3.77 0.07 1,209.00 1,230.00
Notes: This table presents the mean and normalized differences of our matched treatment
and control group of the variables used in the analysis in the quarter before the reform took
place. Ratios are stated in percentage points, and Bank Size is the logarithm of the bank size
multiplied by 100. Number of branches and Number of branches per bil. $ of deposits are not
rescaled.
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Table 4.7: Summary statistics - continued
Level Observations Mean S.D. Min Max
log Mean Income Branch 106,228 11.16 0.38 9.15 12.65
Opened after Regulation Q Branch 107,695 0.09 0.29 0 1
HUB Log Median Income Mortgage 5,973,88 11.08 0.23 9.67 11.6
Applicant Income Mortgage 6,306,67 4.24 0.74 0 9.21
Denied Mortgage 5,452,182 0.19 0.40 0 1
Minority Status Mortgage 5,457,268 0.17 0,38 0 1
Purchased Loan Mortgage 6,454,147 0.45 0,50 0 1
Notes: This table presents the log mean income of all branches’ zip-codes and the number of
branches that were opened after Regulation Q had taken place. It also presents the area’s log
median income of all loan applications, the log of applicant’s income, whether or not the loan
application was denied, the minority status and whether the loan was purchased or not.
can be found in Table 4.4. Our main dependent variable is the number of branches
per $ billion of deposits. Additionally, we look at the number of branches of a bank.
The mean number of branches per $ billion of deposits is 32.0 and the median is
26.09, while the mean number of branches is 7.14 and the median is 3. Our treatment
variable is the interaction of a reform dummy that is zero (0) before the third quarter
of 2011 and one (1) afterwards, and a dummy that is one (1) if the bank’s share
of demand deposits to total assets banks have on their balance sheet in the second
quarter of 2011 is in the upper quartile.11 The median share of demand deposits to
total assets is 11% and banks are considered treated if their share is above 14.9%,
which corresponds to the third quarter of the demand deposits to total assets ratio.
The treated banks fund themselves with around 20% of demand deposits on average,
while the demand deposit share of the banks that are considered untreated is 8%.
Banks might compensate the increase in the interest rate on demand deposits by
reducing interest rates on other deposits and, therefore, they might not experience
a funding shock and the net interest margin remains unchanged. For this reason,
we analyze the ratio of net interest income to total assets and the ratio of interest
expenses to deposits. The net interest margin should decrease, while the interest
expenses should increase more for banks with a large share of demand deposits in
11As a robustness check, we interact the reform dummy with the continuous share of demand
deposits to total assets.
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the aftermath of the reform. Mean net interest margin is 2.16% and mean interest
expenses are 0.58%.
To analyze if banks reduced their risk after the reform, we consider two measures.
First, we employ banks’ nonperforming assets to total asset ratio. If banks changed
the composition of their branch network in the aftermath of the reform towards areas
with better borrowers, we would expect to see a decline in the ratio of non-performing
assets to total assets. The mean share of non-performing assets is 2.6%. In addition,
we consider the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets as an additional risk mea-
sure which should capture the riskiness of the bank as well. The mean share of
risk-weighted assets over all banks is 65%. Additionally, we want to test if the treated
banks reduced their capital in order to save costs. Therefore, we consider the capital
asset ratio. The mean capital asset ratio is 11.2%. As non-performing loans are a
backward-looking measure of bank risk and risk-weighted assets are subject to ma-
nipulation, we consider a third risk measure which is the Z-score. As it is necessary
to calculate the standard deviation of earning to calculate the Z-score, we can only
test for differences in the Z-score by collapsing the data before and after the reform.
All variables were winsorized at the 1% level. In some specifications we employ
additional bank level controls such as the profitability of banks measured by the ratio
of net income to total assets (Profitability), the size of the bank measured by the
logarithm of banks total assets (Bank Size) and the bank’s liquidity of the balance
sheet measured by the ratio of securities to total assets (Liquidity).12 All results are
presented with or without controls.
Following Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), we test whether the normalized dif-
ference between our variables is small enough to employ standard regression ap-
proaches. The normalized differences in the second quarter of 2011 are reported in
Table 4.5. We observe that the standardized differences are lower than the rule of
12In this context, liquidity is supposed to capture the ability of the bank to restructure its balance
sheet in the short-term. A large share of securities on the balance sheet (in contrast to loans) makes
the bank more flexible if it observes a higher loan demand as the securities can be sold on the market
and the liquidity can be used for new loan origination. It should not be associated with regulatory
liquidity measures like the liquidity coverage ratio.
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thumb of ±0.25 for most of our variables. However, banks have a substantial differ-
ence in their size, their share of demand deposits and their interest expenses. While
it is obvious that banks that rely on a large share of demand deposits have lower
interest expenses, as interest payment was prohibited on these kinds of deposit, the
fact that banks in our control group are generally larger and have a lower share of
deposit funding might be problematic in general. To avoid contamination of our re-
sults, we construct a new control group by matching banks that are treated to banks
that are in the same state and have only one log difference in size. The normalized
differences for the matched subsample can be found in Table 4.6. For this matched
sample, the normalized differences are below the 0.25 cutoff for all variables apart
from interest expenses and the share of funding achieved through demand deposits.
Therefore, we are comparing banks of comparable size, with similar asset structures
and comparable funding strategies.
In the next step, we exploit information on each branch a bank has using the FDIC
Summary of Deposits. It provides a yearly panel of all branches of all depository
institutions in the United States including the amount of deposits held in that branch,
the establishing date, the acquisition date and most importantly by branch’s location.
Using this data, we can analyze where treated banks build or acquire new branches.
The summary statistics can be found in Table 4.7. The main variable of interest is the
median income in the branch zip-code location in the year 2010.13 Furthermore, we
only consider branches of type 11 (Full Service Bricks and Mortar Office) and type
12 (Full Service Retail Office) because we want to exclude cyber offices and offices
that have limited service, which might be much cheaper to run but do not provide
the same benefits as full-service branches do.14 In the next step, we calculate the
average of all branches zip-codes’ median incomes for every bank in a year. If banks
reduce branch presence, especially in poorer neighborhoods, or create branches in
13Zip-code-level income is only available in Census years. However, as we are interested in whether
banks move to richer neighborhoods, it should not bias our results that income in a zip-code remains
constant over time.
14Cyber offices and offices that have limited service comprise around 2% of the overall branches in
our sample.
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richer neighborhoods, we would expect that average median income of all branches
to increase. We have around 106,228 different branches in the sample from which
around 9.3% were established after the abandonment of Regulation Q.
Finally, we consider the mortgage loans originated by each bank. To do so, we
make use of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) database. The HMDA pro-
vides data on all loan applications, whether they were accepted or denied, applicants’
income, loan size, minority status and location for mortgages. Using this data, we can
analyze whether banks that are more affected by the abandonment of Regulation Q
give more loans in better neighborhoods than before and even to richer households.
The summary statistics can be found in Table 4.7. The main dependent variable is
HUD-income which is the yearly median household income in the county of resi-
dence and the applicants’ income.15 We collapse the data at the bank and year level.
Furthermore, we only consider observations if banks have at least 20 loan applica-
tions. In a further step, we only include loans that were not used for refinancing and
loans that were granted. Excluding loans only made for refinancing, our sample has
around 6.4 million observations, out of which around 19% of the applications were
denied, 17% of the loan applications were made by applicants belonging to a minority
and around 44,5% of the loans were securitized.
4.2.3 Deposit Legislation
The banking regulation in the United States acknowledges three types of deposits (Ta-
ble 4.8), namely demand deposits, savings deposits and time deposits. The practical
difference between the former and the two latter is that demand deposits are callable
on demand while the bank has the right to wait until it pays out the funds invested in
savings and time deposits.16 Therefore, demand deposits were traditionally used for
checking accounts, while time and savings deposits were used to invest and gain in-
terest. In the 1970s and 1980s, two innovations took place that were able to substitute
15Zip-code information is not available for the HMDA data.
16The minimum time a bank had to demand such that the deposit was not considered a demand
deposit was 7 days.
138
CHAPTER 4. REGULATION Q 4.2. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND DATA
demand deposits: (1) money market funds emerged, which offered a higher interest
rate than Regulation Q permitted and (2) NOW (Negotiable Order of Withdrawal)
accounts, which are deposit accounts that pay interest and an unlimited amount of
checks may be written upon and thereby circumvent the ban on interest payment on
demand deposits.17 However, banks had the right to take 7 days until they trans-
fer the payments and these accounts could only be used by consumers and not by
companies. This forced companies to continue using demand deposits for their cash
management.
17See IMF (2010) for the explanation, why money market funds circumvented Regulation Q. See
Gilbert et al. (1986) on the staggered introduction of NOW accounts and how they circumvent Regula-
tion Q.
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Table 4.8: Deposit types
Deposit Type Description Account Type Interest Callable
Demand Deposits A deposit that is payable on demand, or a deposit
issued with an original maturity or required notice
period of less than seven days, or a deposit repre-
senting funds for which the depository institution
does not reserve the right to require at least seven
days’ written notice of an intended withdrawal
Checking accounts; Certified, cashier’s,
teller’s and officer’s checks; Traveler’s
checks and money orders; Checks or
drafts drawn by, or on behalf of, a non-
United States office of a depository in-
stitution on an account maintained at
any of the institution’s United States of-
fices; Letters of credit sold for cash; With-
held taxes, withheld insurance and other
withheld funds; Time deposits that have
matured
Forbidden until the
abandonment of
Regulation Q in the
second Quarter of
2011
less than 7
days
Time Deposits A deposit that the depositor does not have a right
and is not permitted to make withdrawals from
within six days after the date of deposit unless the
deposit is subject to an early withdrawal penalty
of at least seven days’ simple interest on amounts
withdrawn within the first six days after deposit
Certificate of deposit Allowed At least 7
days
Savings Deposits A deposit or account with respect to which the de-
positor is not required by the deposit contract but
may at any time be required by the depository in-
stitution to give written notice of an intended with-
drawal not less than seven days before withdrawal
is made, and that is not payable on a specified date
or at the expiration of a specified time after the date
of deposit. The term savings deposit includes a reg-
ular share account at a credit union and a regular
account at a savings and loan association.
Passbook savings account; statement sav-
ings account; money market deposit ac-
count (MMDA); NOW accounts
Allowed At least 7
days
Notes: This table presents the different kind of deposits that exist under the US regulation. Information on the regulation is taken from Title
12: Banks and Banking, Part 204-Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions (Regulation D) §204.2 Definitions.
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The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 eliminated interest on demand deposits and limited
interest payments on other classes of deposits. The main reasons to do so was to
prevent banks from taking excessive risk. Unfair competition in the deposit market
was perceived as a reason for banks to engage in investing in hazardous securities.
However, other motives played a role as well. The elimination of interest was viewed
as a tool to save banks a portion of the costs they had to bear for the newly introduced
deposit insurance.18
Over the years, interest rate ceilings on time and savings deposits increased and
were finally abandoned completely through the Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980 by 1986. However, the ban on interest payments
on demand deposits was kept in place. It remained forbidden until the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was passed that allowed but not
forced banks to pay interest on demand deposits. A similar regulation was proposed
in 2009 under the Business Checking Fairness Act. However, it was turned down by
Congress. While the Dodd-Frank Act was debated in parliament, the abandonment
was not yet part of the legislation. It was added at the end of the legislative process
without further hearing of Congress. The federal authorities sought comments on the
new rule until April 6, 2011, announced the change on July 14, 2011 and the reform
was enacted on July 21, 2011. Banks were concerned about the effects of the reform.
Several comments, which were made public, state concerns about the stability and
earnings of banks, as well as potentially disastrous consequences for rural areas.19
Companies were the direct beneficiary of the reform as cash management became
much easier for them as they were not allowed to use NOW accounts to circumvent
Regulation Q.
As the legislation for the reform was already decided in 2010 but only imple-
mented in 2011, one might question if this law change constitutes a funding shock.
The abandonment of Regulation Q was decided jointly with other financial reforms in
18For a more detailed discussion on the motivation of the Banking Act of 1933, see Preston (1933).
19The FDIC received 8 comments and many of those requested to keep Regulation Q. The Fed
received 55 comments. Again, the fast majority opposed the repeal.
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the Dodd-Frank Act. However, the regulatory implementation was not that straight-
forward. The Dodd-Frank Act should have implemented the Volcker Rule as well,
which has not become part of the banking regulation until today.20 This example
should illustrate that, even though being politically decided, it might take a long time
for a regulation to be enacted.
4.2.4 Anticipation Effects and Parallel Trends Test
The underlying assumption of the diff-in-diffs method is that in the absence of the
treatment, treated and control groups would behave similarly. Although it is not
possible to observe what would have happened had the treatment not taken place, we
can still investigate if the outcome variables of the treatment and the control groups
behave similarly before the intervention take place (the so called "parallel trends test").
To this end, we plot the evolution of the number of branches across treated and control
banks to check for the existence of parallel trends. Figure 4.2 plots the mean number of
branches per $ billion of deposits for banks in the upper quartile of the distribution of
demand deposits to total assets against the mean number of branches of the remaining
banks and their 90% confidence intervals. The red line indicates the third quarter of
2011. Both lines are parallel before the reform and start diverging slowly after the
reform was passed, becoming significant some years after. No anticipation effect of
the reform is apparent as the divergence starts after the intervention took place and
the trends of both subgroups are parallel before the reform was enacted. Note that
the two lines start to diverge three quarters after the regulatory intervention took
place and further divergence happens with a slow pace thereafter. We attribute this
observation to a potential inertia in closing down some of the physical branches,
which can very well take some time.
As anticipation does not seem to play a role and trends between treatment and
control group are parallel before the reform was enacted, we arguably measure the
20The Volcker Rule bans proprietary trading by commercial banks. Even through implemented on
July 21, 2015, the rule is still not effective today due to extensions granted by the FED.
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Figure 4.2: Number of branches per $ billion of deposits for treated and untreated
banks over time
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Notes: This figure plots the number of branches per $ billion of deposits for banks with a
large (above 14.9% of total assets) share of demand deposits against the number of branches
per $ billion of banks with a low share of demand deposits and the 90% confidence interval.
Data is taken from the FDIC call reports and aggregated by the authors.
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causal effect of the shock to the net interest margin induced by the abandonment of
Regulation Q on the branch structure of the affected banks. Another potential expla-
nation for our results could be that banks change their branch networks because the
demand for demand deposits declined before the reform took place. To counter these
concerns, Figure 4.3 plots the total amount of total deposits and demand deposits in
the United States over the last 30 years. It can be seen that the amount of demand
deposits did not decline. On the contrary it started to increase several quarters before
the repeal of Regulation Q and grew (in relative terms) faster than total deposits after
the regulatory change. However, an increase in the supply of deposits should lead to
an increase in branches and not a decrease and therefore, downward bias our results.
This gives us further confidence that the change in the branch network is driven by
the reform and not by external demand factors.21
The implementation of the different parts of the Dodd-Frank act took different
amounts of time. Therefore, there are no important contaminating regulatory events
in the third quarter of 2011 that affect banks in terms of of demand deposits. Other
possible confounding regulatory events include: On 6th of July 2011, the Federal Re-
serve announced the issuance of new rules on disclosure of credit score requirements.
On 14th of June, the FED adopted a final rule regarding a floor for the risk-based
capital requirements applicable to the largest, internationally active banking organi-
zations. None of these events should affect the deposits funding or specifically banks
with a high share of demand deposits. The only regulatory change associated with
demand deposits in the period of interest was the unlimited deposit insurance cov-
erage for non-interest-bearing transaction accounts. This change was enacted at the
beginning of 2011 and ended at the beginning of 2013. However, the accounts that
were eligible for the unlimited deposit insurance coverage must not bare any interest.
As we are interested in the change in the interest rate of demand deposit accounts
after the abandonment of Regulation Q, this change should not bias our results.
21In a following section, we conduct a placebo test by assigning the treatment before the actual
regulatory change took place and observe no statistically significant differences across treated and
control banks.
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Figure 4.3: Demand deposits in the United States
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Notes: This figure shows the total amount in billions of dollars of demand and total deposits
in the United States from 1959q1 till 2016q3. The red line indicates the abandonment of
Regulation Q. Data is taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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We consider banks that are in the upper quartile of the distribution of demand
deposits to total assets as treated. Obviously, every bank might be affected by the
abandonment of Regulation Q and they might reshuffle their deposit portfolios and
strategies. However, banks that relied to a large extent on demand deposit funding
while Regulation Q was still in place, experienced a much larger exogenous increase
in their funding cost than banks that only used a small share of demand deposits for
funding their activities. Therefore, if a funding shock leads to changes in the branch
structure of banks, we would assume that it is particularly strong for banks that relied
largely on demand deposits.
As a sensitivity check, we also construct a set of matched banks. Even though the
parallel trends assumption is satisfied, the treated banks in our sample might be not
comparable to the remaining banks in the sample, i.e. they are substantially smaller.
To counter such concerns, we construct a set of matched banks in the following way:
For every treated bank in our sample, we look for a bank that is located in the same
state and the difference between their log total assets is below one.
A final concern might arise from the fact that banks might be different not only in
their funding but also in their asset choice. Despite controlling for state-time and
bank-specific unobserved characteristics with our fixed effects setting, our results
could be driven by the market trend in the corresponding markets rather than the
different funding approaches. To counter these concerns, we consider the share of
loans granted in the following areas: Commercial and Industrial (C&I), Agricultural,
Mortgage and Consumer. We observe that the banks do not differ in these categories
to a large extent. Only the share of mortgage loans exceeds the 0.25 cutoff. However,
in our matched subsample the differences disappear. This strengthens our confidence
that our results are driven by the liability side of the banks and not an unobserved
effect affecting their asset holdings.
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4.3 Results
This section describes the results. We start with the results at the bank level, then
we turn to the branch level and finally the results of the mortgage credit level are
presented.
4.3.1 Bank-Level Results
First, we present our baseline results concerning the number of branches. We esti-
mated the model:
Branchesb,t = αb + αc,t + β× Dem2011Q2,b × Dt + γ× Xb,t + eb,t (4.1)
where b is for bank and t is for quarter. Branchesb,t is the number of physical branches
a bank operates in a given year, as suggested by Table 4.1. Dem2011Q2,b is a dummy that
is one (1) if the share of demand deposits in the second quarter of 2011 (one quarter
before the reform was enacted) is above 14.9% and Dt is a dummy that is one (1)
from the third quarter of 2011 onwards. These banks are most affected by the increase
in funding cost after the deregulation and therefore should react more sharply than
banks with fewer demand deposits. αb and αc,t are bank and state-quarter fixed effects
and Xb,t are additional bank level controls. The headquarter state-quarter fixed effects
should control for changes in the demand for banking services the bank faces in their
local markets. We present every regression model with and without the additional
bank controls.
Before turning to the effect on the branch network, we will analyze the magnitude
of the funding shock. Table 4.9 presents the results. We observe that banks which
relied more heavily on demand deposits before the reform took place experienced an
increase in their interest expenses by around 0.1 percentage points, which is around
half the difference between treated and untreated banks before the reform took place.
Furthermore, the net interest margin of the treated banks is depressed by the same
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Table 4.9: Interest expenses and net interest margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interest Expenses Net Interest Margin
Treatment 0.106∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ -0.0897∗∗∗ -0.0912∗∗∗
(19.93) (19.53) (-12.04) (-12.45)
Bank Size 0.00272∗∗∗ 0.000405
(11.28) (1.59)
Profitability -0.00136 0.000841
(-0.67) (0.75)
Liquidity 0.000217 -0.00613∗∗∗
(0.44) (-10.72)
State-Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 112874 112874 112898 112898
Within R-squared 0.00769 0.0296 0.00359 0.0115
Notes: This table reports bank quarter regressions of the interest expenses and the net interest
margin on a dummy that is one (1) if the share of demand deposits to total assets prior to the
abandonment of Regulation Q was in the upper quartile of the distribution interacted with
the time dummy that is one (1) after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the bank
level. t statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% respectively.
magnitude, falling around 0.1 percentage points. The baseline result in Table 4.10
column 1 shows that banks relying more on demand deposits in their funding reduce
the number of branches per $ billion of deposits when they are allowed to pay interest
on these deposits. This result is robust when bank controls (Bank Size, Profitability
and Liquidity) are included, while the coefficient decreases in size. The economic
magnitude of the results is between one (1) and one and a third (1.3) branches per $
billion of deposits. Considering that the total amount of deposits treated banks hold
is around US $570 billion, this corresponds to a decline in the aggregated number of
branches of around 570 branches. Considering that the treated banks have around
7,000 branches in total, this is a reduction of around 8%.
Furthermore, in the specification of column 3 we look at the number of branches
without scaling by the amount of deposits. In the aftermath of the abandonment of
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Table 4.10: Branches
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Branches per $ bil. of Deposits Number of Branches
Treatment -1.344∗∗∗ -1.035∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ -0.304∗∗∗
(-5.68) (-4.43) (-4.10) (-5.39)
Bank Size -0.143∗∗∗ 0.0388∗∗∗
(-7.81) (7.64)
Profitability -0.0312 -0.0300∗∗∗
(-0.24) (-5.72)
Liquidity -0.0317∗ -0.00803∗∗
(-1.80) (-2.41)
State-Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 113009 112874 113033 112898
Within R-squared 0.00147 0.0740 0.000731 0.102
Notes: This table reports bank quarter regressions of the number of branches per $ billion
of deposits and the number of branches per bank on a dummy that is one (1) if the share of
demand deposits to total assets prior to the abandonment of Regulation Q was in the upper
quartile of the distribution interacted with the time dummy that is one (1) after the reform.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. t statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Regulation Q, banks with a large share of demand deposits to total assets operate
with significantly fewer branches. Controlling for additionally bank controls (column
4) increases the size of the coefficient. As we have over 7,000 banks in our sample
and treatment as designed in such a way that a quarter of all banks is treated, the
aggregated decline in the number of branches is 670 branches. This corresponds to
around 0.5% of the total number of branches in the United States and the average
yearly branch growth. Treated banks have around 7,000 branches in total. Therefore,
they reduce the size of their branch network by around 10%.
The shock to the net interest margin that we identify is around 0.1 percentage
points per quarter. The aggregate net interest margin has fallen around 0.3 percentage
points annually since the financial crisis. The coefficient we measure indicates that the
decline in the net interest margin can explain a decline in the aggregate number of
branches of around 1600, which is roughly equal to a quarter of the total decrease in
the aggregated branch network in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
Banks could concentrate their branches and build bigger but fewer branches, while
the financial service provided is unchanged. To rule this out, we consider the number
of employees and the number of employees per $ billion of deposits. The results can
be found in Table 4.11. We observe that the number of employees is falling drastically.
Treated banks reduce their number of full-time equivalent employees (FTE) by around
5-7 FTE in the aftermath of the reform. Treated banks have 134,015 FTE in the first
quarter before the reform takes place. Therefore, they reduce their total employment
by around 12,000 FTE, which corresponds to around 10% of their total employment.
Furthermore, banks reduce their number of employees per $ billion of deposits by
around 14. Taking into account that the banks which relied heavily on the amount of
demand deposits, have a total amount of deposits corresponding to US $570 billion,
this corresponds to a reduction in employment of 8,000 FTE, which corresponds to
6% of their total employment.
In addition, banks might reduce bank premises and capital to reduce costs. We
observe in Table 4.12 that bank premises fall by around 0.05 percentage points, which
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Table 4.11: Employees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Employees Employees per $ bil. of Deposits
Treatment -5.270∗∗∗ -6.816∗∗∗ -14.42∗∗∗ -13.31∗∗∗
(-4.74) (-5.75) (-12.98) (-12.26)
Bank Size 0.694∗∗∗ -0.521∗∗∗
(7.56) (-8.58)
Profitability -0.510∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗
(-4.32) (5.10)
Liquidity -0.129 -0.431∗∗∗
(-1.42) (-4.32)
State-Quarter Fixed Ef-
fects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 112898 112898 112898 112898
Within R-squared 0.00107 0.0825 0.00833 0.0601
Notes: This table reports bank quarter regressions of the number of employees per bank and
the number of employees per $ billion of deposits on a dummy that is one (1) if the share of
demand deposits to total assets prior to the abandonment of Regulation Q was in the upper
quartile of the distribution interacted with the time dummy that is one (1) after the reform.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. t statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗
and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 4.12: Bank premises and equity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bank Premises Capital Asset Ratio
Treatment -0.0582∗∗∗ -0.0535∗∗∗ -0.349∗∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗
(-4.56) (-4.22) (-6.95) (-5.92)
Bank Size -0.00248∗∗∗ -0.0314∗∗∗
(-6.11) (-10.39)
Profitability 0.0000244 -0.00204
(0.01) (-0.19)
Liquidity -0.00526∗∗∗ 0.00569
(-8.15) (1.56)
State-Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 112898 112898 112898 112898
Within R-squared 0.00152 0.0198 0.00226 0.0854
Notes: This table reports bank quarter regressions of the ratio of bank premises to total assets
and the capital to assets ratio on a dummy that is one (1) if the share of demand deposits
to total assets prior to the abandonment of Regulation Q was in the upper quartile of the
distribution interacted with the time dummy that is one (1) after the reform. Standard errors
are clustered at the bank level. t statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 4.13: Asset risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nonperforming Assets Risk-weighted Assets
Treatment -0.0601∗ -0.0669∗∗ -1.028∗∗∗ -1.079∗∗∗
(-1.81) (-2.03) (-6.20) (-6.94)
Bank Size 0.00186∗∗ 0.0117∗∗
(2.44) (2.44)
Profitability -0.0125 0.0343∗∗∗
(-1.16) (3.19)
Liquidity -0.0165∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗
(-10.53) (-17.19)
State-Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 112898 112898 112898 112898
Within R-squared 0.000168 0.00767 0.00231 0.0568
Notes: This table reports bank quarter regressions of non-performing assets to total assets
ratio and share of risk-weighted assets to total assets on a dummy that is one (1) if the share
of demand deposits to total assets prior to the abandonment of Regulation Q was in the upper
quartile of the distribution interacted with the time dummy that is one (1) after the reform.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. t statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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corresponds to roughly 25% of total bank premises. Furthermore, banks reduce their
capital ratio. Banks that were in the upper quartile of the distribution of demand
deposits to total assets reduce their capital ratio by around 0.3 percentage points
relative to their counterparts. As we use a difference-in-differences methodology, this
results cannot be driven by factors like changes in the capital regulations as these
effect all banks equally.
So far, our results suggest that the reform, which leads to a funding shock exoge-
nously depressing the net interest margin, leads to a weakening of the capital balance
and a reduction in the geographical diversification of banks. In the next step, we want
to analyze whether this reduction in the branch network reduced banks soundness.
Geographical expansion is associated with better diversification opportunities and
therefore a bank’s health should decrease after the branch network is cut (Diamond
(1984)). To analyze if banks’ assets became riskier after the reform, we perform the
same analysis as before using banks’ assets’ soundness measures as dependent vari-
ables. Table 4.13 presents the results. Banks reduce the amount of non-performing
assets in their balance sheet by around 0.06 percentage points (columns 1 and 2).
As a robustness check, we follow Delis and Kouretas (2011) and consider the ra-
tio of risk-weighted assets to total assets. This measure is more universal than the
non-performing loans and measures risks in all asset classes not only the loan port-
folio. However, it is also easier for banks to manipulate this measure to save capital.
Nevertheless, we observe that after the reform banks reduce the risk weight of their
assets by around 1 percentage point (columns 3 and 4). This further indicates that
treated banks’ assets became safer in the aftermath of the reform. Note that an overall
assessment of whether treated banks took less risk is inconclusive as Table 4.12 points
to higher leverage ratios after the reform.
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4.3.2 Robustness Tests
This section presents several tests to check the robustness of the results presented
earlier. We start with presenting the results with standard errors clustered at the state
level. Then, we turn to an analysis where we only consider banks whose branches are
confined to the states in which bank headquarters lie. Finally, we present the results
with a sample excluding mergers and acquisitions.
The results we have presented so far are based on standard error clustering at
the bank level. However, this may not be sufficient if bank behavior is correlated
across banks, e.g. within states. To weed out this concern, we repeat our baseline
analysis with two-way standard error clustering at the bank and headquarter state
level. Table 4.14 presents the results of this exercise. The findings suggest that our
previous results’ statistical significance hold even after a standard error clustering at
the bank and the state headquarter level.
In the next step, we turn our attention to a sample where we only consider banks
whose branches are confined to a single state. Baseline results presented in the previ-
ous section are conditional on headquarter state and quarter dummy variables. One
reason for including such dummy variables in our analysis is to control for any de-
mand factor varying in the community and time dimensions. However, for banks
whose branches are located in more than one state, it is unclear to what extent these
dummy variables capture the demand side of the story. In order to test how our pre-
vious findings change when we control for all community- and time-varying demand
factors, we consider a subsample where we only focus on banks whose branches are
confined to a single state. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 4.15. They
indicate that our baseline findings hold for a subsample with which we can control
for all time-varying state level demand shocks.
Finally, we consider a sample where we exclude banks that engage in mergers
during our sample period. Previously, we discussed that we followed Kashyap et
al. (2002) in an attempt to minimize the number of observations excluded from our
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sample to avoid a potential sample selection bias. Therefore, we did not account for
bank mergers in our sample. However, mergers may be a major way to reduce the
branch network but without necessarily reducing market power. That is, banks that
engage in mergers might not necessarily be affected by the increase in funding costs
after the repeal of Regulation Q due to high market power. At a first glance, one can
interpret that the existence of bank mergers leads to underestimation of the effects we
observed so far. However, the issue could be more severe. The competition effects due
to mergers could mean that banks that did not engage in mergers incurred relatively
higher funding costs and, as a result, branch closures due to merger banks operating
in the same market having higher market power. Under such a scenario, bank mergers
could confound our treatment variable. To weed out these concerns, we repeat our
baseline analysis with a sample that excludes all merger activities for the period 2009-
2013. Table 4.16 presents the results of this exercise. It shows that our baseline results
remain valid for a subsample that exclude merger activities. Therefore, we can claim
that bank mergers do not contaminate our results.
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Table 4.14: Two-way clustering at the bank and state level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Net Interest Margin Branches per $ bil. of Deposits Risk-weighted Assets Nonperforming Assets
Treatment -0.0897∗∗∗ -0.0912∗∗∗ -1.344∗∗∗ -1.035∗∗∗ -1.028∗∗∗ -1.079∗∗∗ -0.0601∗ -0.0669∗
(-11.34) (-10.47) (-4.83) (-2.86) (-5.93) (-6.68) (-1.70) (-1.71)
Bank Size 0.000405∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ 0.0117 0.00186
(6.36) (-7.50) (0.82) (0.45)
Profitability 0.000841∗∗∗ -0.0312 0.0343∗ -0.0125
(3.78) (-0.86) (1.91) (-0.67)
Liquidity -0.00613∗∗∗ -0.0317 -0.232∗∗∗ -0.0165∗∗∗
(-9.06) (-0.82) (-16.15) (-6.46)
State-Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 112898 112898 113009 112874 112898 112898 112898 112898
Within R-squared 0.00359 0.0115 0.00147 0.0740 0.00231 0.00767 0.000168 0.00767
Notes: This table reports bank quarter regressions of the net interest margin, the number of branches per $ billion of deposits, risk-weighted
assets and nonperforming loans on a dummy that is one (1) if the share of demand deposits to total assets prior to the abandonment of
Regulation Q was in the upper quartile of the distribution interacted with the time dummy that is one (1) after the reform. Standard errors
are clustered at the bank and state level. t statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively.
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Table 4.15: Banks that are active in a single state
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Net Interest Margin Branches per $ bil. of Deposits Risk-weighted Assets Nonperforming Assets
Treatment -0.0850∗∗∗ -0.0775∗∗∗ -1.401∗∗∗ -1.098∗∗∗ -0.782∗∗∗ -0.812∗∗∗ -0.0942∗∗ -0.0986∗∗∗
(-10.37) (-10.14) (-7.45) (-6.26) (-4.16) (-4.65) (-2.39) (-2.59)
Bank Size -0.00323∗∗∗ -15.01∗∗∗ -0.0220∗∗∗ -0.318∗∗
(-9.70) (-13.09) (-2.95) (-2.28)
Profitability 0.0852∗∗∗ -11.33 0.235∗∗∗ -25.39∗∗∗
(14.84) (-1.21) (4.87) (-15.54)
Liquidity -0.00667∗∗∗ -2.929∗∗∗ -0.321∗∗∗ -1.448∗∗∗
(-11.69) (-2.63) (-28.04) (-6.78)
State-Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 67975 67975 67975 67975 67975 67975 67975 67975
Within R-squared 0.0047 0.0709 0.0054 0.1428 0.0017 0.1016 0.0005 0.0394
Notes: This table reports bank quarter regressions of the net interest margin, the number of branches per $ billion of deposits, risk-weighted
assets and nonperforming loans on a dummy that is one (1) if the share of demand deposits to total assets prior to the abandonment of
Regulation Q was in the upper quartile of the distribution interacted with the time dummy that is one (1) after the reform. The sample is
confined to banks that are only active in one state. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. t statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 4.16: Without mergers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Net Interest Margin Branches per $ bil. of Deposits Risk-weighted Assets Nonperforming Assets
Treatment -0.0889∗∗∗ -0.0772∗∗∗ -1.373∗∗∗ -1.010∗∗∗ -0.860∗∗∗ -0.831∗∗∗ -0.0763∗ -0.0727∗
(-10.71) (-9.97) (-6.87) (-5.42) (-4.51) (-4.65) (-1.88) (-1.86)
Bank Size -0.00429∗∗∗ -16.98∗∗∗ -0.0284∗∗∗ -0.765∗∗∗
(-11.22) (-9.82) (-3.70) (-6.31)
Profitability 0.0590∗∗∗ -13.06 0.0981 -21.39∗∗∗
(6.00) (-1.34) (1.13) (-8.47)
Liquidity -0.00605∗∗∗ -2.457∗ -0.301∗∗∗ -1.599∗∗∗
(-9.15) (-1.88) (-19.28) (-7.28)
State-Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 67174 67174 67166 67166 67174 67174 67174 67174
Within R-squared 0.0051 0.0657 0.0045 0.1410 0.0020 0.0957 0.0003 0.0419
Notes: This table reports bank quarter regressions of the net interest margin, the number of branches per $ billion of deposits, risk-weighted
assets and nonperforming loans on a dummy that is one (1) if the share of demand deposits to total assets prior to the abandonment of
Regulation Q was in the upper quartile of the distribution interacted with the time dummy that is one (1) after the reform. The sample
excludes banks that engage in mergers for the period 2009-2013. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. t statistics are reported in
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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4.3.3 Matched Subsample
Regression analysis only delivers unbiased results if there is no fundamental differ-
ence in the treatment and control group prior to treatment after controlling for suffi-
cient covariates. Above, we test the parallel trend assumption and reveal that it holds
true. To further strengthen the claim, we look at a sample of similar banks. Imbens
and Wooldridge (2009) suggested considering the normalized differences of the vari-
ables used in the analysis. Obviously, our treated banks have lower interest expenses
and a higher share of demand deposits to total assets. Furthermore, the normalized
difference in size is also bigger than the rule of thumb of ±0.25. To counter possible
selection concerns, we match every treated bank with a bank in the same state, the
same specialization and similar size (max difference 1 of log assets).22 The analysis is
then repeated using the matched subsample.
Tables 4.17 and 4.18 present the result of this exercise. After the matching proce-
dure, we are left with around 36,000 observations compared with the 112,000 before.
From the 1887 treated banks, we can find a possible match in around two-thirds of
cases. We end up with a little more than 1200 banks for both our treatment and con-
trol group. Column 1 of Table 12 shows the results for the net interest margin. The
coefficient of interest (treatment) is highly significant and the coefficient stays signif-
icant (column 2) once we control for additional bank controls. In the next step, we
check whether the number of branches per $ billion of deposits decreases (columns 3
and 4). We observe that the results are similar to the coefficients in the baseline model.
The magnitude of the effect remains at around one branch per $ billion of deposits.
Furthermore, asset risk (Table 4.18 columns 1 and 2) and non-performing loans
(Table 4.18 columns 3 and 4) show the same behavior as in the complete sample. The
two measures of bank risk decrease by around 1 percentage point and 0.1 percentage
points respectively in the aftermath of the reform. This indicates that banks’ assets
become less risky even when decreasing their geographical diversification.
22If more than one match is possible, we take the best match regarding bank size.
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Table 4.17: Matched branches and net interest margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Interest Margin Branches per $ bil. of Deposits
Treatment -0.0813∗∗∗ -0.0806∗∗∗ -1.028∗∗∗ -0.701∗∗
(-7.56) (-7.93) (-3.42) (-2.41)
Bank Size 0.00105∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗
(2.75) (-8.03)
Profitability 0.0426∗∗∗ 0.0495
(8.83) (0.19)
Liquidity -0.00709∗∗∗ -0.0633∗∗∗
(-7.61) (-3.12)
State-Quarter Fixed Ef-
fects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35985 35985 36103 35983
Within R-squared 0.00443 0.0288 0.00177 0.0616
Notes: This table reports bank quarter regressions of the net interest margin and the number
of branches per $ billion of deposits on a dummy that is one (1) if the share of demand
deposits to total assets prior to the abandonment of Regulation Q was in the upper quartile
of the distribution interacted with the time dummy that is one (1) after the reform. Standard
errors are clustered at the bank level. t statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 4.18: Matched asset risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Risk-weighted Assets Nonperforming Assets
Treatment -1.039∗∗∗ -0.996∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗
(-4.32) (-4.56) (-3.17) (-3.25)
Bank Size 0.0218∗∗∗ 0.000173
(2.83) (0.14)
Profitability 0.254∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗
(3.38) (-6.50)
Liquidity -0.257∗∗∗ -0.0124∗∗∗
(-12.52) (-5.11)
State-Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35985 35985 35985 35985
Within R-squared 0.00318 0.0710 0.00161 0.0278
Notes: This table reports bank quarter regressions of the asset risk measured by the ratio of
risk weighted assets to total assets and amount of nonperforming loans to total assets on a
dummy that is one (1) if the share of demand deposits to total assets prior to the abandonment
of Regulation Q was in the upper quartile of the distribution interacted with the time dummy
that is one (1) after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. t statistics are
reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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4.3.4 Further Analysis
Our parallel trends test indicates that we measure the causal effect of the abandon-
ment of Regulation Q on the size of banks’ branch network. To strengthen this claim
further, we perform a placebo test with respect to the reform. Our approach is the fol-
lowing: We move all events back two years, i.e. the new event date is the third quarter
of 2009 and the period analyzed is between the second quarter of 2007 and the second
quarter of 2011. Table 4.19 presents the results. We observe that the placebo coefficient
is insignificant for the specifications with and without controls. In addition, we re-
peat this exercise for the matched subsample. The previous results are confirmed. For
both specifications, with and without additional bank controls, the coefficient remains
insignificant.
Bertrand et al. (2004) suggested collapsing the data into a pre- and post-reform
period to deal with serial correlation. Obviously, serial correlation might be an issue
in our setting as the bank branch network rarely changes over time. Following their
suggestion, we collapse the data into a pre- and a post-reform period and run the
same set of regressions as in Table 4.10. The results can be found in Table 4.20 and
confirm our previous findings. In fact, the estimated coefficients are substantially
bigger (two branches per bank or 2 branches per $ billion of deposits). Our analysis
including bank and time fixed effects leads to R-squared values above 93%. To exclude
potential over-fitting, we run our main regression without fixed effects. The results
can be found in Table 4.21 and barely change. The coefficients get larger (columns 1
& 2). In addition, the results remain robust if the matched subsample is considered
(columns 3 & 4).
Our reform might have diverse effects on different kinds of banks. In particu-
lar, larger banks might be less affected by the decrease in the net interest margin as
they can, on the one hand, compensate with non-interest income and, on the other
hand, make a larger use of loans compared to securities and therefore profit more
from their branch network. We test this prediction in Table 4.22. Our results suggest
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Table 4.19: Placebo test
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Branches per $ bil.
of Deposits
Branches per $ bil.
of Deposits - Matched
placebo -0.130 -0.397 0.841 0.640
(-0.37) (-1.21) (1.62) (1.29)
Bank Size -0.0649∗∗∗ -0.0475∗
(-4.83) (-1.82)
Profitability -0.617∗∗∗ -1.147∗∗∗
(-3.04) (-2.78)
Liquidity -0.0667∗∗ -0.103
(-2.07) (-1.64)
State-Quarter Fixed Ef-
fects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 112386 112251 35908 35788
Within R-squared 0.00000597 0.0191 0.000369 0.0204
Notes: This table reports bank quarter regressions of the number of branches per $ billion
of deposits on a dummy that is one (1) if the share of demand deposits to total assets prior
to the abandonment of Regulation Q was in the upper quartile of the distribution interacted
with the time dummy that is one (1) 8 quarters before the reform took place. Standard errors
are clustered at the bank level. t statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 4.20: Collapsed data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Branches Branches per $ bil. of Deposits
Treatment -2.074∗∗∗ -1.277∗∗∗ -2.053∗∗∗ -4.002∗∗∗
(-10.71) (-7.49) (-2.88) (-5.91)
Bank Size 0.0608∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗
(17.50) (-15.80)
Profitability -0.161∗∗ -0.723∗
(-2.29) (-1.81)
Liquidity -0.0136∗ 0.0358
(-1.89) (1.12)
State-Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13734 13716 13730 13712
Within R-squared 0.0125 0.219 0.00118 0.130
Notes: This table reports bank regressions of the number of branches and number of branches
per $ billion of deposits on a dummy that is one (1) if the share of demand deposits to total
assets prior to the abandonment of Regulation Q was in the upper quartile of the distribution
interacted with the time dummy that is one (1) after the reform took place. Data is collapsed
before and after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. t statistics are
reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 4.21: No fixed-effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Branches per $ bil. of Deposits
Treatment -1.825∗∗∗ -1.327∗∗∗ -1.373∗∗∗ -0.872∗∗
(-7.09) (-5.46) (-3.84) (-2.57)
Regulation Q -1.882∗∗∗ -1.531∗∗∗ -2.070∗∗∗ -1.742∗∗∗
(-11.99) (-6.69) (-8.14) (-4.34)
Treated 8.052∗∗∗ 1.372∗ 3.297∗∗∗ 2.951∗∗∗
(11.01) (1.88) (3.08) (3.11)
Bank Size -0.0892∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗
(-25.32) (-17.09)
Profitability 0.769 2.462∗∗
(1.60) (2.27)
Liquidity 0.00755 -0.0966∗∗
(0.27) (-2.58)
Constant 30.87∗∗∗ 139.8∗∗∗ 34.17∗∗∗ 172.1∗∗∗
(86.75) (32.16) (44.26) (20.78)
Observations 113122 112987 36118 35998
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.194 0.005 0.224
Notes: This table reports bank quarter regressions of the number of branches per $ billion
of deposits on a dummy that is one (1) if the share of demand deposits to total assets prior
to the abandonment of Regulation Q was in the upper quartile of the distribution interacted
with the time dummy that is one (1) after the reform. Regulation Q is a dummy that is one
(1) after the second quarter of 2011. Treated is a dummy that is one (1) if the bank was in
the upper quartile of the demand deposit to total asset ratio in the second quarter of 2011.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. t statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 4.22: Heterogeneity of the results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Branches per $ bil. of Deposits
Treatment -1.486∗∗∗ -1.284∗∗∗ -1.701∗∗∗ -1.592∗∗∗
(-6.03) (-5.41) (-4.25) (-4.11)
Treatment × size_05 1.564∗∗∗ 2.884∗∗∗
(4.26) (6.48)
Treatment × agricultural -0.982∗∗ -0.662
(-2.04) (-1.43)
Treatment × commercial 1.334∗∗∗ 1.599∗∗∗
(3.21) (4.01)
State-Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 113009 112874 113009 112874
Within R-squared 0.00170 0.0747 0.00258 0.0751
Notes: This table reports bank quarter regressions of the number of branches per $billion of
deposits on a dummy that is own (1) if the share of demand deposits to total assets prior
to the abandonment of Regulation Q was in the upper quartile of the distribution interacted
with the time dummy that is one (1) after the reform took place. Size_05 is a dummy that
is one (1) if a bank is in the upper quartile of the size distribution in the second quarter of
2011, agricultural is a dummy that is one (1) if the bank has an agricultural specialization,
commercial is a dummy that is one (1) if the bank has a specialization in commercial loans.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. t statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
that banks that are in the upper quartile of the size distribution prior to the reform,
are unaffected by the increase in interest expenses, while the banks that are smaller
are largely affected. This indicates that larger banks were less affected by the re-
form. Banks with different specializations might react differently to the decrease in
their net interest margin. The FDIC groups banks hierarchically into 9 different cate-
gories depending on their asset portfolio. Most of the banks fall into three main cat-
egories: Agricultural Specialization (25%), Commercial Lending Specialization (45%)
and Other (22%). Banks specialized in mortgage lending account for only 3% of our
treated banks. Banks that are specialized in commercial lending might benefit to a
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Table 4.23: Branches - continuous
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Branches Branches per $ bil. of Deposits
Treatment continuous -0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0185∗∗∗ -0.0655∗∗∗ -0.0454∗∗∗
(-3.93) (-5.28) (-3.97) (-2.75)
Bank Size 0.0389∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗
(7.65) (-7.79)
Profitability -0.0300∗∗∗ -0.0313
(-5.69) (-0.24)
Liquidity -0.00832∗∗ -0.0323∗
(-2.49) (-1.82)
State-Quarter Fixed Ef-
fects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 112898 112898 112874 112874
Within R-squared 0.000979 0.102 0.00143 0.0738
Notes: This table reports bank quarter regressions of the number of branches per bank and
the number of branches per $ billion of deposits on the ratio of demand deposits to total assets
interacted with the time dummy that is one (1) after the reform. Standard errors are clustered
at the bank level. t statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
larger extent from a large branch network as distance to their clients shortens, which
facilitates monitoring and information flow. These issues might be less pronounced
for banks specialized in agricultural loans, where risks are, to a large extent, global
price changes and the weather and banks with other specializations which invest a
large share of their assets in the financial market. Our results confirm this view. Banks
which are specialized in commercial lending do not shrink their branch network. The
effect on other banks is both statistically and economically significant. Furthermore,
the results indicate that banks specialized in agricultural lending might be affected
more strongly by the decrease in the net interest margin. In our previous analysis,
we split the sample based on the fixed cut-off of 14.9% demand deposits to total as-
sets. Now we will relax this assumption and interact the reform dummy with the
demand deposit to total asset ratio to prove that our results are not driven by our
specific construction of the treatment and control groups. Table 4.23 presents the re-
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Table 4.24: Bank soundness - Z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Z-score
Treatment 0.0380∗∗ 0.0502∗∗∗ 0.0479∗ 0.0659∗∗
(2.05) (2.70) (1.73) (2.43)
Bank Size 0.000731∗∗∗ -0.000103
(4.13) (-0.29)
Profitability 0.0166∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(2.46) (6.30)
Liquidity 0.00369∗∗∗ 0.00418∗∗∗
(5.30) (3.42)
State-Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13600 13600 4434 4434
Within R-squared 0.000587 0.0167 0.00138 0.0562
Notes: This table reports bank regressions of the Z-score on a dummy that is one (1) if the
share of demand deposits to total assets prior to the abandonment of Regulation Q was in
the upper quartile of the distribution interacted with the time dummy that is one (1) after the
reform took place. Data is collapsed before and after the reform. Standard errors are clustered
at the bank level. t statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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sults. Our previous results are confirmed. Banks that rely more heavily on demand
deposits in their funding reduce the number of branches (columns 1 and 2) and the
number of branches per $ billion of deposits significantly.
So far, we can prove that banks reduced their asset risk in the aftermath of the
reform. However, as banks reduce their capital, at the same time, the overall effect
on bank risk remains uncertain. To be able to at least analyze how bank soundness
in terms of the probability of default changed with the treatment intervention, we
employ the Z-score. It is defined as the sum of the mean capital ratio plus the mean
return on assets (ROA) divided by the standard deviation of the ROA. To calculate
the standard deviation of the ROA, we collapse the data into a pre and post period
in which we calculate the mean of the capital ratio, the mean ROA and the standard
deviation of the ROA. As the Z-score is heavily skewed, we take the logarithm of
the Z-score as the dependent variable. The results are shown in Table 4.24. We
observe that the log Z-score, which is inversely related to the probability of default,
increases in the aftermath of the reform by between 3.8% and 5.0% (columns 1 and
2). Furthermore, the results remain robust if the matched subsample is considered
and the magnitude increases to between 4.8% and 6.6% (columns 3 and 4). These
results indicate that although an overall risk assessment is inconclusive, the treatment
intervention improves bank soundness in terms of the probability of default.
4.3.5 Branch-Level Results
In the next step, we analyze whether the reduction in asset risk is associated with
expanding into richer or retreating from poorer neighborhoods. Neighborhoods pop-
ulated by households with a higher income might be safer markets as poorer cus-
tomers are riskier as they tend to have more volatile earnings (Gottschalk and Moffitt
(1994)). As the summary of deposits data supplies us with information for every
branch a bank has, and even more importantly its location, we are able to aggregate
the zip-code-level income of all branches up to a bank level measure. To achieve that,
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Table 4.25: Branch-level income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Median Income
Treatment 0.00325∗∗ 0.00302∗∗ 0.00679∗∗∗ 0.00645∗∗∗
(2.11) (1.96) (2.82) (2.66)
Bank Size 0.000000536 0.00000101
(1.02) (0.93)
Liquidity -0.000000593 -0.00000215
(-0.61) (-1.18)
Profitability 0.00000616∗∗∗ 0.0000157
(18.40) (0.95)
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35595 35551 11660 11621
Within R-squared 0.000351 0.00576 0.00192 0.00451
Notes: This table reports regressions on the bank’s average zip-code-level median income over
all branches on a dummy that is one (1) if the share of demand deposits to total assets prior to
the abandonment of Regulation Q was in the upper quartile of the distribution interacted with
the time dummy that is one (1) if the quarter is after the second quarter of 2011. Standard
errors are clustered at the bank level. t statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
we match the branch data to the corresponding zip-code-level median family income
obtained from the US 2010 census. As zip-code-level income is only available as per
census frequency (every five years), the income of a given zip-code remains constant
in our sample period. Therefore, our measure only changes if the bank opens a new
branch or closes an existing branch. The findings of this exercise can be found in Table
4.25. In the first instance, we run our standard model from the previous section with
the dependent variable, average log median income. Column 1 presents the result.
It states that banks change their branch networks towards more branches located in
richer areas after the reform. The results hold true if bank controls are included. The
magnitude of the effect is a 0.3 percentage points increase in median family income.
To rule out selection bias in our result, we employ the same analysis with our matched
data set. The results can be found in columns 3 and 4. Our previous results still hold
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but the magnitude of the coefficients increases to around 0.6% in both cases. These
results indicate that banks close branches in neighborhoods with a lower income or
open branches in areas with a higher income, potentially harming access to finance
for poorer households.
4.3.6 Loan-Level Results
Our results at the branch level suggest that affected banks’ geographical diversifi-
cation tend to favor higher income neighborhoods. In the next step, we would like
to investigate whether this had an implication for credit provision for relatively less
prosperous neighborhoods. To test this, we analyze data from the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA). The HMDA provides data on all mortgage loan applications
from households in a given area, the area’s median income, the applicant’s income
and a link to the FDIC identifier of the bank that reported the application. We collapse
this data at the bank-year level to obtain the mean HUD (Department of Housing and
Urban Development) income and mean income of the applicants. Furthermore, we
observe which loans were accepted and which were used for refinancing. The results
are presented in Table 4.26.
Column 1 reports the change in median income after the reform for all applica-
tions. In line with our previous results, we observe that banks that had a high share
of demand deposits before the reform took place receive applications from borrowers
that live in 0.6% richer areas. Furthermore, we observe that there is no significant
improvement in applicants’ income (column 2). In addition, we exclude loans that
were made for refinancing purposes. These loans might just be rolled over by the
same bank and therefore downward bias our results. However, we observe that the
results remain unchanged. Median family income of the area where the loan was
provided increases for treated banks, while the individual applicant’s income remains
unchanged. Finally, we consider only loans that were granted. The observed coeffi-
cients stay robust even though we consider only loans that are granted.
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These results indicate that banks tried to mitigate poorer neighborhoods after the
reform as their newly issued loans are granted more to customers in richer neighbor-
hoods than before. However, they do not achieve a significantly better client portfolio
(at least in the sense of household income) as the applicants remain unchanged. This
behavior might be favorable for banks as houses in richer neighborhoods represent
better collateral.
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Table 4.26: HUD-median income and loan applicant’s income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
area_income_all income_all area_income_noref income_noref area_income_acc income_acc
Treatment 0.00678∗∗∗ 0.00856 0.00705∗∗∗ 0.00998 0.00641∗∗ 0.00635
(2.91) (1.01) (2.81) (0.96) (2.58) (0.55)
Bank Size 0.00000141∗∗∗ 0.000000719 0.00000142∗∗∗ 0.000000647 0.00000142∗∗∗ 0.000000945
(2.75) (0.40) (2.66) (0.36) (2.68) (0.54)
Liquidity -0.00000111 -0.00000187 -0.00000105 -0.000000987 -0.00000103 0.00000285
(-0.92) (-0.36) (-0.83) (-0.16) (-0.80) (0.43)
Profitability -0.0000224∗∗ 0.0000609∗ -0.0000168 0.0000833∗ -0.0000136 0.0000935∗∗
(-2.03) (1.68) (-1.36) (1.92) (-1.10) (2.01)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9127 9134 9125 9133 9119 9128
Within R-squared 0.00877 0.00107 0.00709 0.000992 0.00611 0.000953
Notes: This table reports regressions on the income of the ares where loan applicants live on a dummy that is one (1) if the share of demand
deposits to total assets prior to the abandonment of Regulation Q was in the upper quartile of the distribution interacted with the time dummy
that is one (1) after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the bank and county level for the first two columns. t statistics are reported
in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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4.4 Conclusion
The branch network is at the core of the transmission of funds and the absorption
of shocks in the financial system. In this study, we analyze the effects of an exoge-
nous decrease in the net interest margin, caused by the increases in funding cost
following the abandonment of Regulation Q, on the banking sector, the bank branch
structure and the mortgage market. Using data on all depository banking institutions
in the United States, we show that banks that relied more on financing through de-
mand deposits before the abandonment of Regulation Q, reduced the size of their
branch networks in response to the funding shock caused by the reform. Overall, the
abandonment of Regulation Q led to around 700 additional branch closures, which
corresponds to the average yearly branch growth in the United States and 10% of
the affected banks’ branch networks. Considering our results, the decline in the net
interest margin in the United States since the end of the financial crisis can account
for the entire decline in the number of branches in the United States. Furthermore,
treated banks have been able to reduce non-performing loans, risk-weighted assets
and capital ratios. It appears that banks’ assets have become safer. However an over-
all risk assessment is inconclusive as the regulatory change induces higher leverage
ratios for treated banks. In terms of bank soundness, Z-score indicates that treated
banks’ probability of default decreases following the abandonment of Regulation Q.
We also show that banks achieved safer assets by a reduction of financial services
offered in less prosperous areas. Banks created branches in areas populated by 0.6
percentage points richer households in the aftermath of the reform. Furthermore, the
area income of their loan applicants as well as granted loans increased by around 0.6
percentage points. Hence, the positive effect on banks’ asset quality was achieved
by reducing the availability of financial services and in particular mortgage credit to
poorer households. On the other hand, companies have benefitted from the reform
as they are granted the opportunity to store their cash and earn interest on it. As
the repeal of Regulation Q cleared a market friction, the reduction in bank branches
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might mean the return to a more efficient equilibrium.
These results contribute to the emerging literature about the importance of the
bank branch network. We are able to demonstrate that the bank branch network is
sensitive to regulation and funding conditions and that this has real consequences for
the financial inclusion of households. Further research is needed to clarify the effect
of the bank branch network on income, employment and credit access for households.
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